

BEHIND

SOVIET POWER

\$1

A sepia-toned portrait of Joseph Stalin, shown from the chest up, wearing a Soviet military cap with a star emblem. He has a prominent mustache and is looking slightly to the left. The background is a textured, aged paper.

STALIN and the RUSSIANS

by JEROME DAVIS

with an introduction by

Former Ambassador JOSEPH E. DAVIES

JEROME DAVIS TAKES YOU BEHIND
THE IRON CURTAIN

And Gives You The Answers To These And Many Other Of The Most
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
SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER: The people will read with interest and I know profit, of the experiences of one who had many years contact with the Russians.

FORMER AMBASSADOR DAVIES: The author knows Russia as few Americans have had the opportunity to do.

RAYMOND SWING, noted radio commentator: Jerome Davis has written an earnest book, full of information every student of American policy needs to take into account.

RAYMOND ROBBINS, colonel commanding American Red Cross Mission to Russia and unofficial agent of the U. S. Government during the first seven months of the Soviet regime: Dr. Jerome Davis knew Russia under the Tsars, under Kerensky, and under Lenin and Stalin. He speaks the language of the Russian people. All that he writes on the Soviet Union is supported by first hand and competent investigation. He has always been concerned about the FACTS and let theories take care of themselves.

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JEROME DAVIS

Soviet Russia and the dynamic force behind it is the great enigma of our time. We are therefore particularly fortunate in having this authoritative work by Jerome Davis to help us formulate a sound, sober basis for our thinking and our subsequent policy toward the USSR.

This is not just another book about a Russian junket. Mr. Davis, trained sociologist, gives a complete, honest picture of Russia and the Russians. He first visited Russia during the regime of the last Tsar and saw the Revolution that wiped it out. He revisited Russia in 1921, 1926, 1927, 1932, 1935, 1937, 1938, 1939 and during World War II.

Travelling thousands of miles within its borders on each visit, he has witnessed virtually every major development in the USSR. Speaking Russian, he has talked with hundreds of Russians, had personal interviews with Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin and nearly every important Russian leader in the past 30 years. The result is a book which is a unique, fascinating document of the life of Stalin interwoven with the growth of modern Russia.

Dr. Davis tells—

Why And How Stalin Won The Fight Against Trotsky

The Real Story Behind The Treason Trials

How An Average Russian Family Lives

*What The Soviet Attitude Toward The USA And The Rest Of
The World Is Likely To Be*

* * * *

The picture of Stalin on the cover was painted by an ordinary peasant, member of a cooperative society in a Russian village, and was presented to the author during one of his many visits to the USSR.

Behind Soviet Power

STALIN AND THE RUSSIANS

by

JEROME DAVIS



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THIS BOOK IS COMPLETE

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DEDICATION

*To the millions who died that freedom might
live, and to all whose lives, judged by what
they do and say, promote friendship and
understanding in the one world of tomorrow*

Publisher's Note



The publisher hereby affirms that he is not affiliated with any political organization or party and is therefore not pursuing any political aim in the publication of this work. We, in common with many Americans, are concerned about the present trend of relations between Russia and other nations. If this book helps in clarifying a highly complex and controversial question or contributes in any way toward a lasting world peace, its purpose will have been achieved.

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Introduction

by

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

Former United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

EVERYONE now recognizes there can be no prospect of maintaining peace for even a limited time without the unity of the U.S.S.R., the British Empire, and the United States. It was only their united strength that restored peace. Their continued unity has been seriously threatened in the last few months.

The will of the peoples of these Great Powers must insist upon mutual tolerance, patience and reciprocal concessions for the common good, so that peace and the security of all may be saved.

Much of the thoughtless hostility, which has been expressed by some few in the three allied countries, comes from lack of knowledge of facts and correct understanding of each other. Each must put itself in the shoes of the other and be capable of seeing how each would look at the facts from the other fellow's view point, and make tolerant adjustments to compose differences. Otherwise, there will inevitably occur a disastrous race in armaments and laboratories, and eventual war.

Differences between Russia and the Western Powers, whether they be ideological, political, racial or religious, need not and must not destroy the "Grand Design" for peace and a decent world.

No one need recount the enormous contribution which the U.S.S.R. made in fighting and in sacrifice. History will record that. That is true also of Britain's

great service, and our own achievement. There is glory enough for all three, and much left to include all the Fighting Allies. The future will pass severe judgment on any who will tarnish that glory, and rob mankind of that for which we fought.

This book contributes much to enlighten public opinion. It should clear up many doubts which linger in certain sections of opinion of the Western Powers. Those who are concerned with being honestly and intelligently informed about our ally, the Soviet Union—one of the greatest and most powerful nations of the earth—will find much of value in it.

The author, Dr. Jerome Davis, knows Russia as few Americans have had the opportunity to do. Before we entered World War I, he served as a Y.M.C.A. Secretary in charge of prisoners of war in Turkestan, and thereafter, during that same war, he served as head of the Y.M.C.A. in the Soviet Union. Over the years, he has visited Russia many times. More recently, from 1943 to 1945, he served as a war correspondent for American and Canadian papers. He knows Russia at first hand, from the days of the Czar up to now.

Dr. Davis, in my opinion, in the publication of this information, is rendering a service to friendship and cooperation between Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and ourselves.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

Foreword

RUSSIA still seems a distant land to most Americans—and yet, Russia is our next door neighbor. It is a truism that the world is growing smaller. How much smaller is something that has not yet sunk in. During the war, planes flew from Alaska to Russia almost every day. It takes only a single day to go to Russia by that route and only two days via Germany now.

Political and economic Russia seems even more distant than geographic Russia to the people of our country—and yet, there is no land on earth which will so deeply and vitally affect the life and happiness of each of us. The Russian people, in valiant defense of their homeland, certainly saved countless American lives even as our aid did for them. Her entry into the war against Japan saved other thousands. In fact, as I hope to show, had we worked in close harmony with Russia since the Revolution, we might have been able to avoid World War II. What we do to and with Russia will undoubtedly determine the matter of peace or war in the future.

It is the job of every thinking, responsible American citizen to know what Russia means for us.

In the post-war period trade and commercial agreements with Russia may help prevent depression and unemployment. Therefore every American worker is far more closely concerned with Russia than he dreams. Whether or not other millions of Americans will be plunged into the holocaust of another, and more incredibly destructive World War, depends on whether we come to know Russia, her problems, her characteristics, and her leaders.

Stalin, more nearly than any other man, holds the key to what Russia will do and what that country will become in the years ahead. It is impossible to understand Russia without understanding Stalin, for he symbolizes the wishes and aspirations of the masses of Russian people.

My first interest in Russia was entirely accidental. While working with Sir Wilfred Grenfell in Labrador in 1915 I was brought face to face with the deadly results of World War I, at a time when the United States was not yet involved. I was studying to become a minister, and my interest in helping to alleviate the misery of war led me to volunteer as a Y.M.C.A. worker among Allied captives in German prison camps. As it happened the Y.M.C.A. needed one secretary in Russia for every one sent to Germany, and it fell to my lot to go to Tsarist Russia. I remained abroad for two and a half years. I came to speak Russian fluently.

Upon my arrival I was sent to Turkestan, then seven days and seven nights on the Tsar's railway from St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). Later, when the United States entered the conflict, I was placed in charge of all Y.M.C.A. work in Russia. My position enabled me to know the Imperial generals as well as the soldiers.

Shortly following my return to the United States I was awarded the Guilder Fellowship at Columbia University and took my doctorate in sociology under Dr. Giddings. There followed three years of teaching at Dartmouth and thirteen years at Yale where I headed the study of sociology and social ethics at the Yale

University Divinity School. During this time it was discovered that I was one of the few American professors who had studied the new Russia first hand. I was under constant invitation to return, by individuals and religious groups, by leading newspaper syndicates, and by University travel bureaus. Once Edward A. Filene of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce took me along as his private secretary and we collaborated on a report for the General Electric Company. On another occasion I was director of a social science commission to Russia composed of leading American sociologists and economists. The report of this trip, which I edited, was issued with an introduction by Col. House. President Roosevelt called the moving pictures I took in Russia the best he had ever seen on the life of the common people there.

I was allowed to visit jails and prisons in Russia because of my nine years' experience as Chairman of the Republican-appointed State Commission on Jails in Connecticut. My intense interest in freedom of speech always made me critical of the lack of it in Russia and other countries.

Thus I was privileged to study the Russian scene over the past thirty years. In 1916, under the Tsar's regime, I watched a backward Russia hurl army after army against crack Austrian and German troops. The Russian columns were decimated by wholesale desertions, capture, disease and death. In 1917 and 1918 I watched the dissolution of that army by a more dynamic power—the power of revolutionary ideas. In 1921 I witnessed Russia's darkest hour when, exhausted by a bloody war, rent asunder by a revolution culminating in a life and death struggle against the armies of the world, she found herself face to face with famine and utter breakdown. Then came the famous retreat from uncompromising Communism towards a new policy which has slowly mended Russia's connections with the world. In 1926, and again in 1927, I saw the revolutionary drama at close range—including a long conference with Stalin regarding the settlement of differences with the United States. In 1932 I travelled 8,000 miles within Russia, seeing at first hand the enormous new construction work of that time and the incalculable sacrifices of the Russian people to make that construction possible.

In 1935 I crossed the great stretch of Siberia, watching developments in this important new hinterland of the Soviets. Again in 1937, 1938, and 1939 I toured

Russia, and now, once again, I have recently returned from over a year in the Soviet Union—this time a country which was waging a mighty war. The destruction wrought by the Nazis was beyond comprehension, and the self-sacrificing heroism of the men, women and children of Russia above praise.

On this last trip I travelled 10,000 miles within Soviet borders. I visited Leningrad twice and was at the Finnish front. I motored through most of the Crimea and visited Kiev, Baku, Astrakhan, Smolensk, Kharkov, Stalingrad, Minsk, Odessa, Kalinin, and Yasnaya Polyana. I visited the infamous Nazi death factories, including those at Klooga and Lublin. Naturally I followed the Red Army into Esthonia, Rumania, and Poland. During this visit, as well as in the others, I interviewed many of the most important Soviet leaders. I had two interviews with Stalin, and was the first American correspondent to have an interview with him.

No one person can tell the whole story of Russia. It is far too big and too complex. It is very possible that I may be wrong in some of my conclusions. But, believing, as I do, that the reader is entitled to know a writer's past record in order better to judge the possible value of his present conclusions, I submit the following:

At the start of the Revolution it seemed apparent to me that the Bolsheviks would retain control, and it was my opinion that Russia would become one of the strongest powers in Europe. I considered the intervention by the United States, Great Britain and Japan against her a grave error, and returned to the United States to speak against it for reasons given in Chapter XVI. As early as 1926 I wrote that history would rank Stalin next to Lenin in importance in making the new Russia. This was considered ridiculous by American "experts" at the time.

When Germany treacherously attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, I publicly predicted that Russia would never be defeated. Our military experts had not seen first-hand the spirit and force of the Russian people and naturally thought otherwise. I then stated that the Germans would probably capture all of White Russia and most of the Ukraine but that it was extremely doubtful if they could take either Moscow or Leningrad. Later I said that the Red Army would be the first to reach Berlin.

JEROME DAVIS

(West Haven, Conn.)

Part One

*Stalin,
Man and Ruler*

*"Distinguish those who work from
those who talk."*

—V. I. LENIN

*"I am only a disciple of Lenin and
it is my whole ambition to be a
faithful disciple."*

—JOSEPH STALIN

CHAPTER I

The Man Behind The Enigma

OF ALL living leaders of nations none has had so unique and adventurous a career as Joseph Stalin. It is doubtful if there is another man in the world who evokes more interest, more adulation, more curiosity, and in some quarters, more fear. His name is the one most frequently mentioned in the press and journals of all lands—sometimes as a symbol of hope, often as the target of hatred.

The story of Stalin is a success story. Its basic ingredients are familiar to Americans even if the settings and the details are strange. He was the son of a humble, poverty-ridden peasant cobbler, a member of a minority race in that "prison house of nations" which was the Russian Empire. Yet, by sheer ability and indefatigable energy, he won his way to the top. Today he is the dominating figure in the Soviet Union and is probably the most powerful leader in all Europe. Russia has emerged from World War II with a record of having destroyed more of the German army than any other nation, and as a result of the conflict has gained all of the major objectives for which she fought. If the Russians had not withstood the entire weight of the Nazi war machine before we entered the fight, if afterwards they had not pinned down and defeated twice as many German divisions as did the combined British and American forces, hundreds of thousands of American G.I.s would not be alive today. Stalin, as nearly as can be said of one man, is responsible for that result. Today Stalin, a member of the Georgian race, which makes up only one per cent of the population, leads the 189 different peoples who make up the Soviet Union, through the unquestionably difficult times of post-war reconstruction towards what most Soviet citizens consider a brighter future.

Stalin is a short, heavy-set man, only five feet five inches tall, with iron gray hair, graying moustache, and dark brown eyes. His face is covered with light

pit marks, the result of smallpox. No orator in the traditional sense, and betraying a Georgian accent, he nevertheless has perfect self-possession in speaking. When the occasion seems to demand it, he can be brutally outspoken.

He is a quiet man. Some of his early associates discounted what they considered his plodding abilities. Trotsky openly expressed his contempt for him. Trotsky remained unaware of Stalin's power until he woke up, after the death of Lenin, to find the plodder, in reality a master politician, in complete control.

There is little to be said about his personal life since the Soviet leaders do not consider their personal lives something to be spread over the front pages. As a result fantastic rumors have spread throughout the world that Stalin loves luxury and lives amid great splendor and pomp. Nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing can give such a misleading idea of the man and his aims. The fact is that Stalin does not care for money, is extremely modest and simple in his dress, in his habits, and in his home. He has a small four room apartment in the Kremlin. When his children were small one of them slept on a sofa in the dining room. Except for the worst period of the winter Stalin lives in Gorki in the little house where Lenin lived before his death.

Stalin has been married three times. His first wife, Catherine Svanidze, was a co-worker in illegal party activity during the Tsar's regime. Both were so engrossed in revolutionary activity that they saw relatively little of each other. Stalin's periods of imprisonment and exile prevented them from establishing a home. They did have one child, Jacob, who was born while Stalin was in the Baku jail. Catherine died in 1917 of pneumonia. Jacob, whose nickname is Yasha, served in World War II and was captured by the Germans. Goebbels did everything in his power to force the son

to denounce the father, but the youth remained loyal. He eventually managed to escape from the German prison camp and reach Switzerland where he was interned until the end of the war.

Stalin's second romance stems back to 1912 when he was dodging the Tsar's secret police in St. Petersburg. He used to hide in the home of a friend from the Caucasus who was employed as a foreman in an electrical station. This man, Alleluiev, had two daughters, one by the name of Nadya who was only ten years old. Stalin stayed with the family often, and Nadya worshipped him from afar as her hero. Years later, in 1919, Stalin again met Nadya. They were soon married and lived happily together. On November 8, 1932 she died of peritonitis following an operation for appendicitis. In her memory Stalin erected an impressive memorial designed by a famous woman sculptor, Mukhino. It is a rough shaft of white marble with the lovely head of his wife hewn out of the rock. She has a beautiful, serene face with the hair combed back over the ears. The body disappears in the uncut stone. The statue is located at the Novo Devitchi (New Maiden) cemetery, which is at the site of the most beautiful convent in Moscow and the Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary.

Stalin and his second wife had two children, Vasili and Svetlana. Vasili is now a Colonel who has seen much action at the front, and was awarded the order of Suvorov in 1945. His sister Svetlana was married during the same year and lives in Moscow. It is said that Stalin is now married to Rosa Kaganovitch, sister of the Commissar of Heavy Industries, but this has not yet been officially confirmed.

The Soviet leader's recreational likes and dislikes are quite in keeping with his character. All Stalin's associates say that he is quite puritanical in his personal habits. He never permits smutty stories to be told in his presence. He rarely drinks vodka, preferring the mild Caucasian red wine. He smokes a pipe, never gambles and never drinks to excess.

Stalin likes both hunting and fishing, and occasionally will play chess. His favorite relaxation, however, is reading, of which he does as much as demands upon his time permit. Starting from a good foundation in such literary classics as Shakespeare, Schiller, and Tolstoy, his favorite authors are Saltykov-Shchedrin, Gogol, and Chekov. He has read the works of many American and English authors in translation, includ-

ing James Fenimore Cooper, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, and Sinclair Lewis, and, on one occasion, used the term "Babbitt" in a speech. He has read widely in the history of civilization and Marxian literature, but his first love in reading was and is poetry. When he was young he wrote poetry, and at the age of sixteen a few of his poems were published in the newspaper *Iberia*. Regardless of their quality as literature they reveal that even at that age he possessed great social feeling as is evidenced by these lines:

*"Whose back was bent with toil unending,
Who knelt but yesterday in thrall,
Will rise, I say, the mountain's envy,
On wings of hope, high over all."*

Not many poets possess the ability to make their poems come true!

Stalin reads all the best works of the contemporary Soviet writers and takes real personal interest in them, frequently receiving authors for personal chats. It is not infrequent that, enthusiastic about a new work, he telephones the author in the middle of the night to congratulate him on the achievement. His interest in culture is well reflected by the fact that the government awards for outstanding work in the fields of literature, art, music, and science have been titled the Stalin Prizes, and Stalin, as head of the government, takes an active part in choosing the award winners. From 100 to 250 prizes of 200,000 to 50,000 rubles are given annually.

The Marshal is an extremely hard worker. He keeps long but unusual hours—probably a heritage from his early days in the revolutionary movement. He is seldom in the Kremlin in the morning. The afternoon is usually spent in his office, and following his evening meal, he works until the early morning hours, sometimes all night. In spite of long hours and a rigorous schedule, at sixty-six he looks the picture of health. He accomplishes a great deal during his working day because he possesses an orderly and self-controlled mind and a marvelously retentive memory. Foreign statesmen are usually amazed at the extent of his knowledge, down to the most minute detail, on matters in which he is interested. A. Yenukidze, Secretary of the Soviet Executive Committee, says that Stalin's distinctive characteristics in speaking, writing, and working are brevity, clarity, and accuracy. This was evident in my interviews with Stalin. He answered ques-

tions instantly in clear, brief statements, frequently listing his points in one, two, three order.

One always receives the impression with Stalin of a flaming enthusiasm kept in bounds by an iron will. The one overmastering passion of his life is to build up his country for all the people, and to make it respected all over the world. In this respect he is much more Russian and nationalist than internationalist—although, more so than many leaders in the West, he is aware that peace is necessary for this and that peace is indivisible. The only two languages he knows are his native Georgian and Russian.

Stalin has a good, if somewhat heavy footed, sense of humor. Once Stalin received Arnold Kaplani and Boris Goldstein, youthful piano and violin stars, and awarded them each a government grant of 3,000 rubles. When the youngsters had the money in their hands, he quizzed them, "Now that you are capitalists will you recognize me on the street?"

Shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution, while Stalin was editing *Pravda*, the Kronstadt sailors telephoned a question: "Shall we march in the demonstration with or without rifles?" The answer came instantaneously. "Rifles? That's your business, comrades. We writers always take our pencils with us." In the parade the sailors carried their "pencils."

In political debate Stalin's humor turns to acid—and it is most effective. When attacking Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin and the opposition from the Right in the Party, he ridiculed their fears of every new policy. Said Stalin: "These features take on particularly ridiculous forms when difficulties appear, when the slightest cloud makes its appearance on the horizon. If any difficulty or hitch has appeared anywhere, they fall into a panic, lest something may happen. A cockroach somewhere stirs, without having time even to crawl out of its hole, and they are already starting back in terror, and beginning to shout about a catastrophe, about the ruin of the Soviet government."

He continued: "We try to calm them down, we try to convince them that nothing dangerous has happened yet, that it is only a cockroach, and there is no need to be afraid, but all in vain. They continue to shout as before: 'What cockroach? That's no cockroach, it's a thousand wild beasts! It's not a cockroach, but the abyss, the ruin of the Soviet government!' And volumes of paper begin to pour in."

If at times his intent is softer his wit is no less

pointed. In our group interviews with Stalin in 1927, after we had questioned him for six hours, he finally turned to us and said, "If the delegation is not too tired, I would ask it to permit me to put several questions." Stalin then slyly asked the sociologists and economists: "How do you account for the small percentage of American workers organized in trade unions?" I can still see Stalin chuckling to himself at our contradictory answers.

Directness in speaking is also a characteristic of Premier Stalin. Alexander Yakovlev, the aviator and plane designer, says the first time he met him, "I looked at the ceiling, wondering how to answer questions." Stalin said, "Don't look at the ceiling, wondering how to answer questions. You won't find the answers there. Better look at me and say what you think!"

It is said that he knows no fear, and it is certain that he never had any doubt that his side would win. Close intimates told me that all through the days of civil war and intervention he had absolute disregard for his own comfort and a contempt for danger. No matter how dark the outlook, or how depressed his co-workers, he always believed that victory was attainable. In World War II, Stalin refused to worry even when the Germans were knocking on the gates of Moscow. He never left the city, and was certain that the Red Army would not fail in its task.

There is no question but that he is accustomed to facing and overcoming the most formidable obstacles. There has not been a single year since 1899 but what has involved some sort of crisis for him. First were the revolutionary struggles in Tsarist times with consequent imprisonments and exile. The civil war and intervention followed. The death of Lenin came next, with the explosion of bitter rivalry within the Party. Almost numberless crises developed on the fronts of economic and social change. There were three great Five Year Plans—and the threat of war always lurked ominously in the background. Hitler's march into Russia in 1941 precipitated the titanic struggle so long expected. Now there is the herculean task of reconstruction.

Experience has made Stalin intensely practical—and when theory doesn't work out in practice it's too bad for the theory. When he wanted to secure an engineer for the Dnieper River Dam a commission was sent around the world to make a choice. They were instructed to secure photographs of actual dams the engi-

neers had built. Col. Hugh Cooper, builder of Muscle Shoals dam, told me the rest of the story. He and a German firm were asked to submit plans for the Dnieper dam. The Germans prepared a complete and elaborate model of their design, and, on paper, their plans were more impressive than those of Col. Cooper. Stalin settled the matter by hiring both the German firm and Col. Cooper. The Germans were to begin building on one side of the river and Col. Cooper on the other. After a month Col. Cooper had demonstrated by accomplishments that his methods were vastly superior. That settled the matter for Stalin. The German firm was paid off and sent packing. Cooper finished the job.

Stalin is similarly undogmatic regarding Marxian theories. They must stand the test of use. For instance, in the early days of the Russian Revolution, wages were much more uniform than they are today. It was found that bonuses to workers and managers brought better results. Wide differentials in pay exist today. Again, in the early days it was legal for any woman to have an abortion. It was found that the resulting operations did physical harm to the mothers. A crop of neurasthenic women resulted. On the advice of a medical commission the Soviet Government abolished the law permitting abortions. Now such an operation can be performed only when necessary to save the mother's life or health.

Many similar examples could be cited. When it was found that collectivizing all land brought peasant opposition, the procedure was changed so that every peasant family could have a small plot for their own exclusive use. In the early days either a husband or wife could secure a divorce, without notifying the other, merely by signing a form. This had a demoralizing effect, resulting in the instability of the family. Today it is more difficult to secure a divorce in the Soviet Union than it is in some of our states.

Paradoxically enough, in view of his very real modesty and unassuming nature, Stalin permits his statue and his picture to be plastered from one end of the country to the other. He has said the reason he does not object to pictures, memorials in his honor and the like, is because the people are merely using him as a symbol of the Soviet state. There are indications, however, that he finds the fulsome tributes to him, which are regulation oratorical flourishes in Russia, somewhat distasteful. In a speech to the workers of Tiflis he alluded to this in a half-mocking way:

I must, in all conscience, tell you, that I have not deserved half the praise that has been given me. It appears that I am one of the heroes, the director of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . a peerless knight and all sorts of other things. This is mere phantasy, and a perfectly useless exaggeration. This is the way one speaks at the funeral of a revolutionary. But I am not preparing to die. Therefore I must give you a true picture of what I once was and say to whom I owe my present position in the Party . . . I have been and still am a pupil of the pioneer workmen of the Tiflis railway workshops.

But, above all, Stalin is a consummate political strategist, with an almost uncanny knack for selecting the right man for the right job. He studies those who work with him until he knows their strong points and weaknesses better than they do themselves. His subordinates respond with a deep loyalty to their chief. During the recent war he seldom made a mistake in appointing leaders, and if unsuspected weaknesses cropped up the man was speedily recalled. His real flair for military strategy aided him in working with the generals and in selecting the right man to lead campaigns.

It would be an error to consider the Soviet leader a willful man who believes in forcing his ideas upon others. Everything he does reflects the desires and hopes of the masses to a large degree. He always has his ear to the ground, making it his business to find out what people are really thinking. Peasants and workers are encouraged to write their frank opinions. A large staff reads and reports on all the correspondence that comes in. Stalin himself takes samplings of the letters, and, in addition, sees many visitors from remote districts of the Union. There are some twenty thousand full time party secretaries scattered throughout the country who keep him constantly informed about "public opinion." Stalin is very responsive to the state of mind of the people. This does not, however, prevent him from initiating policies he considers necessary although the populace has not asked or is not ready for them. He both leads and follows public opinion.

The forced collectivization of 1932 was an instance of something which Stalin felt simply could not wait for public opinion. At that time I asked why it would not be better to set up a model demonstration collective, equipped with modern machinery and methods, and convince the peasants by example, and by showing them the concrete benefits that collectivization would

hold. The answer given me was that if the Soviets had fifty years of assured peace this would be preferable, but, unfortunately, there would probably be a world war within ten years and enforced collectivization was necessary if the Soviet state was to survive. There are few Russians, and few foreign observers, who would not now agree with this.

Stalin has himself given what is possibly the best characterization of what he tries to do in these words: "The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not straggle behind a movement, nor run in front of it, lest one become in both cases separated from the masses. Whoever wants to lead and at the same time maintain his contact with the masses must fight on two fronts; against those loitering in the rear, and those speeding on ahead."

Again, in April 1928, before the Moscow organization of the Party, he declared that leaders often think they are watching but see nothing "until some calamity overtakes them—this is no kind of leadership. Bolshevism does not interpret leadership in this way. To lead means to foresee; and to foresee, Comrades, is not always so simple. It is one thing when only a dozen other leading comrades keep watch and notice defects in our work. . . . It is quite another thing when, together with dozens of other leading comrades, hundreds of thousands and millions of workers keep watch, seeing the shortcomings in our work, bringing to light our mistakes, taking up the common cause of Socialist construction and pointing out the way to improve it." This is the key to what Russia has done in the Soviet Union. He has led, but he has brought the masses of people along with him.

Stalin cannot help but impress anyone who comes in close contact with him. This has been testified to by the many Allied leaders who saw him during the war. After Wendell Willkie's visit to Russia I asked for his impressions of the Marshal. Willkie said, "Stalin would have made a great political leader or business man if he had been born in the West. I am glad he wasn't, for he would have given us too much competition." Cordell Hull, former Secretary of State, declared, "~~I found in Marshal Stalin a remarkable~~ personality, one of the great statesmen and leaders of this age." The testimony of Winston Churchill, since he bitterly dislikes even the mild socialism of the British Labor government to say nothing of communism, is even more impressive.

"It is very fortunate for Russia in her agony to have this rugged chief at her head," said Churchill during the war. "He is a man of outstanding personality, suited to the sombre and stormy times in which his life has been cast. He is a man of inexhaustible courage and will power, a man of direct and even blunt speech. Above all, he is a man with a saving sense of humor which is of high importance to all men and to all nations. Premier Stalin left upon me an impression of deep, cool wisdom and a complete absence of illusions of any kind." And after the Yalta Conference Churchill added, "The impression I brought back from the Crimea and from all my other contacts is that Marshal Stalin and the other Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equality with the western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond."

Most citizens of the Soviet Union would agree with these estimates—after adding that they had been aware of Stalin's qualities for many years. My most recent visit to the Soviet Union took me on travels of over ten thousand miles within its borders. I talked with all kinds of people, of many different backgrounds and professions and scores of different nationalities. I spoke Russian, was familiar with the country, and had many friends made on previous visits. They spoke very frankly. I think it is certain that the opposition to Stalin in the Soviet Union today is far less than against any other ruler in any major country in the world. I asked a Russian who was somewhat critical of Stalin and who longed for the good old days of capitalism what would happen if a free election were held in Russia with rival parties and complete freedom for agitation. He admitted, somewhat mournfully, "There would be no use in having such an election: 98 per cent of the electorate would vote for Stalin. Everyone from the clergy to the peasants consider that Stalin has saved Russia from the Hitler devils. Virtually there would be no opposition."

Stalin has an undying faith in the workers and peasants, and the new Russia idolizes Stalin. They have confidence in him not because of any vague sentimentalism, but because of what he has done for Russia. They remember that in the darkest hours of the war, when the Nazis hammered at the very gates of Moscow, Stalin stood calmly at his post, inspiring everyone to superhuman feats of patriotism. They cannot forget that in the time of greatest peril in all Russian history,

Stalin gave himself unsparingly for Russia. They know him to be honest, and consider that he is genuinely building for the welfare of all the people. They be-

lieve that in the strong way he has guarded them from the Nazis he will guide them in the future towards happiness, progress, and an increasingly good life.

CHAPTER II

Priest or Revolutionist?

MY FIRST talk with Stalin came in 1926. I had gone to Russia with a letter to the Russian leader from Senator William Borah, then Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U. S. Senate. The letter brought immediate results. The invitation to meet Stalin at his party office was soon forthcoming.

The headquarters of the Communist Party are located in an unpretentious building lying within the Inner City of Moscow, the so-called Kitai-Gorod or Chinese fortress. One had to go to the basement and secure a permit before entering the building. The guards examined the permit and ushered me into a large room with a huge picture of Lenin hanging over the desk. Stalin stood up and greeted me with a hearty handshake. It was a shrewd and inscrutable face except when it lighted up with a smile.

He wore the typical Russian blouse of white linen, unbelted and outside the trousers. There were no decorations on it. He spoke rapidly, in Russian. Replies to questions came without deliberation and seemed to be given with entire frankness. I asked first if he would be willing to answer a personal question. When he assented I said, "Why did you first become a Communist?"

The reply came quickly. "It is difficult to describe the process. First, one becomes convinced that existing conditions are wrong and unjust. Then one resolves to do the best one can to remedy them. Under the Tsar's regime any attempt genuinely to help the people put one outside the pale of the law; one found himself hunted and hounded as a revolutionist.

"The reason there are so many Communists in Russia today is that Russian capitalism was the most atrocious and bestial in the world. The Tsar's government was also the most corrupt, cruel, and inefficient. Even the most peacefully disposed people became revolutionists. They were not content to imprison merely socialists or communists. They even imprisoned all those who op-

posed the great wrongs committed by the Tsar's ministers. Even some of the rich and educated were sent to jail if they objected to what was done.

"The Bolsheviks were the only ones who had a clear, sharp program for relief. Therefore the people rallied around them. The people saw the Bolsheviks actually suffering prison and death for their ideal. The common people thus caught the contagion and themselves became revolutionists."

Stalin went on to say that in his own case he saw the injustice everywhere and came to the conclusion that the only way to change it was completely to do away with Tsarist rule. He felt that the Bolshevik (majority) section of the Social-Democratic Party, headed by Lenin, had the best program for accomplishing that end. Therefore he threw himself heart and soul into that movement.

The terrible conditions under Tsarism were very revolting to Stalin, even as a child. There was poverty from the beginning. The family lived in the little village of Gori in the midst of the rugged Caucasus mountains, not far from the capital of Tiflis province. The father, Vissarion Djughashvili, came from peasant stock and was a cobbler by trade. During Stalin's early boyhood he worked ten to twelve hours a day for a few rubles a month at the little Adelskhanov Shoe Factory in Tiflis. The mother, Ekaterina, came from a family of former serfs. The Djughashvilis lived in a one story house which a schoolmate of Stalin describes in these words: "The room in which the family lived was not more than about five yards square, and adjoined the kitchen. The door led straight into the courtyard; there was not even a doorstep. The floor was of brick. Light filtered in through a small window. The furniture consisted of a small table, a stool and a large sofa, something in the nature of a built-in bunk covered with a straw pallet." The rent for the entire house

was 1½ rubles (75 cents) a month. The first three children born in this home died in infancy.

That was the setting in which Stalin was born, sixty-six years ago, on December 21, 1879. He was given the name Joseph.

His mother has told me of his boyhood. I had a long talk with her in Tiflis in 1927. Then 68, she was living in a modest apartment in a house that had once belonged to the Tsar's Viceroy. She was dressed in the old-fashioned Georgian costume, with two black ringlets hanging down on each side of her head. Her face was remarkable for its strength, its will power and its serenity.

She was obviously very proud of her son, whom she called Soso. He was always first in his studies, "way ahead of all the boys in everything." This was in spite of the fact that he had never been strong: the family was poor, food was meagre, and he was often ill. At seven he had smallpox which left deep pits in his face.

The mother said that nothing interested the youth as much as ideas and reading. Although his father did not care for politics, the boy was attracted to the secret political circles. When Stalin was ten, his father returned from work one night saying that he felt ill. He went to bed and died in his sleep. The family was left penniless, but the mother, by sewing until two or three o'clock at night, managed to earn a living and set aside every penny that could be spared for the religious training of her boy. She was determined that he would have an education and become a priest.

"Soso," she said, "was a good boy. I rarely had to punish him. He studied hard, was always reading or talking, trying to find out everything, in fact, was the favorite pupil of the teacher. He was also leader of the boy gang in the neighborhood. Once he demonstrated his superiority by going around a complete circle of trees hanging from the branches by his hands without once touching the ground, a feat that none of the other boys succeeded in doing. He was very sensitive to the injustice all about us."

Stalin graduated from the Gori ecclesiastical school with a certificate of merit in 1894. His mother had him entered in the Tiflis Theological Seminary and moved to the capital to be with him. He was then fourteen. The indoctrination repelled him: the monks were attempting to make him respect the Tsar, the church, and private property all at the same time. He ended by believing in none. A fellow student remem-

bers that he met Stalin outside the school.

"I began to speak of God. Joseph heard me out, and after a moment's silence said:

'You know they are fooling us, there is no God.'

'How can you say such things, Soso!'

'I'll lend you a book to read. It will show you that the world and all living things are quite different from what you imagine, and all this talk about God is sheer nonsense.'

The book which Stalin gave him was by Darwin, a forbidden work.

The students were surrounded by a strict spy system. Stalin pays tribute to the Seminary for making him a revolutionist instead of a priest. "I became one at the seminary, because the character of the discipline enraged me. The place was a hotbed of espionage and chicanery. At nine in the morning we assembled for tea, and when we returned to our bedrooms all the drawers had been rifled. And just as they daily went through our papers, they daily went through our souls. I could not stand it; everything infuriated me."

Many of the searches were for the purpose of finding books from the "Cheap Library," a loan institution which the students were prohibited from using. Here are a few of the entries in the Conduct Book of the Seminary regarding Stalin: November 1896, "I confiscated Victor Hugo's *Toilers of the Sea*. Confine him to the punishment cell for a prolonged period. I have already warned him once about an unsanctioned book, *Ninety Three* by Hugo." March 1897, "Djugashvili was discovered reading *Literary Evolution of the Nations* on the chapel stairs. This is the thirteenth time this student has been discovered reading books borrowed from the 'Cheap Library.' On the orders of the Father Rector confine him to the punishment cell for a prolonged period with a strict warning." On December 16, 1898 there is an entry complaining that the youth opposes the repeated searches and is "rude and disrespectful" towards those in authority.

But the truth was that Stalin had, within his first year at the Seminary, come under the influence of the secret nationalist and Marxist study groups which, under the spur of tyrannical discipline, honeycombed the entire student body. Reading inclined him towards Marxism, and it was less than a year after he entered the school that he formally joined the Georgian Marxist group, the Messameh Dassy. Two years later he became a member of the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Even at this early date

Lenin's writings made a deep impression on him, and one of his friends at the time remembers that after reading an article by Lenin, Stalin said, "I must meet him at all costs."

The youth was soon involved in many activities outside the school. He attended and spoke at illegal workers meetings, wrote leaflets, and organized unions. He was responsible for an illegal student paper. Stalin credits the workers of Tiflis with being his "first teachers." "I recall the year 1898," he has said, "when I was first put in charge of a study circle of workers from the railway shops. It was here, among these comrades, that I received my first revolutionary baptism." Stalin took the attitude that, while he might have more education than the people he worked with, they knew more of the realities of life, and this is the key to much of his success.

The seminary authorities, aided by the police, kept a close watch on "political suspects," and, as Stalin increased the scope of his activities, they received alarming reports of his work, and he became more impatient with their fruitless efforts to break his spirit. Once when Father Dimitry, the seminary supervisor, entered Stalin's room after a search, the student went on reading without paying any attention to the intruder. Father Dimitry said, "Don't you see who is standing before you?" Stalin rose, rubbing his eyes, and said, "I don't see anything except a black spot before my eyes." On May 27, 1899 Father Dimitry proposed in the Seminary Council that action be taken to "expel Joseph Djugashvili as politically reprehensible." This was done two days later, but the official reason given was failure to pay tuition fees and non-attendance at examinations.

At this time Stalin supported himself by taking a job in the Tiflis Observatory. It meant staying awake all night and making observations at regular intervals with delicate instruments. It was a job nobody liked but it gave him the means and standing to continue his revolutionary work. As soon as he could arrange for other financial support, Stalin abandoned the job to devote his full energies to the Marxist movement.

The Social-Democratic movement in the Caucasus was split into a majority who wished to do only what could be done legally and a minority, soon headed by Stalin, who believed that nothing effective could be done by legal means against Tsarism. Stalin once asked a friend what was taught in the legal classes of the majority. The friend truthfully replied that they taught

scientific facts, such as how the sun moves. Stalin smiled and retorted, "Listen, friend, don't worry about the sun; it will not stray from its orbit. What you had better learn is how the revolutionary cause should move, and help me to arrange an illegal printing plant."

Lenin's influence on Stalin was again exerted at a crucial moment. A colleague of Lenin's, Victor Kurnatovsky, came to Tiflis in the autumn of 1900, and soon became a friend of Stalin. A few months later the first copies of Lenin's newspaper *Iskra* (The Spark) reached Tiflis. It was truly "the spark" in the Caucasus. A strike paralyzed the Tiflis railway shops and yards. In 1901 a May Day demonstration, organized and led by Stalin, was held in the center of Tiflis—it marked his emergence as the most prominent revolutionary leader in the region. He had already attracted the attention of the Tsarist secret police and, from the time of the issuance of a warrant for his arrest in March 1901, he had been in hiding and worked "underground."

An illegal newspaper, illegal since that was the only kind that could be uncensored, had been one of the young man's dreams since he first entered the revolutionary movement. In September 1901 the first issue of *Brdzola* (Struggle), founded by Stalin and several other members of the revolutionary group of the Social-Democratic party appeared. The printing press was in his own room, and for this purpose he had deliberately taken a room without a window and with two entrances, one a double door which was kept padlocked as though never used. Clothes were hung in the space between the inner and outer doors to give it the appearance of a closet. Because of the secrecy some of the peasants got the idea that Stalin was printing counterfeit money. When they came to him with their doubts, Stalin replied, "I'm not making counterfeit money. I'm printing tracts telling of your misery." The peasants were enthusiastic and offered their help. One, named Khashim, used to hide leaflets and newspapers under the vegetables and fruit in his basket. When a sale was made to a fellow peasant or worker the tract would unobtrusively accompany it. The publications were issued in Armenian, Georgian, and Russian.

Stalin's abilities were so marked that he was shortly assigned to organize the city of Batum. The organization which he formed there was made up of many different nationalities—Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, and Russians—and it is probable that this

influenced and formed his views on the national question which have been so important in integrating and uniting the hundreds of nationalities in the Soviet Union. He organized and led several strikes. Police began scouring the city, making many arrests. In answer Stalin organized a demonstration demanding the release of those arrested. The government responded by arresting 300 of the paraders. The next day Stalin marched at the head of a still larger demonstration, including dockers and railway workers as well as the factory hands. The police opened fire, killing fifteen and wounding 54. Stalin escaped, but took one of the wounded back to his room. A month later he was found, arrested, and confined in Batum and then in the notorious jail of Kutais. At the end of November 1903 he was condemned to three years exile in the province of Irkutsk, Eastern Siberia.

Impatient, fiery, he remained in exile for only a few months. He escaped, made his way back to Batum and resumed work—this time with more precautions against arrest, but even more daring. He dropped his father's name and used a number of pseudonyms—Koba, David, Chichikov—but the name Stalin, meaning steel, fittingly characterizing his outstanding quality, was the one that stuck.

In November 1904, Stalin presided at a Bolshevik Conference in Tiflis. A month later the historic Baku strike broke out. It was so successful that the Baku workers won a collective bargaining agreement, the first in the history of the Russian labor movement. This was one of the forerunners of the Revolution of 1905. All Russia was stirring uneasily. Stalin founded an illegal newspaper *Borba Proletariata* which he edited. In its columns he urged that all workers and peasants irrespective of nationality should unite in the common struggle for freedom. In an issue in 1905, after "Bloody Sunday" in which more than a thousand workers had been massacred in St. Petersburg by Tsarist troops, this paper declared that the revolution was spreading and that the time was not far distant when it would break over all Russia in a mighty deluge, sweeping away all that was rotten and foul, including the Tsarist autocracy.

Stalin strongly attacked those he thought guilty of dilatory tactics and opportunism. A friend has described a speech by Stalin at this time. He wrote that Comrade Koba (Stalin) mounted the platform and addressed the audience; "You have one bad habit," he said, "of

which I must plainly warn you. No matter who comes forward, and no matter what he says, you invariably greet him with hearty applause. If he says 'Long live freedom' you applaud; if he says 'Long live the Revolution' you applaud. And that is quite right. But when somebody comes along and says, 'Down with arms,' you applaud too. What chance is there of a revolution succeeding without arms? And what sort of a revolutionist is he who cries 'Down with arms'? The speaker who said that is probably a Tolstoian, not a revolutionary. But, whoever he is, he is an enemy of the revolution, an enemy of liberty for the people. . . . What do we need in order to really win? We need three things, understand that and bear it well in mind. The first is arms, the second is arms, and the third is arms."

This is certainly much more easily understood by one who saw Russia under the Tsar, as I did. Workers were employed twelve to fourteen hours a day at wages of seven to eight rubles (\$3.50 to \$4) per month. Skilled metal workers received no more than thirty-five rubles. Soldiers received fifty kopecks (25 cents) monthly pay. There was no legislation for the protection of labor, and trade unions or workers' organizations of any kind were prohibited by law. In Turkestan, where I was working, only seven per cent of the population was literate, and even these were only permitted to read books which were censored and "safe."

Despite the very real misery which inspired it, the 1905 revolution was crushed. The demand for "Bread and Justice" was stifled—for the time being. Reaction was in full swing. In the Caucasus, renewed efforts on the part of the secret police brought discovery of the Avlabar secret printing press which Stalin had established in Tiflis to publish his newspaper as well as writings of Lenin and books, pamphlets, and leaflets of the Bolshevik group. Something of the ingenuity used in protecting this press can be seen from an account which appeared in the Tiflis *Kavkaz* the following day:

"In the courtyard of an uninhabited detached house . . . some 150 or 200 paces from the City Hospital for Contagious Diseases, a well was discovered some seventy feet deep, which could be descended by means of a rope and pulley. At a depth of about fifty feet there was a gallery leading to another well, in which there was a ladder about thirty-five feet high giving access to a vault situated beneath the cellar of the house. In this

vault a fully-equipped printing plant has been discovered with twenty cases of Russian, Georgian, and Armenian type, a hand press costing between 1,500 and 2,000 rubles, various acids, blasting gelatine and other paraphernalia for the manufacture of bombs, a large quantity of illegal literature, and the seals of various regiments and government institutions. . . . The establishment was illuminated by acetylene lamps and was fitted up with an electric signalling system. . . .

The editorial offices have been sealed up. Since electric wires have been discovered issuing from the secret printing plant in various directions, excavations are being made in the hope of discovering other underground premises."

A boy had come to Tiflis to be a priest. His teachers—the monks, his fellow students, the workers, the peasants, the Tsarist police and their dread prisons—had made him one of the most skilled of revolutionists.

CHAPTER III

Tempering the Steel

THE TSAR, as the last battles of the 1905 Revolution were put down, and the hangmen and executioners began to work, might have considered the Empire once more firmly in his grasp. There were others who knew that it was not. In November 1905 Stalin had written a leaflet which proved to be a prophetic utterance: "The general political strike now in swing, which for its grandeur is unprecedented and unparalleled in the history not only of Russia, but of the whole world, may perhaps end today without developing into a nation-wide uprising—but if it does, it will only be to shake the country again with even greater force tomorrow and to develop into that great armed uprising which is to settle the age-old conflict between the Russian people and the tsarist autocracy and dash out the brains of that vile monster. . . . A nation-wide armed uprising—that is the great task which now confronts the proletariat of Russia and imperatively demands accomplishment!"

It was this task which the Bolsheviks, as the Leninist faction of the Social-Democratic Party was by then generally termed, re-organized their forces to accomplish. Two of the three conferences for this purpose had to be held outside Russia, and, in attending them, Stalin had his first glimpse of foreign lands. Stalin was a delegate from the Transcaucasian organization at the first All-Russian Bolshevik Conference in December 1905 at Tammerfors, Finland, then a part of the Russian Empire. He took an active role at the Social-Democratic Party Congress in Stockholm, Sweden, in April 1906, and the Party Congress which was

held in London on May of the following year. At the Stockholm Congress the Mensheviks argued that capitalist democracy must precede socialism in Russia. Stalin countered that either the workers or the capitalists must lead, and that if the workers seized power socialism could be brought in at once. It was at Stockholm that Stalin first met Kliment Voroshilov, now Soviet Commissar of War, and Voroshilov returned to the Caucasus with him to help in organizing the Baku oil workers. It was at this time that Stalin was elected leader of the Bolsheviks in the whole of Trans-Caucasia.

At the London Congress the Bolsheviks were the largest single group and secured a majority on every important issue. Upon his return, Stalin published his "Notes of A Delegate," a report which said that the first significance of the Congress was the uniting of the Russian Social-Democratic Party around the Bolshevik program under Lenin's leadership, and that the second important achievement was that it would follow a strict class policy of socialism, rejecting opportunism.

There was little room for opportunism in the Caucasus. Stalin described conditions as follows, "The criminal Tsarist autocracy has brought our country to the brink of destruction. The utter ruin of the hundred million Russian peasants, the oppressed and poverty stricken condition of the working class, the excessive state debts and heavy taxes, the whole population's complete lack of rights, the endless tyranny and violence reigning in all spheres of life, lastly the citizen's utter lack of security in life and property—such is the terrible picture which Russia presents. This

cannot go on much longer. The autocracy which is the perpetrator of these dark outrages must be destroyed."

In the Caucasus itself a fierce underground civil war continued. In 1907 more than three thousand people were sent into exile from the Tiflis and Kutais provinces alone. There were executions and murders committed by government agents. In September 1907 a Party leader, Khanlar, was waylaid and killed. Stalin wrote of him that "He combined the fire, the passion, of the proletarian soul with the sorrow and burden of the peasant." In facing these conditions it was decided that no Tsarist law was binding. The Party in the Caucasus needed money. The workers felt that they had the right to expropriate the money stolen by the Tsar and use it for their own liberation.

It was decided that a gold shipment to the State Bank at Tiflis would be intercepted. The man for this job was a boyhood friend of Stalin's, an Armenian by the name of Ter-Petrossian, later nick-named "Kamo".

Kamo became a sort of Robin Hood of the Revolution. It cannot be said that he profited from this work for he lived on fifty kopecks (twenty five cents) a day and suffered terribly during his many terms in prison. Twice he was brought to a scaffold to be hung, and once actually had to dig what was to have been his grave. An eye was torn out in an explosion. After being exposed by an agent of the secret police he feigned insanity for four years, during which time he was tortured by having needles put under his finger nails and red hot irons applied to his flesh. He was kept naked in ice cold cells. After four years of this he managed to escape by sawing through his bars and chains. Afterwards he was sent out of Russia to buy arms and ammunition for the Revolution. He purchased and shipped them but was again arrested. After his release he was again jailed in Russia and sentenced to death but this sentence was commuted and the Revolution freed him.

The plan to secure funds involved a Treasury carriage which was scheduled to bring 250,000 rubles (\$125,000) to the State Bank. It was guarded by two policemen and five armed guards. The conspirators, headed by Kamo, had everything in readiness. Ten armed men awaited the arrival of the shipment, the coming of which was to be signalled by several women.

The carriage, surrounded by horsemen, drove into the square in a blinding cloud of dust. The conspira-

tors hurled their bombs and four explosions occurred. Two policemen and a Cossack lay on the street. The carriage hurtled on after the terror-stricken horses. Bachua, another of the conspirators, dashed out and hurled a bomb after it, halting its wild progress. The explosion knocked Bachua down. Another conspirator, dressed as a captain, rode up, seized the money bags, and rode off.

In the meantime Kamo, wearing an officer's uniform, had been parading up and down the square all morning keeping the public away in order to protect innocent persons from the explosions. Under Kamo's direction the money found its way to the safe controlled by the unsuspected Director of the Tiflis Observatory.

The Tsar's troops surrounded the square, but the conspirators had escaped. Months later, Maxim Litvinov, who was later to be Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, was arrested in Paris when he tried to change some of the stolen bills into French money.

Some of the Mensheviks and a few of the Bolsheviks denounced Stalin because of the robbery and it is rumored that the Mensheviks managed to expel him from the Party for a time. Lenin, however, continued to support him. Stalin considered the situation one of civil war, and made decisions by the rules of war.

His life from that time on was a round of arrests, imprisonment, exile, and struggle. It was quite different from the relatively settled lives of the framers of our Constitution. He was arrested and imprisoned six times and escaped five. From his first arrest in 1902 until he was freed by the victorious Revolution, Stalin spent seven years and eleven months in prison or exile. Even during periods of momentary freedom he was hunted, with a reward offered for his capture.

This did not prevent him from doing effective work as a labor organizer. He was one of the chief figures in the organization of the Baku Oil Workers' Union and in 1908 led 47,000 workers in strikes. The demands of the workers, which sound familiar and just, included: 1. wage increases, 2. recognition of the union, 3. the right to hold workers' meetings, and 4. the right to bring their grievances to the management.

The Tsarist police caught up with him for the second time on March 25, 1908 when he was arrested while working under the name "Nizharadze." He was confined in the Bayilov prison in Baku which, built for four hundred, was jammed with fifteen hundred inmates. Even behind bars Stalin contrived to carry on

his work. Most of the second issue of the illegal paper *Bakinsky Proletary* was edited from his prison cell.

Semyon Verestchaka, a political opponent who was confined with him, describes the prison as "a training school for professional revolutionists, a kind of propaganda institute, a militant academy. Koba (Stalin) stood out among the various circles as a Marxist student. He wore a blue satin smock with a wide open collar, and no belt. His head was bare. A bashlik—a sort of detached hood with two tapering scarves—was thrown across his shoulders. He always carried a book. Of more than medium height, he walked with a slow cat-like tread. He was slender, with pointed face, pock-marked skin, sharp nose, and small eyes looking out from a narrow forehead, slightly indented.

"The Stalin of those days was defiant; he submitted to no regulations. The political prisoners at Baku endeavored to segregate themselves as much as possible from the criminals . . . Openly flouting the custom, Koba was to be seen constantly in the company of bandits, swindlers and thieves. He chose as his cellmates the Sakvadelidze brothers, one a counterfeiter, the other a well-known Bolshevik. Active people, people who did things, attracted him . . .

"At a time when the whole prison was upset, sleepless, tense, in expectation of a night execution, Koba would calmly compose himself in slumber . . . He generally enjoyed in the Caucasus the reputation of a second Lenin. He was regarded as the leading Marxist expert."

Once when the political prisoners revolted against some of the arbitrary rules, the authorities forced them to run the gauntlet between two rows of soldiers who struck at them fiercely with rifle butts. Most of the prisoners ran as fast as they could, but Stalin walked, unflinching, with a book in his hand. He was exiled to Volgoda Province.

After an escape, a third arrest, and another escape, Stalin went to St. Petersburg on instruction of the Central Committee of the Party to assume charge of its Russian Bureau. Lenin had nominated him for this position and arranged for his illegal delivery from exile. Here he helped to set up and edit the important Bolshevik daily newspaper *Pravda* (Truth). The Prague Conference of the Party had expelled the Mensheviks, and a new revolutionary upsurge was in evidence. The first issue appeared on April 22, 1912, and on the same day Stalin was arrested. After three

months in jail he was exiled for a period of three years to the remote region of Narym. On September 1, 1912 he escaped once more and returned to St. Petersburg.

He took part in the elections for the Duma, writing a leaflet "Mandate of the Workingmen of St. Petersburg to Their Labor Deputy" which played a considerable part in the election victory of the Party. His associate in editing *Pravda* and guiding the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma was V. M. Molotov, now Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union.

On two occasions Stalin was called abroad to confer with Lenin. On the second journey he remained out of Russia for two months, spending the time working on his book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* which is considered his most substantial contribution to Marxist theory. In it he outlined a theory of nations and formulated the principles of a Bolshevik solution of the National problem. He advocated the right of each national group in the Russian Empire to use its own language and foster its own culture, but insisted that the workers of all nationalities could win freedom only by being united into one party. Lenin valued this work so highly that Stalin was appointed Commissar of Nationalities as soon as the Bolsheviks took power. Stalin was entrusted with drafting every resolution on the question for the Party.

It was the custom of the Tsarist police to attempt to place spies and *agents provocateurs* within all workers' organizations. One of these secret spies, Malinovsky, was so clever that he managed to be elected to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks. Malinovsky brought about the final arrest of Stalin, and this time the authorities took precautions to see that he was held. He was taken to the far off region of Turukhansk, and then, fearing another escape, transferred him further north, to the village of Kureika at the edge of the Arctic Circle. There, under the harshest of conditions, he was guarded so securely that only the Revolution of 1917 set him free.

Vera Schweizer, another revolutionist, made a secret trip to see him, bearing messages from the Party. The last one hundred miles was a frozen wilderness, traversed by dog sled, following the Yenisei River. Kureika consisted of fifteen huts. Stalin lived in the poorest of them all. His first act after the arrival of the visitor was to run to the river, draw in his fishing lines from holes in the ice, and return with a huge

sturgeon on his shoulder. To his visitor, "The very room seemed to breathe of the intense workings of Stalin's mind, which at the same time was not diverted from surrounding realities. His table was piled high with books and huge bundles of newspapers. And in a corner was stacked fishing and hunting tackle of various kinds, which he had made himself."

Meanwhile, under the pressure of stunning military defeats, increasing disorganization in all phases of life, and a new wave of revolutionary activity, the power of the Tsarist regime was cracking. In the spring of 1917 it fell, and the Provisional Government, headed by Kerensky, came to nominal power.

I was in Turkestan, directing Y.M.C.A. work, when the Revolution of March 1917 broke. Masses of soldiers, workers, and peasants surged down the main thoroughfare singing revolutionary hymns and bearing banners inscribed "Liberty, Equality, Free Education." The Soviet became the real power even during the Kerensky era. Soviet merely means "council." Such organizations had always existed, from a soviet of medical workers to a soviet of the Tsar's ministers. After the Revolution the soldiers elected soviets or councils to represent them, as did the workers in every factory and the peasants in every village. All of these councils were represented in a national Soviet Congress so that the masses were here much more directly represented than they were by the Provisional Government.

At first the Bolsheviks were in the minority. On April 16, 1917 I attended the meeting at which Lenin spoke for the first time since his return from Switzerland. He advocated the immediate seizure of the land by the peasants, the nationalization of factories, and all power to the Soviets. The people went wild with enthusiasm. From his far-off exile Stalin had, with the breakdown of Tsarist authority, hastened back to the capital, and began editing *Pravda* again. In one of his first articles he wrote, "We must tear the mask from the imperialists and reveal to the masses what is really behind the present war—but this means declaring war on war, it means making the present war impossible." The Kerensky government was attempting to continue Russian participation in World War I, and to an overwhelmingly war-weary people words like those of Stalin were sparks in tinder.

To those of us who were in Russia at the time, it became quite clear where power resided when, in August 1917, General Kornilov marched on the capital

with the aim of restoring Tsarism. It was not in the Winter Palace with Kerensky and the Provisional Government, but it was at Bolshevik Headquarters in Smolny Institute. Only the Bolsheviks prevented the overthrow of the Provisional regime by the Tsarist forces. It was Lenin's group, not Kerensky, who brought the Bolshevik sailors from Kronstadt. It was the Bolsheviks, not Kerensky, that arrested the forty-two generals who allegedly were the center of the counter-revolution. It was the Bolsheviks, not Kerensky, that sent delegates to Kornilov's "Savage Division" to convince them that they were being used to destroy the Soviets. Col. Wm. B. Thompson, head of the American Red Cross put \$1,000,000 of his own fortune into trying to help Kerensky remain in power. The British placed their own officers, dressed in Russian uniforms, inside the tanks of Kornilov's forces. These men threatened to shoot Russian soldiers when they refused to advance against the Soviets—all to no avail. The troops refused to fight after hearing the Bolshevik deputation, and the Kornilov revolt was over.

The Provisional Government lasted only 197 days. Even when the sceptre had irretrievably passed from Kerensky, he did not know it. I saw Kerensky only a day before the Bolsheviks seized power. I asked if there was any danger that the Bolsheviks would lead a revolt. With an airy wave of his hand he replied, "Not the slightest." The next day he was fleeing for his life.

The Bolsheviks had won a majority in the Soviets and decided to seize power. Lenin and Trotsky were to win the applause, but Stalin almost unnoticed was also directing the revolutionary soldiers, sailors, and workers at the barricades. On November 7, power passed to the new Bolshevik Government and Lenin was able to say to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets which opened that night, "We shall now proceed to construct the Socialist order." Prominent in the new Socialist order was Stalin who was re-elected to the Central Committee of the Party and also to the Political Bureau which handles all questions when the Central Committee is not in session. The Political Bureau (or Politbureau, as it is known in Russia) is the real power. Stalin has been a member since it was founded up to the present time. Stalin was also editor of *Pravda* and Commissar of Nationalities.

The Revolution had won, but inside Russia it faced the opposition of the military officers, the aristocracy,

and property owners. Far more dangerous to its existence, however, was the bitter hostility of every government in the world. The first problem which the Soviets faced was that of ending hostilities in which Russia was involved—that country could hardly have continued them even if the Bolsheviks had not been committed to ending the war.

At the end of 1917 the Bolshevik Government requested the United States to place American officers on the Russian border to see that no supplies went into Germany. Col. Raymond Robins carried this offer to the heads of the Allied military commissions, but their answer was, "These Bolsheviks are thieves, murderers, and German agents. And, even if they are not, they will only be here for a little while. There is a good government coming up from the south, and the White Guards are coming from Finland. This is all moonshine and we don't think you ought to have anything to do with this government." Since the Bolsheviks could get no help from the Allies they were forced to open peace negotiations with the Germans. Their first aim was to preserve the Revolution.

The first serious split in the Bolshevik ranks came over this question. Lenin, Stalin, and Y. M. Sverdlov were for immediate peace. A group of "Left Communists", Bukharin, Radek, and Piatakov, were for war. Another of the "Left Communist" group, Leon Trotsky, proposed that they refuse to sign Germany's unjust peace offer but at the same time refuse to fight. This "neither peace nor war" proposal won, and, since Trotsky had announced to the Germans that demobilization of Russian troops would be continued, the German armies marched in. The Central Committee of the Party was hastily convened and Lenin secured a majority of one vote for peace at any price. Of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Lenin wrote "Intolerably severe are the terms of the peace. Nevertheless, history will claim its own. . . Let us set to work to organize, organize, and organize. Despite all trials, the future is ours."

Now that Russia had peace with Germany, Generals Alexiev, Kornilov, and Denikin began to mobilize for Civil War. The Germans took control in the Ukraine. British and American troops began landing at Murmansk. General von der Goltz of the German Army went to Finland at the invitation of General Baron Mannerheim and helped crush the Finnish revolution. The Allies began landing in Vladivostok in April, 1918 and by September 15 of the next year 8,477

American troops, 1,429 British, 1,076 French, 1,400 Italians, and 60,000 Japanese were in the Russian Far East.

"A specialist in cleaning out Augean stables" are the words which Stalin has used to describe the work he was called upon to do at the time of the civil wars and interventions. In May 1918 the Soviet Government controlled only one sixth of the territory of the country and was fighting for its very life. Of this period, War Commissar Voroshilov has said that, "Between 1918 and 1920 Stalin was the only man whom the Central Committee kept sending from one front to another, to the point at which the Revolution was in the greatest peril."

The first of these points was Tsaritsyn, later Stalin-grad, upon which the White armies were concentrating in the hope that its capture would cut off the Soviets from badly needed grain from the Ukraine and oil from Baku. Stalin's first act was to clear the city of White Guards. Nossovitch, the Chief of Military Direction, a protege of Trotsky, went over to the enemy, but later wrote of Stalin, "We must be fair to him and admit that any of the old administrators have good cause to envy his energy." He paid particular tribute to Stalin's ability to uncover traitors, and reported that the decision regarding them was short and to the point: "To be shot."

Stalin then reorganized the defence of the city, and in so doing increased the barely concealed antagonism between himself and Trotsky. Trotsky, worried by Stalin's activities, sent a wire ordering that the military staff should not be interfered with. Stalin merely wrote across the telegram "To be ignored." Trotsky went to Lenin and succeeded in having his rival recalled. But Stalin had already "cleaned the stables" and Tsaritsyn was saved.

Stalin was sent to Perm to clean up a "catastrophic condition" in the Red Army there. On the 5th of January, 1919, Stalin wired Lenin that conditions were so bad in Perm that it was essential to send in "three absolutely reliable regiments." They came and the Red Army was able to go on the offensive. After this crisis was over Stalin was sent to aid Voroshilov against Denikin in the Ukraine. Then General Yudenitch, supported by the British, began to march on Leningrad. Lenin, fearing to weaken the Denikin front, proposed the temporary abandonment of Leningrad. To this both Stalin and Trotsky were opposed. Stalin was re-

called to defend the city. Both he and Trotsky worked brilliantly and were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Stalin's citation read, in part, that "By personal example in the fighting line, under the fire of the enemy, he lent inspiration to the ranks of the defenders of the Soviet Republic . . ."

A wittily-worded telegram that Stalin sent to Lenin during the fighting on the outskirts of Leningrad reveals his unorthodox methods. "The naval specialists assured us that the capture of Red Hill from the sea would overthrow all naval science. There is nothing left but to mourn the loss of this so-called science. The speedy capture of the 'hill' was the result of the most brutal interference on my part, and of civilians generally, in the operations, including the cancelling of orders on land and sea, and giving our own instructions. I consider it my duty to declare that I shall continue to act this way despite all my reverence for science."

In the east Kolchak's army had been defeated and sent reeling to the Urals, but Denikin was again advancing. Trotsky, as Minister of War, proposed that troops be withdrawn from the Kolchak front and used against Denikin. Stalin was unalterably opposed to this and asked for the resignation of Trotsky. Trotsky countered by offering his resignation. The entire Central Committee, including Stalin, refused to accept it.

Stalin was assigned to the crucial Denikin front, but, before accepting, secured a promise from Lenin that Trotsky should in no event be allowed to interfere with his work. His first act was to veto the plan, which had been ordered, of advancing on Novorossisk across the Don steppes. He wrote to the Central Committee, "It is childishly easy to show that this senseless advance in the midst of hostile country, on an impossible line, would in all probability be utterly disastrous." He advocated, as an alternative, an attack on Rostov through Kharkov and the Donetz basin where the

workers would be overwhelmingly behind the Bolsheviks. He advanced the following reasons for his plan, "1. We would occupy the most important railway line of the Denikin Army. 2. We would split his army in two. 3. If the plan were successful Denikin would be forced to make the Cossacks fall back but this would antagonize the vast majority of them. 4. Finally, it would mean we would capture all the coal and Denikin would have none." At the end of his dispatch Stalin sounded a note of warning if his plan was disapproved. "My work at the southern front becomes meaningless, criminal and useless, which gives me the right, or rather, compels me to go no matter where, even to the devil, but not to remain here." The plan was accepted, and Denikin's complete defeat was only a matter of weeks.

The Caucasus was Stalin's next assignment. He became ill from overwork and had to withdraw, but as soon as he recovered was sent into the Polish campaign, which did not end brilliantly although he succeeded in liberating Kiev. Lenin had demanded the disastrous Warsaw campaign. Stalin has been blamed for not abandoning Lemberg, but the real mistake was Lenin's insistence on pushing the Polish invaders back as far as Warsaw. After the Polish affair was over Stalin was sent on August 3, 1920 to oppose General Wrangel who, backed by the British, was making a swift stab up from the south. Wrangel's army was shattered by the Red Army under Stalin, and at last the Soviet Government was relatively secure.

Foreign intervention and efforts to subsidize and support counter-revolutionary forces had produced a result directly opposite to the intent of these actions. Illusions of finding popular support for anti-Soviet intervention were shattered. Under many blows the Soviets had gathered strength and consolidated their position. A powerful and experienced Red Army had been built, and the steel of Stalin had been tempered.

CHAPTER IV

The War Within

RUSSIA continued to be beset with internal difficulties. Wartime Communism, with its surplus-appropriation system, was causing widespread discontent, particularly among the peasants. A new policy, which would revive agriculture and trade, was obviously necessary. Deep differences of opinion arose in the Party as to what the new policy should be. Trotsky and the groups which developed around him, the "Left Communists" and "Workers' Opposition", proposed to "tighten up the screws" and get needed supplies by coercion. A majority, in which Stalin was active, proposed that the peasants be allowed to dispose of the greater portion of their produce in private trade, believing that this would stimulate economic rehabilitation. The latter plan, as formulated by Lenin, and termed the New Economic Policy, was adopted, but the split within the Party did not heal.

As long as Lenin lived disputes could, by his authority and prestige, be resolved without endangering the state. Stalin, even today, maintains, "I am only a disciple of Lenin and it is my ambition to be a faithful disciple." Stalin always admired Lenin, and after the Revolution was in almost daily contact with him. Lenin, in turn, recognized Stalin's ability, and even before the Revolution, in 1913, referred to him in a letter to the Russian writer, Maxim Gorky, as "a wonderful Georgian."

Stalin had met Lenin for the first time at the Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors. His description of the meeting is colored by his respect and esteem for the man. "I first met Lenin in December 1905 . . . I was hoping to see the mountain eagle of our Party, the great man, great not only politically, but, if you will, physically, because in my imagination I pictured Lenin as a giant, stately and imposing. What, then, was my disappointment to see a most ordinary-looking

man, below average height, in no way, literally in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals.

"It is accepted as the usual thing for a 'great man' to come late to meetings so that the assembly may await his appearance with bated breath; and then, just before the great man enters, the warning goes up: 'Hush! . . . Silence! . . . He's coming!' What then was my disappointment to learn that Lenin had arrived before the delegates, had settled himself in a corner and was unassumingly carrying on a most ordinary conversation with the most ordinary delegate at the Conference. I will not conceal from you that at that time this seemed to me to be rather a violation of certain essential rules.

"Only later did I realize that this simplicity and modesty . . . was one of Lenin's strongest points as the new leader of the new masses, of the simple and ordinary masses, of the very 'rank and file' of Humanity."

Students of Stalin are generally agreed that Lenin's personality had quite a part in shaping that of his successor.

From this first meeting the ties between the two men grew closer and closer, and no question ever divided them until a few months before Lenin's death. During the revolutionary seizure of power Stalin was in Lenin's office most of the time. When General Dukhonin and the army headquarters refused to obey the orders of the Peoples' Commissars, Stalin and Lenin were together. Lenin brought an end to Dukhonin by a direct radio appeal to the troops, going over the heads of the officers. Lenin continually depended on Stalin to handle the most difficult tasks. Besides his many responsible military missions, Stalin was sent to end a railway strike after Kamenev had failed. He did the job. Stalin was sent to the Ukraine to deal with the Rada and restore a Ukrainian Soviet government.

He was successful. These assignments were not lightly given, and Lenin was greatly impressed by Stalin's successes. So it may be said that, from the early days of the Revolution, Stalin had been a sort of understudy and assistant to Lenin.

Lenin died in January 1924. In the months before his death, as he lay ill and partially paralyzed, Lenin dictated a memorandum and gave it to his wife. No one else saw it until after his death.

I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the near future and I intend to examine here a series of considerations of a purely personal character.

I think that the fundamental factor in the matter of stability—from this point of view—is such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and Trotsky. The relation between them constitutes, in my opinion, a big half of the danger of that split, which might be avoided, and the avoidance of which might be promoted, in my opinion, by raising the number of members of the Central Committee to fifty or one hundred.

Comrade Stalin, having become secretary-general, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand, Comrade Trotsky, as was proved by his struggle against the Central Committee in connection with the question of the people's commissariat of ways and communications, is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally, he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee—but also by his too far-reaching self confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs.

These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present Central Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split; if our party does not take measures to prevent it, a split might arise quite unexpectedly.

Shortly after this was written, but with no knowledge of it, Stalin rebuked Lenin's wife for burdening him with Party matters and not conserving his strength. Lenin, much annoyed when this was reported to him, then added to his previous note:

Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of Secretary General. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all respects, except in general superiority, differs from Stalin—

namely, a man more patient, more loyal, more polite, and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky which I discussed before, it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may acquire decisive significance.

It is quite clear that Lenin, deathly sick, was thinking entirely in terms of preventing a split in the Party, which he foresaw. If Lenin could see the Soviet Union today, the great strides which have been made, the position which it occupies in international affairs, who shall say that he would not feel that, in spite of mistakes, Stalin has done far better than he dared hope. For nearly a year while he lived Lenin did nothing with his statement and it was only after his death that it was presented to the Party. When it was presented, Stalin offered his resignation but the Party, including Trotsky, would not accept it.

~~After Lenin's death the choice was clearly between Stalin and Trotsky. Stalin had always been a regular Bolshevik. Trotsky had at one time been a Menshevik and a vacillator, first with one party or position, then with another.~~ Stalin was a modest but unexcelled political organizer. Trotsky had great ability as an orator and writer, but had equally great and often blinding conceit. One of Lenin's last acts, before his illness, was to move that Stalin be elected General Secretary of the Central Committee. When I talked with leading Party members in Russia after Lenin's death they said to me, "Supposing we had a free election in Russia and the choice were between Stalin and Trotsky, how would any intelligently informed man vote? It is obvious that Stalin would build the Soviet state better, and would not stake everything on foreign revolutions. Furthermore, we can talk with Stalin. He will listen to reason, but if Trotsky once has an idea nothing can sway him."

Stalin brought the fight out into the open before Lenin's death. At the 1923 Party Congress he attacked "Trotskyism" and contrasted it with "Leninism". Zinoviev and Kamenev, antagonized by Trotsky's comments on their opposition to the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, temporarily turned against Trotsky. Trotsky was, therefore, in a weak position from the start. Behind the personal antagonism between Trotsky and Stalin there were many substantial theoretical differences. Trotsky believed that it was impossible to build socialism in Russia without world, or at least

European, revolution. Stalin felt that socialism could be built in Russia alone and that dependence on outside help would be fatal.

Besides this central issue there were a host of others scarcely less important. Stalin had long been concerned regarding the attitude of the peasants. He reported, "Our agents in the villages were killed and their houses set on fire by the peasants . . . in some places, especially in the border regions we had to fight the activities of organized bands; and we had to suppress a real peasant uprising in Georgia." Stalin therefore urged, in 1925, an easier peasant policy, declaring that it was absolutely necessary to win the sympathies of the middle class of peasants. In this proposition he was strongly supported by Kalinin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and by Rykov, the Premier. The program was overwhelmingly approved by the Party, but Zinoviev and Kamenev rejoined the opposition declaring that Stalin and the majority were abandoning Communism. The opposition also charged that the Political Bureau had too much power and asked that its authority be curtailed. Trotsky, while a member of the majority, had helped formulate the strict rules on majority rule: now that he was in the minority, he demanded more freedom within the Party.

After the 1925 Conference Stalin issued a warning, "The Party desires unity, and it will achieve it with Kamenev and Zinoviev if they wish it, or without them if they do not wish it." All the defeated opposition leaders nevertheless began to agitate and tried to increase their following. But, according to Party rules, largely formulated by Lenin, and supported previously by Trotsky as well as Stalin, once the majority has ruled everyone in the Party is obligated loyally to support the decision. This is called "democratic centralism." Not to do so is considered treason. Yet Trotsky and his supporters refused to abide by their own rules. They built up a secret organization with a secret printing press. In the latter part of 1926 they visited the factories of Leningrad and Moscow, trying to win over the workers.

Stalin explained his position on democratic centralism when I talked to him in 1926. I asked him "In Russia, according to the Communist Party Constitution, when the Party has decided a question by what we call a Party caucus the minority is not permitted to agitate against the majority. We all know that majorities are sometimes wrong and that minorities are sometimes

morally right. How can a wrong majority decision ever be righted?"

"We are a war party of several million people," Stalin answered. "A fighting party must execute its decisions, not degenerate into a discussion club. At the time of a conference and before an election to a conference there is complete freedom of opinion. But once a decision has been reached it is no longer a question of majority or minority but rather of getting everyone to work to execute the decision, not begin anew the debate.

"Russians love to discuss things, and private discussions go on continuously on every issue, but after a decision is made no one is allowed *by any act* to oppose it. Of course, the situation may change, and any city can ask at any time for a reconsideration of the whole question. The Central Committee can then decide whether it is wise to reopen it. If they think it is, the whole matter is taken up by the Party anew in the light of experience and again decided by the majority after full discussion.

"For example, in 1920 the Central Committee was divided on the question of trade unions. Solution was reached through discussion. In 1925 Leningrad requested the right to oppose the Central Committee decisions and the right was granted. After the conference the majority upheld the Central Committee. Zinoviev tried to continue the discussion after that. He was told that it was illegal."

I pushed the matter further by asking, "Do you think you will permit more liberty of discussion within the party as time goes on and your party government is more firmly established?"

"No," said Stalin, "If anything there will be less discussion, for our leaders will be wiser, have had more experience, and will know how to deal with the problems which arise. On the other hand, there will probably be much more freedom for written criticism than now, especially in periodicals. Such criticism is healthful and stimulating. But a government must have one-ness of aims, must know what its policy is, must act energetically."

When the Opposition foresaw defeat, they wrote a petition to the Central Committee promising in the future to abide by majority decisions. This promise was not carried out. At the Fifteenth Conference of the Party, held in 1926, Stalin again attacked Trotsky and the opposition in vigorous terms, declaring that

they wished to tempt the Party to dependence on world revolution, that they proposed coercive measures against the peasantry, and wished to weaken the position and authority of the Central Committee. Stalin's position was approved by the Conference.

In 1927 the international position of the Soviet Union was again shaken. In May the British Conservative Government raided Arcos, the Soviet trade office, in London. Only a month later Voikov, the Soviet Ambassador to Poland was assassinated. Shortly thereafter almost simultaneous raids were made on the Soviet Embassies in Berlin, Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin. Stalin commented that "something like a united front from Chamberlain to Trotsky is being formed."

During that year this writer again visited Russia, interviewing both Trotsky and Stalin. I asked Trotsky whether it would be accurate to say that the Soviet Union was a dictatorship of the Communist Party on behalf of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. He replied, "Yes, it is accurate to say this. To call the Soviet Union a democracy or not depends upon what meaning you give the term 'democracy.' For my part, I could ask a parallel question—is it accurate to say that the United States is not a democracy but a dictatorship of the largest banks, owners of the largest industrial undertakings etc.? On this question I would reply that democracy in the United States is non-existent—that there exists a dictatorship of concentrated capital and external forms of political democracy."

I also asked Trotsky about the opposition within the Party. He was, for some reason, loathe to discuss the

differences but said, "These questions are discussed within a single party, which is bound together by the great tradition of Civil War, October Revolution, and internal, iron discipline of the Party. What divides us is far less important than what joins us together."

The following day the official Party paper *Pravda* came out with a stinging blast against Trotsky, criticizing his answers in the interview. *Pravda* said, among other things, that he should have explained why there was proletarian democracy in Russia and how it worked.

When I saw Stalin in 1927 he was bitterly critical of Trotsky's factional tactics and for his opposition to socialist industrialization. A few months later Stalin, speaking for the Central Committee, announced a general Party discussion and vote on the issues raised by the Trotsky opposition. The Trotsky group took a decisive trouncing: 724,000 members voted to sustain Stalin and the Committee, while only 4,000 supported the opposition. But it was only after the Trotsky-Zinoviev group attempted to hold rump demonstrations on November 7, the anniversary of the Revolution, that final action was taken. Stalin demanded and secured the expulsion of both Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party.

A more important happening of that year, from the point of view of history, was the fact that the Fifteenth Convention of the Party, in December, initiated the First Five Year Plan which meant that the Soviets had irrevocably determined upon a policy of building up Russia rather than sponsoring world revolution. That had been Stalin's policy from the beginning.

CHAPTER V

The Sword of the Revolution

WITH 1933 three major influences on Russian policy under Stalin came into full view as historic events. Stalin had long believed that Russia's salvation rested upon industrialization at almost any cost. 1933 saw the substantial fulfillment of the First Five Year Plan, and the inauguration of the Second Five Year Plan which proposed to expand output to the amount of 93 billion rubles by 1937.

Stalin had long believed in and aimed at friendly relations with the peace loving nations of the world, and in 1933 had the satisfaction of seeing the healing of the long-standing breach between Russia and the United States through the recognition of the Soviet Government by President Roosevelt. Finally, while Stalin had wanted and needed peace he believed that history since World War I was heading for a recur-

rence of that catastrophe in which he envisioned an attack on undoubtedly wealthy but supposedly weak Soviet Russia. Hitler, who had written longingly and greedily of Ukrainian wheat and Caucasian oil, came to power in Germany in 1933. The pattern of the next decade was substantially complete. Stalin's long-time policies of staking everything on building up Russia while cooperating with the peaceful powers were to have deep and far-reaching effects.

The rise of Hitler was a signal for the opposition to Stalin and socialism to renew and intensify its work. The German General Staff, which had maintained its freedom of action even in the Weimar Republic, had sent spies into Russia even before Hitler. The numbers increased as German war preparations reached new heights. Former Russian property owners and aristocrats who hated socialism and all its works made alliances with these spies. Some of the embittered opposition within the Party, convinced that another World War was inevitable, but believing, as Stalin did not, that Russia would meet inevitable defeat, believed that they might win power by some sort of an alliance with Germany, Poland or Japan.

What remained of the Trotsky-Zinoviev movement had consistently fought against the reforms and policies proposed by Stalin and approved by the Party. The Rykov group violently opposed collectivization of agriculture. Sabotage in industry and in mining began to break out. Henri Barbusse, the well known French writer, who visited Russia at this time, made the following observations, "What subterranean maneuvers; what scheming and plotting! I am still bewildered by all the photographs of documents which I have seen personally. For years one could search in any corner of the Union and one would infallibly discover the English, French, Polish, or Rumanian microbe of spying and foul play mixed with the virus of the 'White' plague. A certain amount of it still remains. The same people who blew up the bridges and whatever public works still remained in liberated Russia, gasping for breath, who threw emery into the machines and put the few remaining railway engines out of action—these same people put powdered glass into cooperative food supplies in 1933."

It is no more than just to observe that Stalin was patient and acted slowly. Against those who wanted to execute Trotsky he urged exile, then banishment from the country. When Zinoviev and Kamenev committed acts which according to both Communist Party

rules and Soviet law were treason, they were permitted to make repeated pledges to change their ways and given positions of some responsibility. Their pledges were found to be insincere. Their word of "honor" was continually violated.

When Zinoviev had been repudiated by the Leningrad Party organization, Stalin sent one of his ablest assistants, Sergei M. Kirov, to that city. Kirov, a member of the Politbureau, and generally conceded to be the logical successor to Stalin, became chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. In this position he began to demand more democracy in the Soviets and the removal of old class distinctions—obviously with the full approval of Stalin. He also urged that the G.P.U. or United Department of Political Police, which had been responsible for the "Red Terror" following an attempt on Lenin's life, be abolished as an independent agency. This was done, and its administration was placed under the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs or N.K.V.D. Many of its judicial powers were taken over by the regular courts. This was a reform of the first magnitude, and others, equally important, were in the planning stage.

Then, on December 1, 1934, Stalin received a wire that Kirov had been murdered. Stalin's patience was exhausted. He felt that a world crisis was approaching and that the fate of Russia would depend on whether or not construction could go forward—everything, the success of the construction, Russia's defense potentialities, and her prestige in the Western world could be menaced unless strong measures were taken.

Stalin's attitude can be determined from statements he had made earlier. In reply to a question from the German writer Emil Ludwig as to why he was governing with such severity, Stalin had said that it was because they had been too lenient at certain times. He cited the fact that when General Krasnov marched on Leningrad and was arrested, his action merited death. But the Bolsheviks gave the General freedom on his pledged word that he would not take up arms again. He promptly went over to the counter-revolution. "It became clear," Stalin said, "that with this policy we were undermining the very system we were endeavoring to construct."

His ideas are made even more explicit in an interview with the Foreign Workers' Delegation on November 5, 1927. At that time he said:

"The G.P.U. or the *Cheka* is a punitive organ of the Soviet Government. It is more or less similar to the Committee of Public Safety which existed during the great French Revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, speculators, and forgers. The organ was created on the day after the October Revolution, after all kinds of plots, terrorist and spying organizations financed by Russian and foreign capitalists were discovered. This organ developed and became consolidated after a series of terroristic acts had been perpetrated against the leaders of the Soviet government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, member of the Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad, after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, member of the Revolutionary Committee of Leningrad, and after the attempt on the life of Lenin. It must be admitted that the G.P.U. still holds good. It has been, ever since, the terror of the bourgeoisie, the indefatigable guard of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the Proletariat.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries hate the G.P.U. All sorts of legends have been invented about the G.P.U. . . . The sworn enemies of the Revolution curse the G.P.U. Hence it follows that the G.P.U. is doing the right thing.

"But this is not how the workers regard the G.P.U. You can go to the workers' districts and ask the workers what they think of it. You will find they regard it with respect. Why? Because they see in it a loyal defender of the Revolution. . . .

"To disarm the Revolution without having any guarantees that its enemies will be disarmed—would not that be folly, would not that be a crime against the working class? . . .

"I do not mean to say by this that the internal situation of the country is such as makes it necessary to have punitive organs of the Revolution. From the point of view of the internal situation, the Revolution is so firm and unshakeable that we could do without the G.P.U. But the trouble is that the enemies at home are not isolated individuals. They are all connected in a thousand ways with the capitalists of all countries who support them by every means and in every way. We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. The internal enemies of our Revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states are the background and basis for our internal enemies. In fighting against the enemies at home we fight the

counter-revolutionary elements of all countries. Judge for yourselves whether under such conditions we can do without such punitive organs as the G.P.U."

Stalin made this analysis of the G.P.U. He would say much the same of the N.K.V.D. In travelling about Russia during World War II, I was often taken into custody by the N.K.V.D. I always made it a point to compliment them on their alertness in spotting a foreigner who might be a spy. In every case I found that the N.K.V.D. had exceptional men in charge, picked leaders with training and intelligence. They always released me promptly after I had shown my American passport and my credentials from the Foreign Office.

The death of Kirov caused Stalin to bring a temporary halt to the policy of liberalization and return to the stern policies necessary during the Revolution and its aftermath of civil war. He determined to use every resource at his command to rid the country of "Quislings." Fanaticism, hysteria, and bureaucracy inevitably caused some injustice—but the guilty were tried.

Nikolaev, the assassin of Kirov, was caught. At the trial he insisted that he had had no accomplices, but investigators became convinced that he was merely a tool for the opposition. He was shot, but the investigation continued. Kamenev, Zinoviev and eleven others were brought to trial on charges of encouraging terrorist acts. They were convicted and sentenced to prison.

By 1936 further evidence led to the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and fourteen others who were charged with treason and terrorism. Purges, arrests spread through the country. The evidence brought out at the trials seemed almost fantastic—yet all confessed. Zinoviev in his confession frankly admitted, "I plead guilty to having been the principal organizer of the murder of Kirov."

In 1937 seventeen more were tried, including Pyatakov, Radek, and Sokolnikov. All confessed to crimes. Thirteen were executed. Radek and Sokolnikov received long prison terms. Radek in his testimony hinted that a conspiracy existed within the Red Army which involved Marshal Tukhachevsky, a high commander. I had personal reasons for feeling no surprise when Radek pled guilty. I had interviewed him in his apartment in Moscow in 1935, knowing that he was in the opposition group. In the course of the conversation Radek remarked that he considered *Foreign Affairs* the

best periodical in America. This seemed a strange comment for a man of his views, until I learned that Trotsky had just published an article there. From further conversation I received the distinct impression, which he possibly wished to convey, that Radek was in closest contact with Trotsky in exile.

In June 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky, Generals Yakir, Kork, Uborevich, Eideman, Feldman, Primakov, and Putna were tried by military tribunal. A majority of the defendants confessed to plotting with a foreign power—not named at the time—and were shot.

In 1938 the last major treason trial occurred. Defendants included Bukharin, ex-editor of Pravda; Rykov; former Undersecretary of State Krestinsky; former Commisar of Trade Rosengoltz; former Secretary of the Treasury Grinko; Yagoda, former head of the G.P.U. and the Kremlin physician Dr. Levin. Although most of these men had been involved in opposition politics for nearly two decades, the positions which they held indicates the leniency which existed and the opportunities they were given to make good—or commit sabotage.

Of those in the last trial Yagoda most richly deserved his fate. He was certainly no more typical of Russia than the central figures of "scandals" which are featured on the front pages of newspapers are typical of America. With the influence and power which his position gave him he instituted a secret terror. To secure money for wild clandestine orgies he embezzled G.P.U. funds. He had brought Dr. Levin under his sway by threatening to imprison the doctor's wife and son if he refused to obey orders. Levin made the usual error of people who do not report malfeasance to higher authorities, and was soon too deeply involved in crime to be able to disentangle himself. Poisonous drugs were secured for his use. As Kremlin physician he had unparalleled opportunities for damaging the Soviet state. He killed Menzhinsky and Kuibyshev, two very important leaders, and close friends of Stalin.

When Yagoda was removed as head of the G.P.U., Yezhof took his place. Yagoda, when the extent of his crimes had not been discovered, was only placed under house arrest. He determined to take his revenge, and possibly believed that he could cover his tracks. He summoned a former assistant who had also been dismissed but not arrested and together they planned and executed the murder of Yezhof. They dissolved

mercury in acid and sprayed the mixture in Yezhof's office seven times.

Later a commission of experts reported: "On the basis of the chemical analyses of the carpet, curtains, upholstery, and the air in Comrade Yezhof's office, as well as analyses of his urine and the nature of the morbid symptoms he manifested, it must be taken as absolutely established that the poisoning of Comrade Yezhof by mercury absorbed through the respiratory tract was put into execution."

Other evidence revealed that Yagoda had poisoned his former superior, Menzhinsky, and thus became head of the G.P.U. in the first place. At the end of the trial Yagoda and seventeen others were sentenced to be shot.

To the rest of the world it seemed at the time that Russia was enveloped in a smothering atmosphere of plots, murders, and purges. Actually this was a superficial view since, although the rest of the world was morbidly interested in the trials to the exclusion of anything else about Russia, only a tiny percentage of the population was involved and the same years which saw the treason trials saw some of the greatest triumphs of Soviet planning. While the screws tightened on a tiny minority the majority of Soviet people were enjoying greater prosperity and greater freedom.

Yet the trials were important, and not only because they revealed Russian weakness as so many experts thought. When Hitler marched into Russia there were no Quislings, and no organized Fifth Column. Every European country conquered by Hitler had traitors in high places. In Russia there were none. It is clear now that Stalin had eliminated the potential Lavals. There is no doubt that innocent people were arrested, and possibly a few innocent people were killed—but Russia was saved from disaster.

The United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, attended the trials. He is a trained lawyer and his initial prejudice was all against Soviet judicial procedure. Yet he came to the conclusion the defendants were guilty. He says that the testimony disclosed that, "The principal defendants had entered into a conspiracy among themselves, and into an agreement with Germany and Japan to aid those governments in a military attack upon the Soviet Union. They agreed to and actually did cooperate in plans to assassinate Stalin and Molotov, and to project a military uprising against the Kremlin which was to be led by General Tukhachevsky, second in command of the Red

Army. In preparation for war they agreed to and actually did plan and direct the sabotaging of industries, the blowing up of chemical plants, the destruction of coal mines, the wrecking of transportation facilities, and other subversive activities."

Ambassador Davies says that not only was he convinced of the guilt of the defendants, but so were the other foreign ambassadors who attended the trial regularly, although there were some differences of opinion on the degree of guilt of one or another of the men in the dock.

Another distinguished lawyer who attended the trials was D. N. Pritt, who had been King's Counsel in London and a Labor Party member of Parliament. He is also the author of a book on the Russian legal system. Pritt, too, was convinced that the men who were tried were guilty. He was certain that they confessed solely because of the overwhelming weight of evidence against them.

There have been many in the West who hint at something sinister about the confessions. Normally, people don't confess, it is said. They charge that either the defendants were tortured or they confessed hoping to save their lives or those of their families.

The evidence is all against either hypothesis. The accused were tried in open court with representatives of the whole world listening in. There was not then and is not now a scintilla of evidence that any of them had been tortured. They knew they were facing death, and yet did not protest innocence, although the world would have been prone to believe them. The defendants were ex-revolutionists who had never confessed under the Tsar's regime to save their lives or their families. Further, both Mr. Pritt from England and Ambassador Davies from the United States say that it would have been absolutely impossible for the defendants to prepare fake confessions which would square with the rest of the evidence and all other testimony. They claim that fourteen defendants could not rehearse their parts in advance and stick to their roles in the rapid give-and-take of Russian trial procedure,

even if they had decided, for some unknown reason, to take part in such a farce.

Again it is said, why should guilt make people confess? It so happens that I was chairman of the Legislative Commission on Jails in the State of Connecticut for many years. I have seen hundreds of criminals who confessed when confronted with overwhelming proof of their guilt. Confession is by no means a "Russian trait." I attended the Kharkov trial of Nazis in Russia in 1944. German officers and men confessed in open court to the most heinous crimes. They were hanged. During the 1920's British engineers confessed to acts of sabotage in the Metro-Vickers trial in Moscow.

The fact is that all the allegedly sinister reasons for confessions do not agree with the evidence. Bukharin, one of the defendants, was far more convincing in his final statement, made when he must have known that he was doomed. He declared that he did not confess because of drugs, or hypnosis, or Russian temperament. He said, "It must be admitted that incriminating evidence plays a very important part. For three months I refused to say anything. Then I began to testify. Why? Because while in prison I made a revaluation of my entire past. For when you ask yourself: 'If you must die, what are you dying for?'—an absolutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you with startling vividness. There was nothing to die for, if one wanted to die unrepentant. And, on the contrary, everything that glistens in the Soviet Union acquired new dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees before the Party and the country." Not all of those who were arrested confessed, but, if the evidence led the judges to believe that they were guilty, they were punished too.

It was easy, reading our newspapers, to believe that the whole of Russia was in the throes of trials and executions. That was not a true picture. Russia was building during this period—industrializing, rearming, educating—faster perhaps than any other country. Stalin was engrossed not so much in eliminating the opposition as in preparing for the war which he felt certain would be forced upon the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER VI

Is Stalin a Dictator?

DURING the war many people termed Winston Churchill a dictator. That was a common epithet used by opponents of the late President Roosevelt. Obviously the word means a great many different things to different people. Whether or not Stalin can be called a dictator depends on how the word is defined. From the American point of view he is more of a dictator than were Roosevelt or Churchill, who were not dictators at all, but also—and this is even more important—Stalin is certainly not a dictator in the sense that Hitler and Mussolini were. Hitler was *The Fuehrer*. In theory, and usually in practice, his every whim was law. All Germans had to Heil Hitler. He was the supreme embodiment of the State. Under Communist theory Stalin is just a leader of the moment. It is the masses who are all important.

It would be well on this matter to examine some basic assumptions. In the West we usually think, wrongly or rightly, of politics as something separate from economic and social life. In Russia the political is so interwoven with the economic and social that it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other.

In England and America we think of dissenters and objectors as having won our freedom. Our democracy was born when a group of individuals sought liberty against an arbitrary power. Russian freedom has stemmed from the subordination of the individual to the organization of the group, from group solidarity.

In the Revolution of 1776 our forefathers established a republic on a virgin continent. Private initiative and individual ownership offered the quickest and most practical means of developing the new nation. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had to overcome a heritage left by the Tsarist autocracy. The basic means of production and distribution were in the hands of a wealthy few, including decadent aristocrats and foreign inter-

ests. Rapid development of the nation could only come through seizure of national resources for the benefit of all.

Both Russia and the countries of the West have been striving for the welfare and happiness of the people, but by different means. America and England have tried to secure freedom, happiness, and human welfare through individual freedom and initiative. The Russian people, on the other hand, have approached the same objectives from the opposite side of the circle, believing that they can achieve these ends only through the group. The Russians believe that the promise of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" is insufficient unless men are given the conditions which make these possible.

Stalin expressed this thought in an interview with Roy Howard, the American publisher. "Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where men are not haunted by fear of being deprived tomorrow of work, of home and of bread. Only in such a society is real—and not paper—personal and every other liberty possible. . . . We did not build this society in order to restrict human liberty, but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of genuine personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks."

Although Stalin will admit as readily as anyone that this aim has not yet been achieved, he has felt, from the very beginning of his career as a revolutionist, that the Soviet system could only survive by expressing true popular strivings. He expressed this to me in 1926. I asked, "Since there is legality for only one political party in Russia, how do you know that the masses favor Communism?" Stalin answered directly and in detail: "Take the most important moments in the life of our country and see whether there are any grounds

for the assertion that the masses really sympathize with the Communists.

"Take, first of all, so important a moment as the period of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist Party, precisely as a Party, openly called upon the workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and when this Party obtained the support of the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants. What was the situation at the time? The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats (Mensheviks), allied with the bourgeoisie, were in power. The governmental apparatus, both in the center and locally, as well as the command of the twelve million man army, was in the hands of the government. The Communist Party was in a state of semi-legality. The bourgeoisie of all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik Party. The Allies wholly and entirely supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) never ceased to call upon the proletariat to overthrow this government and to establish the dictatorship of the Proletariat.

"What happened? The overwhelming majority of the masses of toilers in the rear as well as at the front most emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party—the Kerensky Government was overthrown, and the rule of the Proletariat established. How is it that the Bolsheviks were able to emerge victorious at that time in spite of the malicious forecasts of the bourgeoisie of all countries of the doom of the Bolshevik Party? Does it not prove that the broad masses of the toilers sympathized with the Bolshevik Party? I think it does. This is the first test of the authority and influence of the Communist Party among broad masses of the population.

"Take the second period, the period of intervention and civil war, when the British capitalists occupied the North of Russia, the districts of Archangel and Murmansk, when the American, British, Japanese and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak to the forefront, when the French and British capitalists took steps to occupy south Russia and raised Denikin and Wrangel on their shields.

"This was a war conducted by the Entente and the counter-revolutionary generals in Russia against the Communist Government in Moscow, against the achievements of the October Revolution. In this period the strength and stability of the Communist Party

among the broad masses of the workers and peasants were put to the greatest test. And what happened? It is generally known that as a result of the Civil War the occupation troops were driven from Russia and the counter-revolutionary generals were defeated by the Red Army.

"Here it was proved that the outcome of war is decided in the last analysis not by technique, with which Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully furnished by the enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by proper policy, the sympathy and support of the millions of the masses of the population.

"Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party proved victorious then? Of course not. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party in Russia enjoys the sympathy of the wide masses of the toilers? I think it does. This is the second test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

"We will now take up the present period [1926], the post-war period, when questions of peaceful construction are the order of the day. The period of economic ruin has given way to the period of the restoration of industry and later to the period of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis. Have we now ways and means of testing the strength and stability of the Communist Party, of determining the degree of sympathy enjoyed by the Party among the broad masses of the toilers? I think we have.

"Take first of all the trade unions which combine nearly ten million proletarians. Let us examine the composition of the leading organs of these trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists are at the head of these organs? Of course not. It would be absurd to think that the workers in the U.S.S.R. are indifferent to the composition of the leading organs of their trade unions.

"The workers in the U.S.S.R. grew up and received their training in the storms of three revolutions. They learned as no other workers learned, to try their leaders and expel them if they do not satisfy the interests of the proletariat. At one time the most popular man in our party was Plekhanov (before the Revolution). However, the workers did not hesitate to isolate him completely when they became convinced that he had abandoned the proletarian position. And if these workers express their complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to responsible posts in the trade

unions, it is direct evidence that the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the workers in the U.S.S.R. is enormous. This is one test of the undoubted sympathy of the broad masses of the workers for the Communist Party. . . .

"Finally, take the innumerable conferences, consultations, delegate meetings, etc., which embrace millions of the masses of the toilers, both working men and working women, peasants and peasant women, among all nationalities forming the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, people wax ironical over these conferences and consultations and assert that the Russians like to talk very much. For us, however, these conferences and consultations are of enormous significance in that they serve as a test of the mood of the masses and also as a means of exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods by which these mistakes can be rectified; for we make not a few mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think that to expose these errors and honestly to rectify them is one of the best means of improving the management of the country.

"Take the speeches delivered at these conferences and consultations. Note the business-like and ingenious remarks uttered by these 'simple people,' these workers and peasants; note the decisions taken and you will see how enormous is the influence and authority of the Communist Party, an influence and authority that any party in the world might envy. Thus you have still another test of the stability of the Communist Party."

Stalin's contention, then, is that he governs by the consent of the governed. How does this square with the realities of Soviet government? People as well as governments can be judged by the direction in which they are moving, and by comparison with the past which produced them. If contrasted to the Tsar's regime, the Soviet Union is democratic. To one who has studied both Tsarism and Sovietism at first hand there can be no question that there is far less dictatorship today in Russia than under the Tsar. People talk about personally conducted tours under the Bolsheviks, but under Tsarism the secret police trailed me twenty-four hours a day, using three shifts. Nevertheless, the many abuses which occurred could not be concealed. Men and women were arrested and exiled for the least trace of thought or criticism to say nothing of liberal views.

The Soviet Union has, since its establishment, slowly tended in the direction of more democracy—although the Soviet leaders do not intend strictly to parallel Western democracy, for neither they nor the Soviet people accept all of our basic assumptions about democracy. The 1936 Constitution reveals the main trends of Soviet democracy. In 1935 Stalin was made chairman of a commission to draft a new constitution. When the draft was completed it was distributed for popular analysis and discussion. Sixty million copies in leaflet form were printed. These were issued in every one of the many languages spoken in the Soviet Union. Ten thousand newspapers with a total circulation of 37 million copies printed it in full. It was broadcast over the radio and discussed at over half a million meetings. As a result there were 134,000 suggested amendments. Every one of these suggestions was examined by the Commission and many were incorporated in an amended draft. This draft was further amended and finally approved at an extraordinary Congress of the Soviets in December 1936. Most Westerners are totally unaware that such a democratic process was ever in operation in the Soviet Union.

The Constitution provides for a federation of sixteen Socialist Soviet Republics. It frankly recognizes the Socialist character of the government. A citizen may own only what he himself can use—a home, an automobile, personal belongings, and savings. He cannot own and exploit in his personal interest the mines, the oil, the forests, the factories—in other words the basic means of production and distribution. They belong to the people.

The Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights to the citizen:

The right to work with payment according to quality and quantity.

The right to leisure—a seven hour working day "for the overwhelming majority of the workers" and "vacations with full pay."

The right to security in old age and sickness; free medicine.

The right to free education.

Equal rights to all citizens irrespective of race.

Freedom of religious worship.

Freedom of organization—the constitution specifies trade unions, cooperative organizations, youth organizations, sport and defense organiza-

tions, cultural, technical and scientific societies, as well as the All-Union Communist Party.

Freedom from arrest "except by order of the court or with the sanction of a state-attorney."

Inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of street demonstrations are guaranteed by law, but only "to strengthen the socialist system."

Many of these rights have not been realized and others were suspended during the war. For instance, many industries had not reached the level where the 7-hour day was practical, but during the war, all industries instituted longer hours. Nevertheless these rights represent goals which the Soviets expect to reach. Today the eight hour day and vacations with pay have been reinstated.

The Constitution also exacts certain duties from citizens. Every able-bodied citizen must work. The New Testament principle of "he who does not work shall not eat" is rigidly observed. The Constitution also states that "It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of the working people. Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people."

The Russians consider their Constitution the most advanced and democratic in the world—and they feel that Stalin more than any other man was responsible for it. It is a fact that many leading Communists opposed granting secret and universal suffrage. They feared that the backwardness among certain sections of the people might make this dangerous. Stalin strongly supported the voting provisions and they were adopted. So far they have proved to be dangerous only to officials who were neglecting their duties—and this is what Stalin had hoped for and wants more of in the future.

The governmental mechanism provided by the Constitution does involve large numbers of people directly in government. Any idea that there is a small Communist group which runs things by itself is erroneous. The Russian government is a union of Soviets. A Soviet, as we have noted, means council. Every town and city has its council. Naturally, under a socialist system, the

council is responsible not only for roads, schools, and the fire department, but also for factories, stores, and homes. Soviet meetings are usually short because delegates work in an office, or factory, or on a farm. Consequently the delegates elect an Executive Committee which meets as often and for as long as may be necessary. Every delegate to a Soviet is subject to recall by his constituency and therefore must make frequent reports to the citizens.

There are roughly 70,000 local soviets in the Soviet Union. Above the local soviets are the county soviets, then those of the regions, provinces, territories, and the Soviets of the sixteen republics. Above all of these is the Supreme Soviet which corresponds to our Congress and which is elected for four years. It is divided into two chambers. The Council of the Union has one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants and consists of 682 members. The Council of Nationalities consists of 657 delegates elected on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven from each Autonomous Republic, five from each Autonomous Region, and one from each National Area. Roughly 24% of the members of the Supreme Soviet are non-Communists.

So far, the system has worked out best in the villages and small towns, where everyone knows everyone else. With an unlimited right to nominate candidates, and the secret ballot, there is genuine democracy in the villages. In the higher soviets, up to and including the Supreme Council, the Communist Party machine tends to swing into action. Since the Communist Party has a monopoly on legality as a political organization, there is often only one slate. This is not necessarily true. I have, for instance, been in many cities where there were several candidates for Mayor.

Eric Johnston, President of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, reported that when he visited Omsk in Siberia there were five candidates for Mayor.

Stalin apparently welcomes this trend. In an interview in 1936 he said, "I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our country which work badly. Cases occur when this or that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions? Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labor more effective and our lives more cultured? Such will

be the criteria with which millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates lists, and promote and nominate the best. . . . Universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the organs of government which work badly."

In the cities every member of the Soviet is obliged to choose one section in which he wishes to work. These vary in number all the way from eighty-five in Leningrad to twenty-two in Rostov on the Don. Moscow, for instance, has twenty-five sections: Agriculture, Anti-aircraft Defense, Building, Communal Economy, Communications, Courts, Prosecutions, Police and Fire, Culture, Defense, Eliminating Adult Illiteracy, Finance, Fuel, Children, Housing, Local Industry and Cooperatives, Local Trading, Main Drainage, Subway, Motor and Horse Traffic, Public Feeding, Public Health, Railroads, Roads, Bridges and River Banks, Schools, Sewage, Lighting, Foliage and Parks, and Tramways. Any organization in the city may also send a delegate to observe and participate in the work of a section. In Moscow alone roughly 25,000 persons thus participate in government. In the Section of Public Health there were 600 elected delegates and over 1,000 who represented interested organizations.

This system undoubtedly creates great public interest in civic problems and results in widespread participation. It certainly gets a lot of public business done. I sat in a section meeting in Moscow where the war-time food shortage was under discussion. Everyone had the right to speak, and there was no backwardness about using it. The official Party leader read his proposal to improve food rationing. I have never, in any country, heard a governmental representative receive such scathing criticism. Typical was a man from the floor who said, "The man who proposed this report is a bureaucrat. He knows nothing about standing in line for food. It is a theoretical proposal which will mean nothing practical. If his wife had to stand in line as the rest of ordinary folk do, he would never advocate such a proposal." Others were equally stinging. There was a three-hour discussion and debate. The government proposal was thrown out. Another plan, suggested and amended from the floor, was adopted. This is not at all unusual, as even a casual skimming of the average Russian newspaper will show. Within the limits of the system there is a freedom of speech which

any country might envy. This gives individual participation in government real substance and meaning.

Yet the Communist Party dominates the governmental mechanism. There are over one hundred and thirty thousand communist cells which cover every section of the Soviet Union. From the cell the party structure leads by an ascending chain up through the town, county, city, and state committees. The supreme authority in the Party is the bi-annual All Union Congress. A decision made by this body is, under the principles of democratic centralism, binding upon all Party members. Discussion is held before and not after a decision. The Congress elects a Central Committee which is the highest authority between congresses and which holds sessions every two months. This Committee elects the General Secretary of the Party and the Political Bureau of nine members and five candidates. The Political Bureau has full responsibility and power in the interims between meetings of the Central Committee, and is thus the most important single party body.

In my talk with Stalin in 1926 I put the following question: "Conservatives claim that the Communist Party and the Government are one and the same because they are all controlled by the Political Bureau. How far is this true?"

Stalin's eyes flashed with a characteristic twinkle and his face lighted with a smile as he said, "The only difference between our party control and that of foreign countries is that we do things in the open whereas abroad they do them secretly. The conservatives in England have a shadow cabinet and in most of your states in America there are political bosses who sometimes have more power than your elected officials.

"I wonder if the Republicans do not occasionally have what might be termed a shadow cabinet at Washington? Do they not sometimes have secret conferences to discuss important questions? Nine-tenths of those who criticize our party here on this basis are either ignorant or hypocritical.

"What grounds have foreigners to criticize our Political Bureau which is openly elected by the Party and known to everyone, when in Europe there are shadow cabinets and in the United States bosses who are not elected by the people, but rule nevertheless. It is humorous!

"I will try to make it clear to you. The All Union Congress was composed last year of 673 voting and 642 consultant members. It chooses a Central Commit-

tee of 63 active members. That Central Committee rules Russia. The Communist Party in Russia happens to be the governing party in Russia, just as one party has at the moment Federal control in the United States. It decides general questions of policy.

"For instance, the Central Committee may decide to concentrate energies on industrializing the country. This means that new factories must be built. Such a decision may be made after an hour's discussion by the Central Committee. But the People's Commissars—who compare with the Ministry of England or France or with the Cabinet in Washington—may require twenty meetings to decide the actual problems involved and how to arrange the loans and credits."

In reply to a question on the monopoly of legality by the Communist Party, Stalin said, "The position of our Party as the only legal party in the country is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations. The monopoly of our Party grew out of life, it developed historically as a result of the fact that the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party became absolutely bankrupt and departed from the stage of our social life.

"What were the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Menshevik Party in the past? They were channels for conducting bourgeois influence into the ranks of the proletariat. By what were these parties cultivated and sustained prior to October 1917? By the existence of the bourgeois class and ultimately by the existence of bourgeois rule. Clearly, when the bourgeoisie were overthrown the basis for the existence of these parties disappeared. What did these parties become after October 1917? They became parties for the restoration of capitalism and for the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. Clearly these parties have lost all support and all influence among the workers and the toiling strata of the peasantry."

Many conditions mentioned by Stalin at that time have changed. The new Constitution provides that the Party is not the government, but that it is the only political party which may participate in the government. Theoretically non-Communists may be elected to any post, and, in practice, are elected to many local positions. But the Party remains dominant. With its recent growth it is a tremendous force. In 1932 there were roughly three million members or candidates. Ten years later there were four million five hundred thou-

sand. The war brought a vast increase, and there are now over six million members. Besides this, as an auxiliary, there are fifteen million persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three who are members of the Communist Youth organizations. Thus there are twenty-one million people who are actively guiding the destiny of Russia.

It is the aim of the Communists to induce everyone who is outstanding in any respect to become a member of his Party. In this respect the Party is like a fraternity in college. It tries to attract the best leaders. But there are many millions in Russia who sympathize with the Party but do not join. Membership brings few if any privileges and imposes heavy duties. Each member must pay the Party treasury an income tax on his salary. Every member must devote at least several evenings a week to volunteer Party work. A Communist is expected to set an example to others in daily life and work. If he works in a factory he must turn out more goods and be absent fewer times than the non-party worker. If he is at the front he must display more bravery than the others. If he fails to perform a duty or breaks a law, the punishment is more severe because of the higher obligation resting upon a member of the Party.

The Party itself, reflecting the general trend, is much more democratic than it was even a few years ago. The right of unrestricted nomination and the secret ballot have been introduced. Local autonomy is more real. The General Secretary of the Tula Gubernia Party told me recently that the local organization may, for what they consider good reason, resist the suggestions of Moscow on administrative matters. Moscow had suggested someone as general secretary. The local party rejected the suggestion and elected another person.

Today all Party members may make criticisms and complaints *to* anyone higher up and *of* anyone higher up. A good example of this is a story which was headlined in *Pravda* not long ago.

A girl by the name of Rukavishnikova made a ten day trip to Alma-Ata to see a district official of the Party regarding the difficulties experienced in getting supplies and equipment for a children's nursing home in Semipalatinsk. When, after the long, arduous trip, she arrived at Party headquarters, the secretary ignored her. Rukavishnikova had to interrupt by saying, "I have come to see Comrade Fedulin." "On what question?" the secretary asked severely. The young woman

explained her business and told of the distance she had come. She received a peremptory reply, "Comrade Fedulin is not receiving today." "Well, then, tell me when to come," the girl replied. "Drop in tomorrow," she was told. Tomorrow turned out to be exactly like yesterday. Nine days went by. She was told, "He is very busy," "He has a conference," or "He has asked not to be disturbed." On the tenth day Rukavishnikova bought a ticket home. But the matter did not end there. She sat down and wrote the story to *Pravda*. The paper investigated to make certain the story was true and then slapped the story across the front page. Rukavishnikova was a rank and filer while Fedulin was Party leader in a large district. The article praised Rukavishnikova and concluded with a blistering criticism of the "bureaucrat."

Democracy is increasing in Russia—how the trend will go is a matter which will have to be settled by the future. Judged by Western standards Russian de-

mocracy seems highly defective, but no doubt unemployment and racial discrimination seem defects in our democracy to the Russians. The significant facts are that Russia has more democracy than most Americans are aware of, and that Stalin's rule has been marked by a steady increase in popular participation in the government. Most Soviet leaders sincerely believe that, after Russia has experienced lasting peace, this will culminate in a "withering away" of the state apparatus—a situation where the voluntary assumption of citizenship responsibilities by the majority of individuals would make the usual forms of government superfluous.

This would be far in the future, but facts do show that as the need for dictatorship disappears in Russia the dictatorship tends to disappear. Stalin has expressed his hope and belief in these words, "Leaders come and go, but the people remain. Only the people are immortal. Everything else is transient."

CHAPTER VII

The Men Around Stalin

IN THE heart of Moscow, at the side of the great Red Square, towering above the black marble tomb of Lenin, are the walls of the Kremlin, inner citadel of the Soviet regime. Here only those with properly certified passes are permitted to pass the guards. Here, too, Soviet policy—sometimes after discussions which involve the whole nation—is made. In one of the rooms which long ago belonged to the Tsar, the Politbureau, the highest committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meets under the chairmanship of Stalin.

The closest associates of any leader provide an index to his character and ability. The kind of men who make up the important Politbureau tell us much, by their lives, about Stalin. Generally it can be said that they are all hard-hitting, shrewd executives with proven ability to get things done. They are ardent communists, but it is by works as much as faith that they have been chosen. Of course, Russia has gone through many kinds of crises since the Revolution, especially those arising from counter-revolutionary activity, intervention, and threatened war, and it is not surprising that at one

period stress should be laid on loyalty and at another emphasis should be placed upon executive and organizational talent. But in the long run, with Stalin, men are judged by their contribution in building the new Russia.

I once made a detailed study of one hundred and sixty three outstanding Soviet leaders. The majority had been born in cities of over ten thousand population, and sixty per cent came from families that could not be classed as either peasants or workers. They had sacrificed much for their revolutionary ideals. Over three-fourths of them had been involved in radical activities by the time they were twenty-one years old and all, under the Tsar, had been arrested an average of three times. Their zeal was such that no sooner were they freed or paroled than they resumed revolutionary activity. It is from this group and this background that the men of the Politbureau came.

The West prides itself in having a free society and free enterprise. It is boasted that the best men rise to the top. It is usually overlooked that the Soviet Union

also has a system of free competition where ability wins. The leaders around Stalin today are generally conceded to be good administrators. They did not win positions because of family or wealth but fought their way up from the bottom—and the bottom in Tsarist Russia was incredibly low. Twelve million out of the 180 million people of the Soviet Union were government employees in 1941—since production and distribution is controlled by the state—and this figure shows how impossible it is to call government service a hereditary caste.

Study reveals that, particularly as problems of building an economy came to the fore, "talkers" stayed where they were or were demoted while practical men gravitated to positions of responsibility. A man might be a good agitator and a brilliant speaker but if he wasn't a good administrator sooner or later he fell by the way and was replaced. Zinoviev could make a good speech and talk about world revolution by the hour but when it came to doing anything practical he was hopeless. Another example can be found in Radek—a superb writer and orator but a man who could not be depended upon. Similarly Bukharin was a spinner of wonderful theories but could not analyze a situation coolly and wisely and then act strongly. It was typical of Radek and Bukharin that after the Brest Litovsk Peace Conference they proposed a revolutionary war against Germany, although the Bolsheviks, as was all too apparent to nearly everyone else, including the Germans, had neither the army nor the resources to wage it. These men eventually became involved in questionable activities and came to trial—not on charges of impractical dreaming. Others like them, who did not let their theories carry them so far, dropped out of sight into small and unimportant positions.

On the whole the men who remain in top leadership are the ablest of the twelve million government employees. Although shouldering more responsibility they do not receive salaries anywhere near as large as those of corporation presidents in the United States. They do receive decorations and they may have cities named after them. They are all provided with automobiles, expense accounts and good houses or apartments. But their chief satisfaction must come from building the new Russia. Most of the very top men have risen from the ranks of labor or from the peasant class. All have risked their lives for the cause in which they believe.

They have led Russia out of chaos to a place as one of the world's three great powers.

Who are these men?

Important among them is Viacheslav Mihailovich Molotov, Foreign Minister, who commanded so much attention at the San Francisco Conference. Handsome, graying, looking more like a Harvard professor than a revolutionist, Molotov is First Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a Vice-Chairman of the State Committee of Defence and a member of the Political Bureau. He was born March 9, 1890 in Kukarka. His political life began early by American standards. At fifteen Molotov was already engaged in revolutionary activity in student circles. At sixteen he joined the party. At nineteen he was arrested and exiled to Volgod. After serving his term of banishment he went to St. Petersburg and worked on the editorial staff of the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* (Star) and *Pravda* (Truth). After a short time he became secretary of the editorial office and was active in the Bolshevik faction in the Duma or parliament. It was during this time that he became associated with Stalin. They have remained close friends and co-workers ever since. So far as is known they have never disagreed on a major issue—and there is much evidence to show that Molotov has a mind of his own.

Molotov was arrested and exiled several times before the Revolution, but came back as a member of the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee which directed the seizure of power. Following the Revolution he became Chairman of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Executive Committee. He was so successful there that in two years he became Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. At its Tenth Congress, Molotov was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since 1926 he has been a member of the Political Bureau and from 1930 to 1941 was Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars.

I have seen Molotov on a great many occasions and he has always impressed me by his ability and judgment. He is stubborn and nothing can budge him once he has decided that a policy is correct. Once he gets beyond diplomatic phrases he can be extremely blunt. He has a trace of temper but this is rigorously controlled. One American newsman knows that the control can slip. Angry because a dispatch was censored he tore up the story and showered the scraps upon the

Russian censor. Molotov ordered him out of the Soviet Union and no amount of diplomatic pressure could change the verdict. Because of the position he occupies Molotov is more seen at social affairs than most Soviet leaders. He and his wife have a beautiful home outside of Moscow but, in keeping with modern Russian tradition, Mrs. Molotov works every day just as her husband does. She is an attractive woman who heads, and is largely responsible for building up, the cosmetics industry.

Also a member of the Politbureau is Anastas I. Mikoyan, an Armenian, who when only thirty-two was already Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade. Born into a poor workingman's family in Tiflis, Georgia, he became a full member of the Communist Party at the age of twenty.

At the outbreak of the Revolution Mikoyan was sent to Baku as a party worker and for the next three years lived a life of extreme danger. In 1918 he was a commissar at the front against the advancing Turks. When the Turks took Baku he was arrested but soon freed. Later, when the British captured the city, he was arrested again. It was only by chance that he was not shot along with the 26 commissars executed by the British as an object lesson for the people. He was kept in various prisons until March 1919 when he was freed upon demand of the people. Two months later, with the British still holding the city, Mikoyan organized and led a general strike, but by mischance, he and the entire strike committee were arrested. He escaped before he was shot but was soon re-arrested. This time his captors did not learn his real identity and he was only exiled. He stubbornly returned to Baku to carry on his work. At the end of 1919 he managed to reach Moscow with a report on the possibilities of a revolt in the Caucasus and then returned to renew his activities. Within a few years after the victory of the Soviet government in the Caucasus, Mikoyan was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

Mikoyan shows few signs of his years of prison, exile, and revolutionary activity. He is a man of great personal charm. His brilliant mind and executive ability have made the Commissariat of Trade highly efficient. One feels immediately at home in his presence. Although he is a rapid fire conversationalist he does not rush his visitors. In one interview I talked with him for more than two hours. He is the only Commissar besides Molotov who has visited the United States.

In our interview he told me of his admiration for American technique. He has introduced American methods of canning and preparing frozen foods into the Soviet Union.

Mikhail I. Kalinin, until recently Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was nominal head of the State. Ranking member of the Politbureau until his death on June 3, peasant born Kalinin entered the revolutionary movement in 1896 and was since involved in nearly every major event in Russian history. He had already suffered arrest and exile prior to the 1905 Revolution and took part in that uprising as a supporter of Lenin. It was as a member of the editorial board of *Pravda* in St. Petersburg, after a period of underground work in Moscow, that he came to know Stalin. He took an active part in the seizure of power and in 1919 was elected to the Central Committee of the party.

Kalinin was an extremely popular figure. To millions of peasants he symbolized that they are represented in the highest position in the Soviet. Common people all over the Soviet Union sent their troubles, requests and grievances to him. It was said that he wrote over eighty thousand letters a year answering questions, giving advice and promising assistance. In one of my several interviews with Kalinin he said, "We want to make the Soviet Union a state where the welfare of the workers and peasants is supreme. Every force in society must serve that end. Our progress will of necessity be slow, but nothing can stop us because we are working with truth and justice." One felt that his words were those of deep conviction, and that everything he said was flavored with a shrewd, kindly, peasant common sense.

Nikolai M. Shvernik in 1946 was elected to take Kalinin's place as head of the Supreme Soviet. Shvernik was Chairman of the All-Council of Trade Unions, but while I was in Russia in 1944 was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities. He then dropped all trade union work. He had been Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1930 and under his leadership membership rose from 12 to 26 millions. I watched him preside at sessions of the Supreme Soviet. He handled the delegates with tact and dispatch. I had a brief talk with him in London in 1943, while he was attending sessions of the British Trade Union Congress. At that time he was much concerned about the second front and insisted

that a second front in France would "end the war within a year of the time it starts." Shvernik is one of the few leaders who does not smoke and rarely drinks.

Lavrenti P. Beria has, until recently, been Commissar for Internal Affairs, handling security police work similar to our F.B.I. Balding, bespectacled, he looks like the former architect he is. Somewhat inaccessible and seldom interviewed, one must depend on knowledge of how very little war-time sabotage and espionage took place in the Soviet Union to realize that he is a successful administrator. In addition to police work he is in charge of running the factories which use the labor of convicted criminals.

The only man of Jewish extraction now a member of the Politbureau is Lazar M. Kaganovich. A top-notch industrial executive, he usually gets the toughest assignments in the country. He built the beautiful and efficient Moscow subway, and after that whipped the Russian railroads into shape. His success there had much to do with defeating the Germans. He was born in the Ukraine in 1893, and was a shoemaker when he joined the Party at the age of nineteen. His sister Rosa is now married to Stalin.

Nikolai Voznesensky is the youngest member of the State Defence Committee and the Politbureau. Now considered the most spectacularly brilliant of the men around Stalin, he was born in Tula Province in 1903. In a sense he may be considered a representative of the coming generation of Soviet leadership, for, although he joined the Party at sixteen, he is one of the few men at the very top who became members after the Revolution. An extremely hard worker, he is almost never seen at the theatre or attending concerts. In 1938, it was he that drew up the Third Five Year Plan. He was therefore responsible for much of the redistribution of industry in the interior which was such an important factor in staving off the German invasion and winning the war. Also in 1938 he became Chairman of the State Planning Commission, one of the heaviest responsibilities in all Russia, since the planning and organization of reconstruction falls under his supervision in this post.

The question of Stalin's successor is a matter which arouses considerable interest and is of real importance. In more than one respect it is doubtful that any single man can be said to be the one to take Stalin's place. Stalin's position, like that of Lenin before him, is unique. Lenin solved the problem of winning power;

Stalin solved the problems of consolidating the position of the Soviet state. A solid foundation has been laid for other men to build upon. Stalin will go down in history as the man who built that foundation and who, in the process, gave Germany the worst military defeat in her history.

None of the men already mentioned nor the professional Army men are likely to succeed Stalin. In Russia it is generally believed that Andrei Alexandrovitch Zhdanov will be moved up to leadership if anything should happen to Stalin. He is a heavy set man of fifty with black hair, black moustache and piercing dark eyes. Speculation as to what would happen to Soviet policy under his leadership is best answered by considering his record to date.

First of all Zhdanov is a Party man. He was born in the family of a school inspector on February 26, 1896 and at sixteen was already leading an illegal Marxist circle of students in Tver, now called Kalinin. Zhdanov has risen from the ranks, holding at one time or another nearly every post on the way up the ladder of power.

At twenty he was elected to the city Committee of the Communist Party of Tver. One year later, following the Revolution, he was Chairman of the County Party Committee in Shadrinsk. From his record it is clear that he will not tolerate factionalism. All through his career he has been noted for relentless struggle against the opposition.

Zhdanov is very close to Stalin, and this is an association of many years' standing. At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1925 he was elected to the Central Committee for the entire Soviet Union and in 1934 he became Secretary of the Central Committee—one of the highest positions in the Party and directly under Stalin. In that same year, a fateful one for Zhdanov, S. M. Kirov, Stalin's right hand man in Leningrad was assassinated. Stalin sent Zhdanov to take the place of the fallen Kirov, and, almost automatically, Zhdanov was elevated to the Political Bureau in the following year. In 1938, in addition to his other duties, he headed the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Party. The fact that this department then controlled the work of 112,000 propagandists working in every village and community in the Soviet Union gives some idea of the power wielded in this key post. Zhdanov's first action, and very characteristic of him, was to reduce the number of propagandists.

Should he take the helm, Zhdanov will favor inner party democracy. In 1939, at the Sixteenth Party Congress, he presented a report, of over sixty pages in length, on changing the Party rules. It is a revealing document. Zhdanov demanded more democracy. He wanted an all-union party congress held annually. He recommended that the social background of candidates for membership no longer be considered. Whether a man's father was a capitalist or a worker didn't matter. A man should be judged on his own, not on the record of his family. Further, he advocated permitting any member to criticize anyone regardless of position. Abolition of mass expulsions was urged.

Zhdanov, as this report proves, has a good sense of humor. His address, despite its serious subject, kept the audience in gales of laughter. He told of the secretary of one Party Committee who expelled 58 out of 175 members, using what Zhdanov termed "the belt system"—first one individual was expelled and then everyone who had anything to do with the first was also forced out and so on and on. By using this ingenious device every Party member in the Progress Collective Farm was eventually expelled!

Zhdanov is also a military man. He entered the Tsar's army in 1916, and was active in revolutionary soldiers' groups. Since the Revolution he has developed into an able and imaginative leader. His extraordinary record in defending the besieged city of Leningrad has won him the rank of Colonel General. On August 21, 1941 he aroused the populace to a white heat of patriotism that is hardly equalled in the annals of war by a stirring declaration pointing out the great danger and evoking the city's historic and revolutionary past. As a result every able-bodied male formed a Home Guard to man the guns. Four hundred thousand women and children volunteered to dig trenches and raise fortifications. Nazi aviators came time and time again to strafe them—but they never stopped working. The Nazi armies were blocked at the very threshold of the city.

The Hitlerites surrounded Leningrad and waited, hoping to shell and bomb and starve the city to its knees. On December 15, 1941 everything came to a standstill—except the indomitable people. There was no fuel, no electric current, no running water, and no tram cars were moving. The populace was getting only a quarter of a pound of straw bread daily. Workers in the great Kirov ammunition plant were being served

a yeast soup with soya flavoring "to give them the illusion of eating something" the director told me. To prevent scurvy Zhdanov had the children collect fresh pine and fir needles. A soup was made from these. It had a horrible taste, but it did the trick and people drank it. Hitler waited for the death of the city, but, as the Russian proverb says, "Though your elbow is very near, you can't bite it."

North of the city stretched Lake Ladoga, largest lake in Europe. With this lake and "Engineer Frost" Zhdanov broke the German blockade. A highway, in an engineering feat of the first magnitude, was built across a fifty mile length of gale swept ice. The first supplies came in by motor truck, then a parallel railroad, also across the ice, was placed in service. Every day, while the ice lasted, some eight thousand tons of supplies came in and over six thousand children and invalids evacuated. Leningrad stood.

It was also in Zhdanov to be hard when it appeared necessary. In December 1942 it would have been possible to make a slight increase in the food ration. Zhdanov vetoed the idea, saying that food reserves must be built up for the defence army at any cost. Zhdanov collaborated in the brilliant military strategy which finally pulverized the German Army and sent the Nazis reeling back to East Prussia. In the two visits I made to war-time Leningrad I saw his picture everywhere and the people spoke with great enthusiasm of his leadership.

Stalin's lead will be followed by Zhdanov in continuing the industrialization of Russia. During the early days of revolution and civil war he worked in the Urals and is thoroughly familiar with the mammoth industrialization program in that region. Later he became Secretary of the Party in Nishni-Novgorod, now Gorki, on the Volga River. For helping to organize the gigantic "Ford" automobile plant and other factories there he was awarded the coveted Order of Lenin. He has built up the heavy industries in Leningrad until they rank among the most important in the Soviet Union.

Also like Stalin he believes in building Russia rather than working for revolutions abroad. He is President of the Russian Republic, by far the most important of the sixteen constituent republics of the Union. In 1939 he became Chairman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs. Since that time he has borne major responsibility for the Soviet foreign policy. His work as

Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Finland indicates his attitude. In this position he has refused to receive any Finnish Communists, and has insisted on letting the Finnish people solve their own political problems.

It is probable that the future will show even greater achievements for many of the leaders mentioned here, with the exception of the elder statesman Kalinin. And there are others of significance who cannot be considered in the space of a short survey. There is, for example, fifty year old Andrei Andreyev, Chairman of the Party Control Commission, who has the power to investigate every feature of party life. He is also Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, a position which might be said to correspond to that

of President of the Senate in the United States. It is interesting to note that he at one time supported Trotsky, which indicates that all who differ with Stalin are not necessarily replaced. Another important figure is Stalin's former private secretary, Georgi Malenkov. He is head of the Organization Bureau of the Party and responsible for picking the men for important tasks.

If, as we have said, one test of a leader is the character of his inner circle of advisors and assistants, Stalin passes the test. The ability of the men in the top positions of the ruling party in the Soviet Union compares favorably with that of governmental officials in the West.

CHAPTER VIII

Planning for Plenty

THE HERITAGE of Tsarist Russia lay so heavily upon the land that it looked as though the Soviet leaders could not but fail. Their talk of industrialization, of planning, of raising the standard of living seemed, against the backdrop of ruin and starvation that Tsarism, Revolution and civil war had left, utter fantasy. Lenin talked of electrification, and observers shook their heads and said "*electrofiction*." H. G. Wells talked to Lenin. Afterwards he wrote of what he termed the "Utopian" plans and said, "I cannot see anything of the sort happening in this dark crystal of Russia, but this little man at the Kremlin can . . ."

The Soviet Union of 1918 to 1923 was indeed a dark crystal. Such industrial development as had gone on under Tsarism was hopelessly backward and inefficient. Much of it, because the aristocracy feared the development of a powerful Russian middle class, was in the hands of foreigners who cared only to exploit the rich natural resources and cheap labor without benefitting the country.

The whole country reflected the inertia of its rulers and the lack of responsibility of outside capital. The average work day was from ten to twelve hours. The average yearly wage was 255 rubles or slightly above \$63. The workers' homes were described by the Moscow

City Council as "dens." Only twenty per cent of the cities and towns had a regular water supply.

Civil war and intervention brought complete collapse of the economy. Mills and factories came to a halt for lack of raw material and fuel. The railroads, their tracks rusting, the lines clogged by wrecked and worn-out equipment, the bridges blown up in the fighting, ran infrequently if at all. Agriculture was so disorganized that the food supply for the cities dwindled into nothingness. Industrial production dropped to a fifth of its already low pre-war volume.

The Bolsheviks tried to run the factories but were met everywhere by sabotage on the part of the managerial and engineering class. Machinery was damaged, factories blown up, and inefficiency encouraged. This hostility in Russia was more than matched by the enmity of all the important world states. No country offered help. No credits or outside capital was available.

There was no alternative. It was nationalize, unify, and plan—or defeat. Thus the very opposition of capitalistic elements helped to create the extreme war communism of 1918-1920. But more than mere nationalization was needed. The people needed a great goal. They needed to see how, in practical terms,

Russia could lift itself by its bootstraps out of the morass of centuries.

Lenin wrote a letter in 1920. It said, "Couldn't you produce a plan (not a technical but a political scheme) which would be understood by the proletariat? For instance, in ten years (or five?) we shall build twenty (or thirty or fifty?) power stations covering the country with a network of such stations . . . We need such a plan at once to give the masses a shining unimpeded prospect to work for; and in ten (or twenty?) years we shall electrify Russia, the whole of it, both industrial and agricultural."

The plan was formulated. Stalin wrote to Lenin regarding it: "I move: 1. That not a single minute more be wasted on talking about the plan. 2. That a practical start be made. 3. That at least one third . . . of all we do be subordinated to the interests of this start."

In 1921 a commission was appointed to work out plans for complete electrification of the country. This commission was called Goelro. In the same year the State Planning Commission, known as Gosplan, was charged with the responsibility of working out a plan for the entire economic life of the country. So began a daring experiment—the first national planning in world history.

I visited the Soviet Union on a famine relief mission in 1921, the year planning started. Prospects did not look bright. I carried all my food with me. The population was starving. My room in the leading Moscow hotel was so infested by vermin that I was forced to disinfect the mattress and place the four legs of the cot in pans of water to hold off nocturnal invasion. Large rats roamed the room at all hours. The next twenty-two years was to bring an almost incredible transformation.

What happened was the logical result of the policies and program of Lenin and Stalin, which could succeed only by arousing the enthusiastic cooperation of the Russian people. The country tightened its belt and went to work—not to make things people desperately needed, but to make a basic transformation in the economic life of the land.

The people were frankly told that there would be a long period of hardship, of pinching, of shortage. The Soviet leaders recognized that if the people were unwilling to work for the future everything would fail—no amount of pressure could accomplish what was needed. What was needed had been summed up by

Lenin before he died, "To save Russia we require not only a good harvest in the peasant farms—this is insufficient. We need not only an efficient light industry, which will be in a position to supply the peasantry with the manufactured goods they require—this, too, is not enough—we must have a heavy industry . . . without the restoration and development of our heavy industries we shall be unable to organize any industry, and without organizing our industry we should perish as an independent country."

Progress was slow—for the start was made from almost less than scratch. One by one the scattered threads of a ruined economy were gathered together through the Central Planning Commission and the mending began. By 1922, just as the last piece of Soviet territory was freed from the Japanese, the railroads had begun to work, factories were re-opening, agriculture was getting on its feet. 1924 brought somewhat better times for both peasants and workers—although there were still many unemployed and prices were high. By 1925 the restoration of the national economy had been completed. Wages and the productivity of labor had risen. The Soviet Union was able to invest 385,000,000 rubles in construction work.

Restoration completed, Stalin turned the attention of the country to the problem stated by Lenin, the development of heavy industry. Increasing Soviet capital made it possible to embark upon the first major projects, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the AMO Automobile Works, and, one which captured the world's imagination, Dnieperstroy Dam for generating electric power. In 1927 the Soviets were able to invest a billion rubles in industry. Three years later they were able to invest five times that amount. A great test of Soviet principles came in the period from 1929 to 1933 when the rest of the world suffered an economic crash. During that period the physical volume of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. more than doubled. And from there it kept going up at an ever faster pace.

The ground had been laid for a series of Five-Year Plans. The First Five Year Plan was adopted in April 1929. It provided for the investment of 64 billion rubles during the period set. Nineteen billion would go for industrial and electric power development. Ten billion was set aside for development of transportation, and twenty-three billion was to be spent in agriculture. Stalin outlined the objectives in a speech to the All-

Union Conference of Managers of Soviet Industry: "In ten years at most we must cover the distance which separates us from the advanced countries of capitalism. We have all the 'objective' possibilities for this. What is lacking is only the ability to utilize properly these possibilities. And this depends upon us. *Upon us alone!*"

The Soviet Union was pioneering in a vast, planned industrial revolution which was to astound the world. But at first the world was more amused and scornful than astounded. The *New York Times* in November 1932 declared, "It's not a plan, it's a speculation." Others declared that the Plan was "impossible of fulfillment." The speculation, however, was rising rather solidly across the great breadth of the Soviet Union. Iron and steel mills rose at Magnitogorsk. Automobile plants in Moscow and Gorky. Collieries and coal mines at Kuznetsk. Tractor works at Stalingrad. The Lugansky Locomotive Works in the Donetz region. Machine building and chemical works in the Urals. By dint of both enthusiasm and forced sacrifices, the first plan was completed in four years. Lack of efficiency, poor technique, and scarcity of skilled workers created mountains of obstacles. But the output of coal jumped from 35 million to 64 million tons. Production of oil and pig iron doubled.

Still the Soviet leaders demanded that the tempo of development be increased. An atmosphere of great urgency was developed. Every method of getting things done faster was explored. Stalin gave the reason for this in one of his speeches, "the history of old Russia is one unbroken record of the beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish bey's. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness . . ." Russia was determined not to be beaten again. The Party, Stalin said, must be held in a state of mobilization for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

The Second Plan had as its objective the increasing of production to eight times more than the highest level reached under Tsarism. The amount of money to be invested in production facilities was to be 133 billion rubles, almost double that of the first plan. The plan was fulfilled in four years and three months instead of

the five scheduled. During the period (1933-1937) technique improved. Agriculture was mechanized. The number of tractors was quadrupled. Transportation was improved, modernized and extended. Industrial production was 700 per cent above pre-war output. There is no question that the condition of the people improved vastly during the Second Five Year Plan. Real wages for factory workers and office employees actually doubled. During the Second Plan, Russia, for the first time in history took first rank among European countries in industrial production.

The Third Five Year Plan was interrupted by the war, but during the first three years, 108 billion rubles were invested in production facilities. During this period 2,900 new plants, factories, and power stations were put into operation.

Michael Borodin, Soviet writer and editor, told me, "We renounce butter and turn that butter into bricks. We deny ourselves meat to convert it into machines." In these words he emphasized the sacrifices made to industrialize the nation. The ultimate aim of Soviet planning is abundance for the Soviet people, but the only way of reaching that aim was to temporarily sacrifice consumer goods in favor of building heavy industry. A measure of this sacrifice can be made by comparing the United States and the Soviet Union. Out of our national income we normally save and invest as new capital only about fifteen per cent. Russia, building a substantially new economy, has had to put aside forty per cent of the national income for investment in production facilities. The result was that the first three Five Year Plans telescoped into a few years what it has taken other nations many decades to accomplish.

If it were not for the war the present Five Year Plan would undoubtedly show a change of emphasis in the direction of supplying material comforts to the people. As it is, however, there is no change in the policy of concentrating on heavy industry. This means that Soviet citizens will have to tighten their belts for at least five more years. The present plan, which runs from 1946 to 1950, aims at rebuilding the industrial plant to surpass that of the pre-war period. This means not only complete restoration of the devastated areas but expansion as well. By the end of 1946 the Soviet Union plans to be turning out twenty million tons of steel annually.

Planning in Russia is a cooperative procedure stretching from the smallest village to the largest statistical

office in the world in Moscow. In the process every group and every people and many individuals take part. Every factory, enterprise, farm, village, city, and republic has a planning department which submits a report of what was done in the past year and an estimate of what it will need and what it will do in the next year. This great mass of material goes to the Central Planning Commission where it is sorted and analyzed. When this is done the Planning Commission has a complete picture of what the community needs and of what raw materials, factories, and how much labor is available to supply those needs. The plan takes in everything—agriculture, education, transport, culture, industry. The over-all plan is made up by balancing all available resources against all known needs. It is done not on the basis of whim but on the basis of the desires of the people as expressed in the estimate of needs of the various enterprises. Stalin has said of the process that "Millions make the plan."

The building of electric power plants might be taken as an example. Every district in the country can put in a claim for one. The Planning Commission in Moscow cannot satisfy every request. They decide the matter in the light of what will give the greatest good to the greatest number.

Planning on such a scale is enormously complex, yet it has enabled a country to decide what kind of country it wants to be. In a period of less than a quarter of a century, Russia has leaped from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth century. A backward, semi-feudal land has become a mighty world power. Russia has ceased to be predominantly rural. The center of economic gravity has been deliberately shifted from the farm to the industrial city. Roughly fifty per cent of the Soviet citizens are now city dwellers and industrial workers and 44.6 are collective farmers.

Planning has also made it possible to plan for the best and most efficient location of production centers. The guide posts for the geographical distribution of industry were:

1. *Security.* Stalin realized that if Russia were to be attacked by Nazi Germany and Japan the great industries ought to be located where they would be safe from capture or destruction. This meant that where industry could not be moved from a precarious frontier, the Russians made an effort to duplicate it far in the rear and also made plans for evacuation if and when necessary.

2. *Nearness to raw materials and cheap power.* Factories, for example, would be built near sources of iron ore, of coal and of cotton.

3. *The development of backward peoples and regions, the elimination of economic inequalities between regions.* Cotton would be grown in Uzbekistan and textile mills built there rather than in Moscow. In the long run this would eliminate poverty in Uzbekistan.

4. *Transport facilities.* Wherever factories are built transportation must make possible the shipment of finished products to all parts of the Union.

5. *Proximity to Markets.* The nearer the factory to the ultimate market, the less demand there was on transport.

6. *Available labor supply.* Where this was absent the Soviets would encourage migration by offering special recognition, higher wages etc.

It is the contention of Soviet planning that nearly all of these factors can be made subject to a degree of control. All fields of knowledge are drawn upon to find the answers to the problems that arise. It was known that there were large coal deposits at Kuznetsk. Was it possible that the coal could be used at the source instead of being shipped to other points in the Union? Geologists were sent out to search for iron ore in the vicinity, and it was found. Coal and ore were used there and the metal shipped.

In view of the threat of war there was an effort to make areas in the vulnerable west as little dependent on transport as possible. Moscow, by plan, during the war, produced enough coal, peat and wood to take care of its own immediate requirements from the vicinity.

Low grade coal deposits, where the cost of mining and shipping would be exorbitant in relation to the value of the product, were utilized with the aid of science. Professor Peter Kapitsa developed an oxidation process which burned the low grade coal in the mine and turned it into gas. The gas could then be piped, at low cost, to where it was needed.

Under the impetus of planning, a great exploration of the Soviet Union took place. Many new natural resources were uncovered. There was an immense increase in the known mineral deposits. Today Russia stands first in the world in apatite, iron, lead, oil, platinum and nickel. She stands second in aluminum, chromium, coal, gold, manganese, and zinc. In fact, sizeable quantities of nearly all known natural resources

are to be found somewhere in the Soviet Union. These new discoveries are being utilized as rapidly as they can be integrated in the framework of the national plans.

Just before the war, in 1941, engineers were boring for oil near Saratov. Suddenly they struck natural gas deposits yielding 700,000 cubic meters per day. During the siege of Stalingrad this was piped to that city. New wells were drilled, and by 1945 practically all industry in the Saratov region was being serviced by gas from this field. Indeed so much gas was found that it was decided to lay a pipe line to Moscow. The project was made a *narodnaya stroika* or "people's construction." All the regions which would benefit by the pipe line were called on to furnish labor for it. Thousands of people volunteered to help. When completed the line will be 560 miles long and it will supply Moscow with 1,350,000 cubic meters of gas a day. This in turn will effect a saving of some 3,000,000 cubic meters of wood which has been used for fuel, and will release 100,000 freight cars, that were formerly used for fuel shipment, for other purposes. Moscow expects the gas in 1946.

The stupendous industrial development behind the Urals was also the result of planning. Under the Tsar's regime only four million tons of steel were produced annually. But as I travelled across Siberia in 1935, I saw that this was not due to a lack of raw ore. Magnet Mountain, in the Urals, is a solid mass of magnetite. It contains 300 million tons of ore assaying 65 per cent iron and 85 million tons assaying 45 per cent iron. Under the Tsar this vast industrial potential was used for the grazing of cattle.

Planning for the development of Magnitogorsk began in the late Twenties. The year 1929 saw a vast army of workmen, equipped with the latest machinery, and assisted by American engineers, begin the subjugation of the great mountain of iron. Ruthless methods were used. Exiled Kulaks and state criminals worked on parts of the project. Tractors and bulldozers struggled with mud in summer and terrible cold in winter. Many lost their lives under the unequal conditions, but day by day "the Pittsburgh of Russia" emerged in the wilderness. It lies to the extreme south of the Ural mountains, two thousand feet above sea level, eight hundred miles as the crow flies from Moscow. Today the sprawling city covers twenty-seven miles and has 400,000 inhabitants. It is about as ugly as Pittsburgh was in the early days.

The Magnitogorsk plant will eventually be the largest of its kind in the world. It now employs 45,000 workers of whom 45 per cent are women. The average age of the workers is 32. Although the plant will not be completed until 1948, it already produces 7,500 tons of ingot, 8,000 tons of pig iron, and 8,500 tons of coke daily.

This is only one of the hundreds of new developments which planning has put down in the former wilderness of Siberia. The Tsarist regime could think of no use for Siberia except as a place of exile, a huge natural prison. The Soviets consider it a land of promise, much as Americans used to regard their western frontier. The former prison is now sending out a constant and increasing stream of new products to strengthen the young giant which is the Soviet Union.

Two hundred and fifty miles from Magnitogorsk is the ancient town of Sverdlovsk, where the Tsar was executed. It is now a large city, a center for the production of machines and turbines. The Ural Machine Building Plant has 30,000 employees of whom 35 per cent are women. During the war it produced ten self-propelled guns every twenty four hours. One of the artillery plants was turning out six times as much when the war ended as it had in the beginning.

Five hundred miles farther on is the city of Omsk, famous for tank and tractor production. Eastward another four hundred miles, on the banks of the Ob, third longest river in the world, is the great production city of Novosibirsk, the "Chicago" of the Soviet Union. The Yak airplane plant, which has 30,000 workers, and produces 25 planes per day, is located here.

The development in the Urals and in Siberia proved of incalculable worth to the Soviets in the war. The wartime migration of industry would have been impossible if these great producing centers had not already been established. As it was, hundreds of plants were evacuated from threatened regions and yet, by miracles of effort, kept producing with little break. The Lenin Optical Plant left Moscow on November 16, 1941, and was in operation 22 days after its arrival in Novosibirsk, in spite of the fact that 6,600 workers had to be hired and trained locally. It now has 15,000 workers and will probably not return to Moscow. The Douglass airplane plant evacuated from Moscow and turned out its first plane only 35 days after moving. The Kirov Armament Works, with 9 rolling mills, 310 forges, 420 heating furnaces, and 40,000 workers, was evacu-

ated to the Urals and soon was producing more than ever before.

At the very heart of Soviet planning is the electrification of which Lenin dreamed. Lenin is responsible for the aphorism "Communism is Soviet government plus the electrification of the whole country." Communism, by this definition, (and by no Soviet definition, it should be noted) has not been reached. The Soviet Union is at perhaps the half-way mark in electrification. Today the Union holds first place in Europe for the generation of electric power. Great regional power plants serve the principal regions. High voltage grid networks, connecting these plants, serve virtually the entire country. Countless numbers of villages are electrically lighted. Many have joined together and built their own hydroelectric plants. In the single province of Kuibyshev, forty such small plants are being built on small streams. According to the plan for 1945, 2,565 small stations were built in various parts of the Union. One hundred larger stations were constructed. These were mainly to serve rural areas, for rural electrification went forward steadily all through the war. Any group of collectives with initiative can get together, borrow money from the government, and build a power plant.

With the coming of peace the Soviets' most impressive plans for electrification are about to get under way. The Volga river project, by which twenty hydroelectric stations will harness that great river and its main tributaries, is No. 1 on the list. A number of its stations were completed prior to the war. Beyond the Volga, great projects are mentioned for the many lakes and rivers of Siberia. This is Lenin's "shining prospect" on its way to becoming a reality.

In 1944 I met Pierre Cot, former French Minister of Air, in the Soviet Union. He had just completed an intensive tour of inspection of the transplantation of Russian industry and devastated areas where reconstruction was already going forward. He was greatly impressed by the accomplishments of Soviet planning. He told me, "After the war Russia will raise the standard of living. The movement of factories to Siberia will inevitably create a new balance in the Russian economy. Siberia will see an enormous shift in her population. The center of gravity will shift." Further he asserted that the Russian budget is the only one in the whole world on a sound basis. This, he explained, was because the Soviets increase their budget only to finance increased production.

The land of the ignorant moujik has indeed come a long way—by its boot straps.

CHAPTER IX

Stalin and the Red Army

THE Tsarist army was one of the most inefficient military organizations in world history. It made a poor showing against the Japanese in 1904, and its record on the side of the Allies in World War I was little better. Many observers were led to believe that "Russians aren't good fighting men," and on this basis predicted ignominious defeat for Russia when the Hitlerites attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. But the real reason for the defeat of Tsarist troops, as the history of the recent war has so eloquently shown, did not lie in the Russian character.

As a Y.M.C.A. worker in Russia during Tsarist days, I had an opportunity to see the deplorable state of the army at first hand. Two of the most competent

Tsarist officers, Generals Kuropatkin and Brusilov, in private conversations, gave me expert testimony which confirmed my own impressions. The staff was poorly organized. In one case the commanding divisions received the order to move in battle two hours after they were supposed to have started. Criticisms were omitted in maneuvers to save the feelings of officers. As a result, according to General Kuropatkin, "Mistakes pass unnoticed, are repeated and tend to become chronic. All the generals use their own pet theories, most of which are wrong." General Brusilov said that "Graft and corruption were rampant," and told me that he did not dare tell the Tsar when he was going to make an advance for fear that the news would reach the

Germans beforehand. Above and beyond all this was the fact that the discontent which prevailed among most of the people affected the Army. Tsarist officers trembled when they gave their troops arms.

When Hitler attacked in 1941 many Britons and Americans thought it would be a repetition of the old story. In that year Germany was thought of as invincible, the master of all the industrial resources of Europe. Joining in the attack were Rumania, Italy, Hungary, Spain, and Finland. Hitler was using 260 divisions as against 127 divisions in World War I, and each five of the new divisions had more fire power than 100 in the last war. Germany had the advantage of military experience, surprise, and mastery of the air. According to some reputed experts Russia had purged her only able generals along with Tukhachevsky. The thing that had been forgotten in these doleful analyses was that Stalin had created a mighty Red Army backed by a powerful Soviet state.

Stalin never attended a military school. He acquired his vast experience in the revolutionary movement. There he thought of his work as a kind of war and conducted it as such. During the Revolution he was given enormous responsibility, being shifted from front to front as new dangers arose. Voroshilov, Commissar of War, describes his work in seemingly doomed Tsaritsyn in these words, "You should have seen Comrade Stalin at that time. Calm as usual, deep in thought, he literally had no sleep for days on end, distributing his intensive work between the fighting positions and the Army headquarters. The position at the front became almost catastrophic . . . Stalin was inspired with one single thought—victory! To smash the enemy whatever happened! And this indomitable will of Stalin was passed on to his closest colleagues, and despite the almost hopeless position, we were victorious."

The many victories which he brought out of situations where defeat seemed inevitable brought him wide recognition as a first-class organizer and military leader. Even then he showed great concern for the physical well-being and morale of troops under his command. Voroshilov recalls that Stalin was very insistent on political work in the Army, believing that the soldiers would fight well only if they knew what they were fighting for. He initiated a special mobilization of Communists so that the rank and file fighters would be permeated by the fire and inspired by the example of the Bolsheviks. He demanded that the most able

Communists be attached to regiments as political commissars, and once sent a telegram to Lenin reading, "Military Commissars should be the soul of military action, giving a lead to the experts." Apparently the method worked, for troops that had been retreating in confusion before Stalin took charge, were, soon after, on the offensive and winning victories.

He knew the ways of winning men. He has always been a good mixer, with personal qualities that make very few enemies and many loyal friends. During the civil war, on the front near Petrograd, Stalin noticed that one of the soldiers did not cheer him as a commander, which is Red Army custom. He halted and asked why. The soldier said nothing but pointed to his feet. It was December and he was wearing straw sandals. Stalin took off his boots and gave them to the soldier, putting the sandals on his own feet. He wore them for many days.

I once talked with a Red Army Colonel who, during the civil war, had, with great difficulty, collected food for some of the hungry cities along the Volga. It had only been prepared for shipment when Stalin's lieutenants confiscated it for the front. The Colonel went to Tsaritsyn to protest. He found Stalin in a hotel room, pacing up and down like a caged animal. The Colonel, pointing out the desperate plight of the city populations, demanded release of the food. Stalin brushed every argument aside: "It can't be helped, if we lose those cities it is only an incident. We will recapture them, but if our army doesn't have food the Revolution is lost!"

At the close of the civil war Russia had five million men under arms. Stalin reduced the army to 600,000 men, but they were carefully selected so that every branch of the service was maintained. The artillery was picked for special strengthening. Technical forces were kept in service. All of those demobilized were called up for a few weeks of training every year. In 1923, at the suggestion of Stalin, all the republics formed national units of the Army. Universal military training was introduced in the senior classes of secondary schools and universities.

Special attention was given to the promotion of young, trustworthy men into the officer ranks. By 1924 roughly 85% of the commanders were former workers and peasants. Finally Stalin made his old friend and co-worker of civil war days, Klimenty Voroshilov, Commissar of War. Stalin undoubtedly felt that this period

called for a man with organizational rather than strategical ability. General Semyon Timoshenko was picked to train the new Army.

Born into a landless peasant family living in Bessarabia, Timoshenko received no formal education under the old regime. In World War I he was a machine gunner. A short time before the Revolution, the young soldier struck an officer. He was held for court martial and would almost certainly have been shot had not the Revolution intervened. It was Timoshenko who later introduced a discipline which was stricter than that under the Tsar, but it was an equal discipline and without favoritism.

Timoshenko moved slowly in introducing reforms until after the Finnish war. The Russians, using only a small part of their army, had been unable, over a period of several months, to break the "impregnable" Mannerheim Line. Timoshenko was sent to that front. Behind his own line he constructed an exact replica of a small sector of the Mannerheim fortifications and began to experiment. A short time later the Russians opened a furious barrage against the real line. The Finns were momentarily puzzled by this attack, for all the shells had fallen mysteriously short of their supposed objective. The puzzle was solved when the Finns discovered that the fortifications had been so tilted from beneath as to make their guns useless. This method of "rocking" fortifications had been discovered in Timoshenko's experiments.

After the Finnish War, Timoshenko began the job of re-making the army in earnest. His first step was to move in the direction of abolishing political commissars since the Army leadership was both dependable and politically competent. Second, he began enforcement of strict discipline. Third, he began training the soldiers to endure the fiercest winter weather, training them in temperatures of 40 to 50 below zero. Army equipment was re-designed with winter service in view.

In the meantime neither the civilian population nor the country's economy was being neglected in preparing for defense. Mass training of civilians in sharpshooting, map reading, scaling barricades, swimming and marching with rifles was organized. Before the war actually broke out, over a million persons had been trained as sharpshooters, and more than five million had qualified for the Labor and Defence Medal which meant that they had passed rigorous tests in marching, swimming, map reading and wall scaling.

Since the Russian leaders expected the country to be attacked, although the where and when were bound to come as a surprise, the emphasis in production planning had, for the time being, to swerve from its goal of plenty to providing the sinews of war. Artillery production was increased from 50 to 75 per cent depending on the size and type of gun. Tanks and airplanes were turned out in vast quantities. The Soviet Union turned out welded instead of riveted tanks long before the United States Army. The Chrysler plant, for example, had to shut down production in the midst of the battle for North Africa and lose months of time to effect a change which Russia had done seven years before.

Stalin has always displayed contempt for military experts who are satisfied with old "tried and true" methods, and it was he who always insisted all technical, scientific, and industrial advances must be utilized by a modern army. Voroshilov says, "It was he who initiated the most far-reaching and important organizational and technical measures to develop and improve equipment, and he devoted a great deal of attention and care to the military inventors and their inventions, doing everything in his power to assist them in their work." Commanders who displayed daring in thinking out technical problems and utilizing modern machines and weapons could be certain of both support and promotion.

While America was court martialing Gen. Mitchell for advocating that military aviation should be placed on a basis of equality with other branches of military service, Russia had already put the idea into practice. On my visits to Russia from 1932 on, I was amazed to find parachute towers in parks, playgrounds and athletic fields all over the country. Men, women, boys and girls laboriously climbed to the top of these unique structures, attached themselves to a parachute and jumped. I at first thought this was simply a new form of sport. Then I was told that soldiers were receiving similar training. Then, one day at an air field outside Moscow, I saw thousands of soldiers jump from planes. As they reached the ground they formed military units with full armaments. Here were paratroops in action—long before other powers adopted the idea.

The secret of Red Army success when the test came lay in no single factor. Vast foresight, in every field of endeavor, had prepared the basis of victory.

The Red Army won success on the battlefield through the same factors which organized, trained, and pro-

vided for it. Every section of the population, from hard-boiled scientists to pretty ballerinas, contributed what they could. When it was mud that had to be licked the engineers went into action and produced machines which could crawl through mud at thirty miles an hour. Specially designed tanks and tractors slopped through marshes and swamps while the Germans bogged down.

The Russians were used to new ways of handling industrial problems, and they took their fresh attitudes with them to the battlefields. There was wholesale improvisation and innovation. An example of this was the Katyusha, which one saw everywhere at the front. It was mounted on a heavy truck and looked like a row of organ pipes laid at a slight slant. Each pipe shot a rocket projectile which, at night, looked like a giant silver meteor.

Captain I. Ivanov told me how effective they were in action. On one occasion he was notified while at midnight supper that a German artillery dump must be blown up to stop a German counterattack. The Katyusha was raced through the town and into position. It had fired only two volleys when a great flame and explosion rose in the distance. The dump had been fired in 28 minutes from the time the Captain was notified of its position. He said that he usually played a "cat and mouse" game with the enemy, firing from one position, then rushing to another. The Germans returned the fire, but always in the place where the Katyusha had been, instead of where it was. Russia was first in developing the rocket gun. The discovery was shared with the United States, and was used extensively in the Pacific.

Other innovations ranged all the way from the use of dogs to a unique utilization of searchlights. Dogs were trained to leap at tanks with dummy dynamite stick and still others to ferret out enemy mines. I watched some of these dogs in action at the front. They detected hidden mines by smell, even when the murderous device was buried under ice and snow. They were taught not to dig them up, and whenever their search was successful they would sit and await their masters who deactivated the mine. In the assault on Berlin Marshal Zhukov used thousands and thousands of banked searchlights turned directly on the enemy to blind him and nullify his fire power.

The newly developed tactical uses of artillery are among the most brilliant achievements of the Red

Army. When the Germans first attacked Sevastopol in 1941, they subjected each square meter of the Red Army zone to an average of one to one and a half tons of projectiles. The Russians developed their artillery methods in the war. When the Russians later stormed German positions in Sevastopol, they dumped twice as many projectiles per square meter as the Germans had done. Within one week they had not only captured Sevastopol but killed or captured all the Germans in the Crimea. The Red Army often fired as many as two thousand shells per kilometer. This saturated the terrain like rain.

The Russians combined this mass use of artillery with high offensive ability, or high mobility. Old ideas of using the artillery to conquer ground from a safe distance were completely abandoned. The main job of this massed and mobile artillery was both to prevent the passage of enemy tanks to the rear of Russian troops and prepare, by fire, for advances by Russian troops. As a result of these tactical requirements the Red Army did not use as much heavy artillery as the Americans, but became masters of medium size artillery, particularly the seventy-six millimeter cannon. When I visited the Crimea just after the Germans had been annihilated, with the Nazi dead still cluttering the beaches, I interviewed Col. General Beriuzov, Chief of Staff of the Russian operations. Beriuzov said that the Red Army had used such heavy concentrations of artillery in the attack that they had one gun to every ten feet. Nothing could live under such concentrated fire. German fortifications were pulverized. Immediately thereafter the infantry swarmed forward, capturing the German positions.

The Red artillerists also made extensive use of the "wrenger." When an enemy column established a salient the Russians preferred not to use the traditional, and costly, infantry flank attacks. Instead, batteries of artillery were established at both sides of the salient while a concentrated infantry attack began at the head of the column. The enemy was thus rolled back through a gauntlet of deadly fire. Enemy troops that managed to survive were usually useless in battle for some time to come.

The daring which characterized the Red Army use of artillery marked every phase of Russian warfare. The Reds were masters of the art of maneuvering. They by-passed obstacles. They took sudden action. They ran risks. For example, in crossing the Dniester

River the Russian tanks drove ahead capturing the bridgeheads long before the infantry could follow through and secure the positions. The result was that the Germans retired without blowing up the bridges. The attack was never wholly interrupted. If one army paused for reformation, another sector was struck. The Germans were given no rest. The spirit of the offensive is the very heart of Russian war doctrine.

The Germans talked about "total war," but it was the Soviets whose system permitted involvement of the whole population. There is no better example of this than the role of Soviet women in the war. The Revolution had given women, so far as was humanly possible, complete equality with men. The Soviet tradition, diametrically opposed to that of the Nazis, was that women ought to have a life and make a contribution outside the home.

Even before the war, women made up one-fourth of all Soviet milling machine and lathe workers, electric welders, and gauge makers. Some 150,000 women had become engineers and technicians, another 5,000 were engine drivers. During the war, hundreds of thousands of women took the places of men in the factory, mill and mine. On the farms six times as many women drove tractors and combines as before the war. Over 456,000 women are now serving as deputies in the local Soviets. At the front more than 75,000 Soviet women have been decorated. Forty-four women were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. One of those who received this award was Senior Lieutenant Anastasia Popova who made 737 flying missions, dumping over 100 tons of bombs on the Germans.

I saw and talked to many of these intrepid women. Typical of them was Lt. Col. Yevdokiya Bershanskaya who was in charge of a regiment of light bombers. Her regiment used one of the smallest bomber bi-planes in the world, only twenty-five feet wide with a bomb load of only 650 pounds but which often made as many as eight missions in one night. Bershanskaya's group annihilated German forces near Grozny, in the Kuban, the Crimea, and the North Caucasus. Or there was Lt. Boiko, twenty-six years old and commander of a heavy Russian tank. Her husband was a crack truck driver who earned over five thousand rubles a month. He offered the government fifty thousand rubles for a tank providing he and his wife could operate it. The request was granted. In one battle they knocked out five German tanks. Hero of the Soviet Union, Maria

Batrakova, commanding a group of Red Army men, actually threw back 53 enemy sorties in one five-day-long battle. These are but the merest few of many thousands.

An integral part of Russia's total war was the guerilla movement behind German lines. On July 3, 1941, in a radio message to the nation, calling for a scorched earth policy, Stalin set the tasks of the guerillas. "In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, mounted and foot, must be formed, sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines and set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated."

No small part of the guerilla work all over Russia was due to the unceasing inspiration and planning of Stalin. Every guerilla leader spoke of this. He was in frequent communication with guerilla units by radio. In cases of need, supplies and doctors were dropped from planes. I think all this activity behind the German lines recalled to Stalin his early days in underground work. He has a deep admiration for heroism and courage, qualities which were the very essence of the guerilla movement.

In the aggregate, Russian men, women, and children killed over a million Germans behind the Nazi lines. In the small area of White Russia alone, in the first year of the war, they killed 121,675 soldiers, 3,039 of whom were officers including 13 generals. They derailed 1,097 trains, blew up 980 bridges, destroyed 250 enemy aircraft, 295 tanks and armored cars, and 5,039 automobiles, besides blowing up 181 military warehouses and 19 staff headquarters. And this is but a small part of a great total.

Even small children took part in this work. I talked with Michael Strelsov, fourteen years of age. When the Germans occupied his village they hanged all suspected Communists and confiscated all food stuffs. The neighboring village of Noulesova was burned to the ground when the Germans discovered that some farmers had sheltered wounded Red Army soldiers. Michael organized the children, a group of thirteen boys and girls ranging in age from twelve to fifteen. They stole rifles and three machine guns from the Germans. They decided to ambush a road leading to

the front, hiding in the foliage at the roadside. Late at night when German troops came by with loaded supply carts, the children began firing. Most of the Germans were killed immediately; the rest surrendered. A German major emerged from one of the trucks with blanched face and trembling hands. He was dumbfounded to find himself the prisoner of children. This group served to inspire the adults of the region, enrolled one hundred forty-one grown-ups, and became a serious threat to an important German communications line.

The girls were not behind others in resisting the enemy. One Russian heroine volunteered to wait on tables in the German officers' mess. She systematically poisoned one officer after another. She was never caught, although the Germans finally discharged or imprisoned everyone connected with the restaurant.

As one concrete example of a girl guerilla, consider the story of Nadezhda Tryon, a small, attractive, blue-eyed girl who was just nineteen when the Germans invaded her home city of Minsk. After finding her way into the guerilla movement, she was given the hazardous assignment of buying arms and ammunition from the Germans. She would lure German soldiers to her house, asking if they wanted some of the finest liquor in Russia. When they were partly drunk she would demand payment, offering to take rifles or revolvers if they had no money. In this way Nadezhda and other girls secured a considerable quantity of weapons. There remained the problem of getting them to the Guerilla units. Nadezhda loaded them in a wooden cart, covered them with sawdust and loaded hay on top. Every road was guarded, but Nadezhda devised a way of getting through. She invited Nazi soldiers along the road to ride with her. The road guards, seeing the cart filled with soldiers, permitted her to pass. Then she would take the soldiers where they wanted to go, afterwards making a detour to the guerilla hide-out.

Nadezhda was part of a well organized movement. I visited Minsk when the Germans were still near the city, and it seemed from all I heard that the Germans had been the real prisoners in Minsk and that it was the Russians who had been free. The buildings in which Germans lived had steel shutters and concrete pillboxes outside. The Germans were afraid to go out at night for fear of being killed—and yet vengeance reached them. Russian scrub women carried bombs

under their dresses and planted them in the bed of the Nazi governor-general. When he retired he was blown into the next world. Certainly the Russians who fought behind German lines were voting in a perilous plebiscite, and the vast majority of them took their lives in their hands to vote for the Soviet system. In no other conquered area of Europe was guerilla activity so widespread, so all-inclusive.

Stalin was at the center of the great Russian effort, and must be given major credit for the victory. People close to the situation realized this. The American Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, commented, "There is no doubt he is the brain directing the Russian Army." Rumors circulated in the United States regarding a conflict between Stalin and the Red Army General Staff can only be characterized as ridiculous. The ablest generals are Party members. They respect Stalin and are, in turn, respected by him.

Typical of the top ranking military men are Marshals Konev, Rokossovsky, and Zhukov. All are Communists, and all come from working class or peasant backgrounds. They are also alike in being devoted family men who lead simple lives. Zhukov lives in a modest one-floor flat in Moscow with his wife, one daughter and two sons. The family has no automobile and the children attend the public schools. Konev has a son and daughter who are aviators.

Ivan Konev was born 49 years ago in the tiny village of Ladirno near Archangel in northern Russia, the son of peasants. He received no regular schooling and at ten was working full time in the fields. At the age of 12 he was doing a man's work as a lumberjack. In 1916 he was conscripted into the Tsar's army where harsh conditions soon turned him toward the revolutionary movement. He became one of the leaders of the revolutionary soldiery in Moscow when the Bolsheviks seized power. From that time on his rise has been steady. In the civil war he was commander of an armored train. He would send scouts ahead along the line, and then follow with daring raids through enemy territory at sixty miles an hour. Once he drove the train right through enemy lines into the city of Omsk, then headquarters of the white armies. Consternation at the appearance of an entire Red Guard armoured train was such that a general retreat was ordered, and Konev seized Omsk almost literally single handed. Later on Konev's train took part in operations against Japanese interventionist troops and won every

engagement. He attributes his success to painstaking study of what the enemy would expect him to do. Then, he says, "I always do the opposite."

A tall, lean, blue-eyed man with head shaved as smooth as a billiard ball, Konev has a typically Russian face, bright and intelligent with twinkling eyes and strong mouth. He is one of the few Russian generals who speak English. He is idolized by his troops. They say he is master of the art of war and yet treats them as "comrades." He despises military pomp, and it tickles the soldiers that he refuses to wear the regulation epaulettes on his coat. The red and blue rockets which celebrate victories have lighted the Moscow skies for Konev's achievements. His troops disposed of half a million Germans in World War II.

Constantine Constantinovitch Rokossovsky is one of Russia's most popular generals, perhaps because he is essentially a democratic commander. In war he is always in the thick of battle with his men. He prefers to establish headquarters near the front where the fighting is hottest. If you enter his dugout, you will find a folding table with maps, a hanging lamp powered by batteries, and the usual field telephone. Nearby is an ordinary folding cot where he sleeps, with his dog on the floor beside him, during operations. His habit of staying at the front has resulted in his being wounded three times.

He makes a practice of spending at least half of his time out among the troops so that he will know their characteristics and reactions. He has a rare talent for remembering faces, and can call thousands of his men by name. He is a good listener, willing to listen to the opinion of any man in the ranks. Officers of his staff told me that Rokossovsky is never flustered, remaining calm and self-possessed even at the most difficult and decisive moments.

Rokossovsky is tall, straight as an arrow, with unmistakable military bearing. At the front he usually dresses simply, with the regulation blue trousers and khaki tunic. Kept in trim by a stiff regimen of exercise, he never tires of work. By ten A.M. he is at staff headquarters, and while the war was on frequently remained on the job until three or four o'clock in the morning, sometimes even forgetting to eat.

Marshal Zhukov is the greatest military strategist of the Red Army. There can be no doubt that he is one of the two or three outstanding generals of the recent war. He commanded over twice as many troops as

Eisenhower. He has never suffered a major defeat. In the war he was not only, together with Stalin, the chief strategist of the Russian command, but he has gone back and forth as a field commander as well. Together with Rokossovsky he saved Moscow and Stalingrad, and he won back the Ukraine with Konev. He led the capture of Berlin.

Under the Tsar Zhukov would probably have lived and died a nonentity. He was a semi-illiterate, conscripted private in World War I. Severe illness caused him to be discharged and sent home. He volunteered to fight on the side of the Bolsheviks during the civil war, and thereafter became a Communist. He served with distinction, was wounded and became an officer of such promise that he was sent to the Frunze Military Academy, the Red Army's West Point. His brilliance was soon recognized and he was asked to join the teaching staff upon graduation. Later he was sent to Germany where he studied Prussian military technique. His progress up the ladder continued. He was chief Russian observer with the Loyalists in Spain, where he studied German aviators and Italian troops at close range. In 1939 he went to Mongolia and there participated in an unpublicized rout of several Japanese exploratory invasions.

Zhukov believes in knowing the opposing side as well as his own. During the war he made a study of every opposing German general so as to become acquainted with his psychology, his habits, his military techniques and quirks. Every captured German contributed something to his pattern of the opposing staff. Every minor engagement added to the picture of the tactical predilections of the German officer involved. Zhukov's intelligence service was of the best, and he made full use of it.

These men, together with Marshal Alexander M. Vasilovsky, former Chief of Staff and Supreme Commander of the Russian forces against Japan, Marshal Alexander Novikov, Chief of Aviation, and General A. E. Antonov, Chief of Staff, are chief among those with whom Stalin worked during the war. Stalin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Supreme Commander in Chief, Commissar of National Defence, and Chairman of the State Defence Committee, kept his finger on the pulse of every phase of the war effort. The Russian people believe he richly deserves the title which was conferred upon him at the war's end, that of Generalissimo.

And the Russian people themselves? An ordinary soldier who had taken part in the fighting before Orel told me that the offensive was "like an X-ray. It lays

your whole soul bare." The war applied a test like that to the Soviet peoples. The results are known to the whole world.



Part Two

*The Russia
Stalin Has Made*

*"It is time to realize that of all
the valuable capital the world
possesses, the most valuable and
most decisive is people. . . ."*

—JOSEPH STALIN

CHAPTER X

Socialism Comes to the Countryside

LENIN, Stalin, and the Bolsheviks did not have one revolution to accomplish in Russia; they had a half dozen or more. There was the seizure of power, the political revolution, but that could only have lasting effect if the industrial, the educational, the religious, the medical, and agricultural revolutions were carried out. Since Russia was predominantly agricultural, and the majority of the population peasants, the latter was perhaps the most important of all.

The soil of Russia is incredibly rich, but, under Tsarism, the people who lived on it were incredibly poor. The Russian peasant, illiterate and unschooled, had never come out of the medieval age. The hooked wooden plow was still in use. Modern methods were unknown. Holdings were small, being made ever smaller by the common system of inheritance, and distributed in a crazy system of strip patches so that each peasant would have a little good and some bad, some far and some near. Yields, as a result, were pitifully small. The peasant was seldom able to accumulate any surplus against the future; anything that happened, a drouth or the death of a horse, was a calamity which sent the family forth as outcasts and beggars.

To improve the lot of the peasant and increase the productivity of the countryside was a giant's task. The best the struggling Soviet government could do for some time was to redistribute the land on a more equitable basis. The landed estates were seized and the landlords outlawed. The poor peasants were helped at the expense of the "kulak" or comparatively wealthy peasant. The land was nationalized, but each peasant was granted the use of "his" plot of ground.

All that the Soviets were able to do in the first few years was apply some ameliorative measures, sufficient only to carry the country through a crisis period. When the civil war ended and conditions became more stable

there was a clear necessity for something more fundamental and far-reaching. Stalin stated the alternatives of the 14th Party Conference in 1925: "There are two paths along which agriculture can develop: the capitalist path and the socialist path. The capitalist path means development through the impoverishment of the majority of the peasantry for the sake of enriching the upper strata . . . The socialist path, on the contrary, means development through steady improvement in the standard of living of the majority of the peasantry."

It was with this statement in mind that I asked Stalin, when I saw him in 1926, a question that I considered crucial. "Is it possible to win the average Russian peasant who tills his own soil to communism?"

"In general very little can be done by propaganda," Stalin surprised me by saying. "The reason why we hope that the peasants will ultimately join with us and the reason we are now leading them is because we are creating such material and cultural conditions as will push them over to our side. The peasant is a practical man. What are his needs? He must be supplied with manufactured goods at reasonable prices, he needs credits, he wants to feel that the government considers his interests, helps him in time of famine, and is anxious to work with him and for him.

"The peasants realize that we have protected them from the former landlords who would take back their land. We are giving them a cultural life they have never had before. We are bringing them into the general political life so that they can share in it. In fact, we are giving them the means to build the whole social structure to satisfy their needs. We, standing at the center of power, are doing this not 100 per cent as yet, but as fast as we can.

"You must know that out of every hundred peasants nearly fifty fought on the various fronts in the civil war and for the first time realized what the word 'state'

means. Previously they knew only their own province or 'gubernia.' Now they have a genuine 'state patriotism.' They realize what their own national government means. They know that Russia will become a greater United States, governed by one central committee for the benefit of the inhabitants.

"Our peasants lean toward communism without prejudice. In France or England the peasants received their land from the owners or middle classes, whereas here they received their land from the Socialists. They realize it.

"We are creating conditions through cooperation, which are convincing the peasant that it is better to be with us than against us. It is true the middle class, small land-owning peasant is naturally not enchanted with us, but when he considers his experience with capitalists, who were unwilling even to talk with him, and his relationship to Communists who do talk with him, and do not exploit or despoil him, then the contrast shows him clearly with whom he must deal. He doesn't think we are ideal; but better than anyone else.

"There are two parts to peasant work—production and distribution. Profitable production depends on distribution. This side of peasant economy is being organized on a cooperative basis. We are already influencing twenty million peasants through consumers' or distributors' cooperatives. The peasant is beginning to realize that without this communal method he will never make the money he needs. He is slowly beginning to join producers' cooperatives or collective organizations.

"There are roughly fifteen thousand of these organizations in Russia, but many are not well conducted. They are mainly composed of poor peasants who have received tractors or agricultural implements. From the standpoint of the whole, this is a rather small showing, but it is important as an example, for it demonstrates the advantages of collective or mechanized peasant economy. The peasants are increasingly eager to enter into such collective organizations.

"Since the revolution we have also nationalized credit, and this helps the peasant because we can furnish him with cheap money. Those who are working collectively are given even better terms. So that here again the peasant values our help, and values communism. It will be much harder to organize cooperatives for the production of grain, but this will be done in time."

"Do the religious sects organize the best peasant communes?" I asked.

"No," said Stalin, "members of the sects are rather suspicious and do not work easily with others. In the province of Moscow there are some exceptionally good sectarians who work admirably, but in general they do not do well. The best cooperators are those demobilized from the Red Army and those who were in German prison camps. They learned that it is necessary to work together."

Even before the great collective farm campaign was under way, I could see, when I travelled through the countryside in 1927, that the peasant, despite filth and poverty still remaining, was living better than ever before. He no longer had a landlord over him and thus could take care of his own needs first. The government stepped in at countless points to help him. There was state insurance which protected him against fire and hail. He could insure his horse against death for \$1.50 a year and his cow for 40 cents. Taxes were lower than ever before, actually only one fourth as much as had been paid under the Tsar. For 1926-1927 they were only \$1.50 per capita, and sixty per cent of all tax monies were spent for local needs such as schools, hospitals, libraries, bridges and roads. The poor peasants were tax exempt. The position of the peasant woman had also changed. One peasant woman said, "The Soviet law is kinder to a woman than her own husband."

I also noted at that time that Stalin was opposing Trotsky by insisting that as much be done for the peasants as for the workers. What the peasants persistently demanded they got.

Neither the peasants nor the government were satisfied. Stalin said his policy was to ask, "What does the peasant want and how can he get it?" Now the peasant really wanted prosperity—and, once shaken out of his centuries of inertia, the Russian peasant was a formidable force. He could not get prosperity on the basis of individual ownership because there was not enough land (in settled territories) nor enough machinery available. Furthermore, the government could not industrialize the country and prepare against attack, which Stalin saw ahead, unless an adequate food supply could be assured. The individual peasant often flatly refused to try scientific methods and, even if it had been available, it was uneconomic to use machinery on the small crooked plots of land which were the heritage

of Tsarism. Stalin was convinced that it was impossible for a country long to remain socialist in the cities and capitalist in the villages. The Soviet answer was the collective farm.

In Stalin's words: "The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on common cultivation of the soil, to introduce collective cultivation of the soil on the basis of new and higher technique. The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, cooperative, collective cultivation of the soil with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture."

This was done and, as more tractors and supplies became available, more and more of the poor and middle peasants flocked to the collectives. The wealthy peasant or kulak was bitterly hostile to the collectivization movement. He was often a man who "lived off the backs of the other peasants" through granting loans, renting out machinery and implements, or by control of local trade. The collective deprived him of these advantages. A kind of civil war broke out between the kulaks and the collectives, the counterpart of the revolutionary battles which had been fought in the cities. Communist leaders of the collectives were murdered or beaten. The kulaks burned collective farm buildings and slaughtered livestock. In some places overzealous communists used coercive measures and turned entire villages against collectivization. In a speech at the end of 1929 Stalin announced, "Today we are able to make a decisive attack on the kulak, to break his resistance, to liquidate him as a class and replace his production by the collective and soviet farms." The property of the kulaks was confiscated, they were exiled to Siberia and the North, to work camps. It was a harsh policy and many died as a result.

By 1930 the collective farm movement had triumphed. Stalin became convinced that some officials had gone too far in forcing collectivization, which was contrary to his original plan of "example and persuasion." In March 1930 he published a famous letter, "Dizziness From Success," calling for a halt to coercive measures and roundly scoring excesses. Kulaks who had sons in the army, in the civil service, or in the factories, were permitted to return to their villages.

By 1933 there were 200,000 tractors and 25,000 combines in use. More than two thousand central machine-tractor stations had been organized at a cost of two billion rubles to provide services for farms in need of machines. Just before World War II there were 242,000 collective farms with a total of 292,000,000 acres of arable land. This is an average of over 1,200 acres per farm.

On my last visit to Russia I became convinced that the collectivization of agriculture was almost as much responsible for Russian victories as the Red Army. Even much of the strength of the Red Army came from the collective farms. Nearly a million peasants had learned to drive tractors and could immediately become tank drivers. Tractor factories were turned into tank factories almost overnight. It was no accident that the commander of all tank units, Marshal Rotmeisterov, was born and raised on a collective farm near Kalinin. It is doubtful if, without the collective farms, either the army or the war workers would have had the food which the emergency demanded.

The collective farms, along with all phases of human life in the Soviet Union, have "socialist competition". Great efforts are made both by farms and individuals to do the best and most in some work. This has had the result of raising efficiency, and increasing the income of the farm and its members. During the war most of the men were away, and it was the women who made the records. This got them as much publicity as a beauty contest winner would get in the United States. Take the case of Maria Demchenko, daughter of a poor farmer. She took a course in scientific farming and succeeded in raising more sugar beets per acre than anyone else in the Soviet Union. Afterwards, S. Ketishvili, a Georgian woman, beat her with a yield of 48 tons to the acre.

In Azerbaijan the world's cotton growing records were surpassed with a yield of six and two-tenths tons to the acre. In another district a brigade raised over four tons of spring wheat to the acre. A girl by the name of Markova succeeded in getting 4,573 gallons of milk from a single cow in one year. Another raised one hundred pigs in a year from one sow. One of the nine hundred thousand women who drove tractors during the war was decorated for introducing day and night shifts in tractor plowing. In addition she effected an economy of 24 tons of fuel per tractor. The result of all this is, that for Russia as a whole, agricultural

production is incomparably more efficient than ever before. Where under Tsarism it took thirty-two hours of labor to produce a ton of grain, it now takes only 1.7 hours.

This increased efficiency was very striking as I saw it when I visited the collective farms of the Raimonski District of Great Russia in 1944. In this area the one hundred and one collective farms were producing twenty-six thousand tons more potatoes than they had before the war.

The farm named "Comrade Stalin" was average. The chairman of this collective, Kusina Ivanovitch Zakwatkin, was a wiry, alert, good-looking man of 55. He had lived in the district under the Tsar. At that time, he told me, each peasant was land-starved. His holdings were divided into strips a few feet wide, widely separated and difficult to till. Zakwatkin had had a tiny plot only three feet wide. He worked from three in the morning until ten or eleven o'clock at night—but not for himself. Prince Galitzin owned all the forest and most of the land. Zakwatkin used his own horses when working for the Prince and so received enough to feed his family. There was no doctor in the village, and only one school for five villages. A club or library was something unheard of. Epidemics of cholera and typhus were frequent, but no one ever did anything about them.

When the Soviets came to power all the land became the property of the villagers. The industrious ones forged ahead, but not much could be done because there was no agricultural machinery and few horses. In 1925, thirty peasants, including Zakwatkin, joined together to rent a tractor. In 1929, twelve of them organized a collective farm. One hundred and twenty others were persuaded to join. Nevertheless, more than three hundred peasants adopted a "wait and see" attitude, and remained outside the collective, tilling their individual plots.

The members of the collective exchanged their individual plots for one large piece of land, and although the average quality of this land was lower, this disadvantage was outweighed by the possibility of using scientific methods. They planted 15 acres of cabbage, 10 of beets, 10 of cucumbers, 75 of potatoes, 50 of oats and 40 of rye. The collective had 15 horses, enough to plow all the land. Many of the individual farmers did not have horses and were forced to leave part of their strips fallow. The collective harvested

more cucumbers and potatoes than they could use. The surplus was sold and the money divided. By careful planting and planning the surpluses became larger year by year. The collective demonstrated that collectivism paid. However, it was not until 1935 that all the families joined. Even then some individuals continued to work in the local textile factory.

"When we started our collective," said Chairman Zakwatkin, "we had nothing except our individual houses. Now we have barns, electric lights, a seven-year school, a kindergarten, a club, two greenhouses, chicken houses and a dairy. Members may leave their children all day at the kindergarten. The children get three good meals for only 20 cents."

The collective, or kolkhoz, is run democratically. The chairman and a board of seven are elected by secret ballot at a meeting of all the members. Speeches are made for and against various candidates. On the present board are two women brigadiers, the girl who is director of the kindergarten, a woman hothouse worker, one man of seventy, and two soldiers at the front. "When the war came," the Chairman explained proudly rather than apologetically, "all the men between 18 and 45 were mobilized and we became a women's collective."

The workers are divided into eight brigades of forty to fifty members each and a brigadier in charge. The brigades are sub-divided into "links" of from four to eight workers. All the links compete with each other to see which, for example, can plow the most land. The names of the best workers are placed on an honor roll each month. The brigades compete with similar groups in the neighboring collective, "Klishva." Each June both collectives send commissions to study the methods of the other. These commissions report to full membership meetings. Rivalry is further stimulated by an area competition, in which the government awards a "Red Banner" to the best collective in the district.

The Chairman continued. "Our main crop is potatoes and our endeavor is to raise more and more to the acre. We have already eaten the potatoes we plant."

"How is that?" I interrupted. "If you eat them, how can they be planted?"

"Quite easily," he replied. "We simply cut out each small eye and eat the rest. We are getting more potatoes to the acre than ever, between 16 and 24 tons. Before the war, with men working, we never got more than five. Now, in spite of the fact that we only have

women and children, we are plowing 25 per cent more land. We are giving the government three times as much as before the war, and with less workers." He said that in the summer of 1942 alone, the children of Russia did over 108,000,000 adult "labor days" on the collective farms of the country.

We got in a horse cart, sat in the hay, and jostled out to the greenhouses to see how some of their miracles were accomplished. I found that they got the jump on the weather by planting under glass. They used machines to make dirt pots so that the plants could be set out without disturbing the roots.

The wage system was intensely interesting. A certain mark was established as the amount which could be done in a normal labor day in each kind of work. For instance, two and a half acres of plowing equalled three "labor days." The worker who plowed this much in one day still got three "labor days" credit. Harrowing two and a half acres counted as half a "labor day."

Quality in work is a collective rule. Work badly done had to be done over without credit. Some women receive pay for 450 "labor days" in a year. In winter Sunday is a day of rest, but in summer only rainy days are free.

If the collective turns out more than its quota it may receive a bonus from the government. In addition, each brigade gets extra for high yields. An average yield of six tons of potatoes per acre is expected, for example. Twenty-five per cent of anything produced above that is given to the brigade members.

At the end of the season the farms sell a certain amount to the government at a low fixed price. Then they take what they need for seed and livestock feeding. The remainder is divided among the workers in proportion to their "labor day" credits.

I asked for concrete figures on what the average worker received. The Chairman gave me the previous year's figures. For each "labor day" a worker received ten pounds of potatoes, half a pound of grain, two-thirds of a pound of beets and carrots, and three and three-tenths pounds of other vegetables, plus 5.63 rubles in cash. The worker is allowed to sell all the produce in the open market.

"How much would the worker get, supposing that he sold everything on the open market?" I asked.

Zakwatkin answered, "You must remember that each family also has its own garden plot of about three thousand square yards. Here potatoes, onions and

other vegetables can be raised, also chickens and pigs. Most of these products are sold on the open market." The Chairman then painstakingly figured out what everything would bring on the open market. The total was ninety thousand rubles for the year. Of course no one could sell this much, since the family had to eat a good share of what it produced. But it did mean that the members of the collective generally lived well and had lots of money. Of food products only sugar was scarce. All the families had radio receivers. Some homes had phonographs. The children were riding tricycles—something undreamed of in the old days.

The relationship between the collective farmers and its front line soldiers was close. One of the farmers in uniform had been made a Hero of the Soviet Union, while many others had received lesser decorations. The families of the killed or badly wounded are cared for by the collective. The returning wounded are all given special jobs.

It should not be thought that life is simply a monotonous round of work on the farm. They have movies in the clubhouse three times a week. The youngsters have dances nearly every evening. A dramatic group of collective members puts on about three plays per month. There is a choir, an athletic circle, and a program of lectures. Even the kindergarten children dance and recite, showing remarkable skill.

But the collective farm is not the only thing which has changed the face of Russia's rural districts. A factor very often overlooked by foreign observers is the co-operative movement. There are three great cooperative organizations. One is the all-Russian Union of Invalids. This is an association of handicraft workers who have been disabled in war. Invalid bookbinders join together to practice their craft. Disabled metal workers do likewise. All share in the profits. This organization has lower dues than other cooperatives, and the government has given it an advantage in reduced taxes.

Second, there is the extremely important handicraft producers cooperative society. This is organized very much along the lines of the invalids' cooperative. The producers' cooperative doesn't have a Union-wide organization. Each separate republic has organized one such co-op. They are responsible for a tremendous industrial output. In 1937 they turned out \$2,80,000,000 worth of goods. By 1940 they were marketing \$4,600,000,000 worth. In that year their profits were \$600,000,000.

The consumers' cooperative movement is the third great organization, and the one of particular interest in connection with the peasants. Its 20,000 societies extend over all of the Soviet Union. It is made up of rank-and-file peasants and serves their interests.

Each village has a store. It belongs to the great network of consumers cooperatives. They are small and usually have from one to three clerks. In peace time the store sells all the articles consumed by the peasantry, including flour, cereals, macaroni, rye bread, meat, sausage, chickens, fish, salted and pickled herring, butter, fat, cheese, eggs, sugar, canned goods, tea, salt, potatoes, vegetables and soft drinks. There may be a clothing department. During the war the stores were not always so well supplied. Sometimes they had only bread, tea, and salt.

The cooperatives in Russia are free and democratic. Local peasants run their own branches. The management is elected by secret ballot. Membership meetings occur at least quarterly. It is as democratic as any organization in Russia.

A meeting of the local cooperative in the village of Batutin, province of Moscow, is typical. There were seven co-ops in this one village because it serves a number of other settlements. One hundred and nineteen sturdy peasants, mostly women, attended, and of these 102 had the right to vote. The chairman of the local cooperative, Kondrashevoi, gave a report for the past year. This was followed by a vigorous discussion in which all participated.

There was no restriction on criticism. Kulikov said he thought the collection of scrap and waste material, such as tin cans, old shoes, and rags, needed to be improved. Filipkov said the sale of small agricultural implements such as hoes and rakes has not been sufficiently organized. He also felt that a department for the repair of shoes was needed. Tatyann said he believed that the cooperative should devote more attention to its own production of prime necessities. Matveev found fault with the cooperative farm. They should increase the amount of cultivated land and raise more cattle and fodder. Belyakina praised the work of the cooperative, particularly the assistance given to the invalids and families of those at the front.

After what seemed interminable discussion, the work of the cooperative for the past year was approved. Members then went on to nominate candidates for the

board of management, chairman, audit commission, accounting commission, and delegates to the regional conference. Voting was done by secret ballot.

The financial situation came next on the agenda. There was a balance of \$483,703.40. The meeting voted to donate 20 per cent of the profits, which shareholders would normally receive, to the government for the purchase of tanks. The manager was continued in office. Seven of the best workers were awarded \$800 for their efforts. I read over the report of the society for the past year. The gross turnover was \$3,256,600. The membership increased by 493.

Plans made for the coming year gave a vivid picture of the vitality of the Russian cooperative movement. These included: first, providing food and supplies for the population without interruption, and increasing farm supplies such as agricultural implements. Articles most needed and desired by members were to be produced in a cooperative factory. Second, reconstructing and repairing the entire cooperative store. Third, arranging to raise more fodder and increase the number of cattle on the cooperative farms. Fourth, opening a special shop for spring and summer goods. Fifth, opening a new cooperative store in the village of Borodino. Sixth, making provision to set aside at least 20 per cent of goods most in demand for families of those at the front and of war invalids. Seventh, increasing the shareholders' fee to \$80, and utilizing money from new members for national defense work. This store seemed very democratically run.

The structure of the consumers' cooperative stretches from the village through the regional center to the province, then to the republic and finally to the central office of all societies in the Soviet Union, called the Central Union or Centersuiz. The central office organizes the management of the entire system, plans production and trade, secures needed goods and capital, arranges for bank credits, audits the work of societies and plants, orders manufactured goods, and concludes contracts with factories. Whenever a region lacks goods it can order them through Centersuiz.

I interviewed N. P. Sedorov, chairman of the executive committee of Centersuiz. He has devoted sixteen years to the cooperative movement, working his way up from one of the smaller societies. His move up the ladder started by attendance at a co-op school for executives. After graduation he went to a housing cooperative, and then, in 1939, to Centersuiz.

He told me that the cooperatives represent a very powerful force in the country. They have no stores in the larger cities because the government has a virtual monopoly on urban merchandising. They do, however, serve the entire rural population.

Anyone, whether a member or not, can buy in the cooperative stores. The advantage in being a member is that you help run the store and get a share of the profits. In peacetime 20 per cent of the profits were turned back to members. In the co-op movement in the United States dividends are usually given in proportion to the total purchases a member makes in the store. In Soviet Russia the dividend is based on the number of shares a member has purchased. Membership pays in other ways, too. During the war the purchase of certain scarce items was sometimes restricted to members. A certain amount of the undivided profit is used for the general welfare of members. Membership is not a hardship. The annual fee is only 60 cents, and shares of capital stock usually cost only \$10. After one person in a family belongs, others in the family may join through purchasing as little as one-quarter of a share.

The cooperatives did much to help win the war. They played a considerable part in increasing the output of agricultural products for the Army and war workers. They developed their own factories for goods in wide demand, thus preventing or easing many critical shortages. Articles manufactured by the cooperatives range from crockery and toys to soap and sheepskin clothing. Almost the whole gamut of goods demanded by the peasantry is co-op manufactured. Co-op production tripled between 1942 and 1943. Their clothing factories,

for instance, produced 600,000 valenki (heavy felt boots worn in the winter months), 143,000 suits, 105,000 overcoats, 169,000 hats, and hundreds of thousands of pairs of socks, mittens and other knitted items.

The cooperative also acts as government purchasing agency for all things made or grown by the peasants. The peasants supplied even needed things to the government during the war so that the Red Army would have all it needed. Also during the war, the cooperatives voted to place their financial resources at the service of the government. They purchased several billion dollars worth of war bonds and gave \$13,600,000 from membership receipts for the purchase of tanks.

The Germans, when they occupied a region, destroyed the cooperatives. Property was seized and either used on the spot or shipped back to Germany. What could not be used was wantonly destroyed. More than ten thousand acts of destruction against the cooperatives were recorded by Centseruiz in Moscow. When caught, the managers of co-op institutions were often shot or hanged. Those who escaped became guerillas and many were awarded the decoration, Hero of the Soviet Union.

The consumers' cooperative movement is the basic distributive system for all the peasants of Russia. It is free, democratic, and directly represents the wishes of the peasants. It has played a vital part in raising the standard of living and bringing rural Russia out of the dark ages.

CHAPTER XI

Workers and Jobs

THE SOVIET trade unions, with 191 organizations and 31 million members, are the largest in the world. This rate of organization is three times as high as among British workers and four times that prevailing in the United States. No one is compelled to join the Russian unions, but 85 per cent of those eligible belong.

There are substantial differences between the Russian unions and the trade union organizations as we

know them. Our trade unions began as efforts on the part of workers to improve wages and working conditions. No such simple and peaceful movement was possible under Tsarism. The political movements started first, and the trade unions were started under the leadership of the working class political parties in Russia. It will be remembered that Stalin helped found the trade union movement in his native Caucasus and

led some of the historic strikes under the Tsar. The trade unions were thus, from their inception, an integral part of the movement which created the Soviet state. After the Revolution three possible courses of trade union development were considered. One group wanted to have the unions control all production. A second group wanted to make the unions part of the state apparatus. Lenin and Stalin believed that the unions should be independent organizations but with a close tie between the Party and the union. Stalin expressed it this way, "Trade unions form the link between the advanced and backward elements in the ranks of the working class; they unite the masses of the workers with the vanguard." This conception was not imposed on the Russian unions, it developed naturally and normally out of their history.

The activities of the Soviet trade unions are also different—they are, it must be remembered, functioning in an entirely different economic system. Under capitalism the main object of the unions is to fight for workers' rights and to win higher wages, shorter hours and better conditions of work. In order to do these things they must prevent employers from using the unemployed to destroy what labor has won. But in Russia there are no unemployed, and, consequently, labor does not have to fear displacement.

Socialization of industry is responsible for many changes in attitude. When in the service of corporations operating for private profit, labor may feel that wages are too low while profits are too high. But when the factories are owned by the state, workers tend to feel that regardless of their own hardships at least they are serving their country. Capitalism assumes that it works for the common good through having each person strive for his own self interest and profit. Socialism reverses this, saying that each individual can benefit only as he works for the common good.

In the Soviet system wages are determined by partners—labor and the state. Economic planning distributes the total wage-bill among the various industries. To increase production in a given industry more money is allocated to it for wages. Once the Central Planning Commission has determined the wage plan for every industry the wage unions begin negotiating agreements with management. These agreements are settled every year and cover such matters as time and piece rates for each kind of work, overtime rates, quality of output, transfer of workers from one grade to another,

welfare, and payment for improvements and inventions. In big factories the union often assigns an expert to assist any worker who has an idea which might benefit the factory.

Since factories are not privately owned, the unions consider it part of their function to increase production and so have more to distribute among all workers. The worker feels that the factory is "his." Consequently the Russian unions often initiate measures which would be considered part of the job of management in the United States. The penalties for tardiness, for example, are much heavier in the Soviet Union. If a worker comes late once or twice he is merely reprimanded, but if he is late again or comes more than twenty minutes late, he has to go to court and may lose as much as 25 per cent of his salary for several months.

Many humorous stories are told about the ingenuity of those who wished to avoid this penalty. One worker who had been reprimanded twice already suddenly realized that he would be late again and had no excuse. He decided to feign insanity on the street and so secure a medical certificate for his absence. He was taken to the hospital and even the doctor thought his illness genuine. At noon he was served with a wonderful meal. He couldn't resist asking the nurse, "Do you always have as good dinners as this?" "No," the nurse replied, "But this is Sunday." It suddenly dawned on him that he hadn't had to go to work at all.

Another worker who also had been twice warned told the foreman when he came late for the third time that it wasn't his fault at all as he had been called up by the N.K.V.D. (the secret service) for questioning. The foreman said, "Well, get a slip from the N.K.V.D. to that effect." The man went out and after a lapse of time called from a telephone booth the foreman in the factory saying, "This is the N.K.V.D. calling. You sent a workman down here to get a slip. Don't you know that we never give slips when we question anyone?" "Oh, all right," replied the foreman, "just send the worker back." The ingenious laborer had no further trouble about having been late.

In 1944 the Russian trade unions introduced a "Charter of Honor" given to all workers who, in addition to maintaining quality of work, overfulfilled the norm of output in their shop over a six month period. As a result of this and similar trade union actions, productivity jumped. It increased 46 per cent in light industry. In the West it is generally considered

that increasing output is only of interest to the employer, since the profits are his.

Theoretically the Russian worker has the right to strike. Practically he might get into trouble if he tried it. Actually he isn't much interested in this right. The worker and the management have a common aim, to turn out the maximum amount of goods. Cooperation is substituted for industrial conflict.

Still strikes do occur. In April, 1946, for instance, the electrical workers in a Moscow factory went on strike because their complaints about ventilation and other matters have been ignored. The unions are very thorough, and sometimes very aggressive. Grievances are first considered by a works committee in the plant. Adjustment is usually possible at that point. If that fails the matter is taken up by a grievance committee composed of equal representations of labor and management. If no decision can be reached here the question is referred to an Arbitration Board made up of one representative of the union, one from management and an impartial chairman. Sometimes the conflict goes directly to the Central Committee of the trade union and the commissariat of the industry involved. If a change of policy is at stake the whole subject may be referred to the All-Union Central Council of the Unions and the Government.

The peculiar characteristics of the Russian trade unions lead some Western leaders to charge that they are not independent and are mere creatures of the state. On the other hand, Col. Cooper, builder of the Dnieper River Dam, complained to me that the trade unions had too much power. "They babied the workers," he said. "In America we would never think of providing the club facilities and the easy going work that they do in Russia. If a manager doesn't get on with the workers, he may be fired. He has to agree pretty much with the trade union."

The Russian workers are not "slaves." All my conversations in the factories made me feel it would be truer to say that the workers now feel themselves to be "citizens of industry." An American who had formerly held a responsible job in Detroit and is now working in an automobile body plant in Moscow went even further, asserting that he felt the workers had complete democracy. "They can nominate anyone they please and oppose the Party machine if they wish. The greatest difficulty, as in America, is indifference or inertia."

There is an impression in the West that all the

benefits are for manual laborers and top government officials, and that little consideration is given to the educated person. The unions in Russia are industrial. Everyone in a given plant can belong, from manager to scrub woman. Such unions cover every "industry"—including the purely intellectual and seemingly individual enterprises. The Russians are very proud of having wiped out what they consider the very harmful distinction between manual and mental work. If an individual works for the good of the country, whether as a writer or a welder, he is considered a worker in Russia, is eligible for membership in a trade union and enjoys their very extensive advantages.

Russian workers complain, and loudly, about many things—mainly bureaucracy and petty graft—but never that the entire system is run primarily in the interests of someone else. In general there is to be found a genuine spirit of cooperation. A foreman in an automobile plant in Moscow, who had formerly held a similar position in New Jersey, said that in Russia he felt as though he were a teacher rather than a foreman. In the Gorky automobile plant the workers would put in voluntary overtime or free day work if they were not turning out their usual quota.

A different system has also brought different incentives into play in the Soviet Union. The powerful profit motive does not exist. Soviet citizens cannot dream of becoming millionaires through having others work for them. This does not mean, however, that Sovietism makes no appeal to self interest. Stalin believes that self interest is not harmful as long as it can be synchronized with the public welfare. He has tried to build a system of rewards for achievement without private monopoly and private profit.

Wages are determined by results. The more a worker produces, the more he is paid. A truck driver I met in Moscow in 1944 had been getting as high as \$600 per month. A certain norm is set for every job, and the more the worker exceeds this, the more he is paid. This inequality has been greeted with cheers and groans, according to the point of view, as a departure from socialist principles. Stalin has denied this when he said, "These people evidently think that socialism calls for equality, for levelling the requirements and the personal lives of all members of society. Needless to say, such an assumption has nothing in common with Marxism . . . By equality Marxism means not equality in personal requirements and personal life,

but the abolition of classes, *i.e.* (a) the equal emancipation of all toilers from exploitation, after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated, (b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production, after this has been transformed into the property of the whole society, (c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements. And Marxism starts out with the assumption that people's abilities and requirements are not, and cannot be, equal in quality or quantity, either in the period of socialism or of communism."

In 1931 the light industries had increased their rates of pay faster than the heavy industries. The result was that Stalin told management, "We must set up a wage scale that will take into account the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor, between heavy work and light work. It cannot be tolerated that a highly skilled worker in a steel mill should earn no more than a sweeper. It cannot be tolerated that a locomotive driver on a railway should earn only as much as a copying clerk."

Wages depend to some degree on the scarcity of particular types of labor. For example, competent engineers and managers are hard to find, so their compensation is much higher than for lower skills. Copper-plating was paid at a very high rate in 1932. I found that this was done to induce more boys to enter this trade.

Beyond the wage incentive, however, is the worker's knowledge that his efforts go to the public welfare. His labor either increases the amount of consumer goods available to all, or aids in building heavy industry which will be the basis for future consumer goods, or is necessary for defense. Nothing goes to private owners or coupon clippers. Thus the Russian worker in peace time has much the same drive to produce as motivated workers in the West during the war.

The desire for attention, for recognition by one's fellows, is another motivation much used in industry. The pictures and name of the best workers are posted on a big board outside of the factory or plant every month. Top workers also get medals, prizes and citations. This is also used in reverse, by posting the names of the worst workers. Some of the foremen told me that no other method was so effective in reducing absenteeism and eliminating inefficiency. Those listed

as the worst workers received such a "razzing" from their fellows that they invariably improved.

The government also appeals to the desire for power of the average individual. The most expert workman is given advancement and more important positions. Creativeness is also well rewarded. Any worker who invents a new process to increase production or lower costs is assured of a good-sized cash award and promotion as well.

While all workers receive vacations with pay, the workers with the best records are sent to the finest rest and vacation resorts in the Crimea and elsewhere. While in Yalta in 1939, I visited the former summer palace of the Tsar. It is used as a rest resort by the workers of the heavy steel industry. The brawny smelting workers who were walking in the elaborate gardens and swimming in the warm waters of the Black Sea, where once the courtiers had disported themselves, were a measure of the change in Russia.

"Team spirit" is an essential part of all Soviet endeavor. Competition is far from dead under socialism. The Soviets use men's sporting instincts to turn out more goods. Every factory and farm competes with another. All the factories in a given field, such as the production of boilers, compete to see which is the best. Within each factory groups compete with each other.

The interest in these competitions reaches feverish heights. In peace as well as war, workers frequently volunteer to increase production quotas. Col. Cooper told me that, while building the Dnieper Dam, workers would exceed their quotas time and time again. When the government plan proposed that they lay 427,000 cubic meters of concrete, the workers countered with a plan of 500,000, and actually laid 518,000. Col. Cooper also said that interest in competition became so keen that many workers voluntarily worked overtime without pay. While working on that dam the Russians laid more concrete in shorter time than had ever been done before. Of course, along with incentives that worked, there was much waste and inefficiency due to inexperience.

A unique feature of Soviet competition is that the winning factory or group tries to help the losers improve their work. Commissions are sent from one factory to another to share ideas and learn better methods. Sometimes this help takes the form of organized patronage. One factory may "adopt" another, in much the way that a prosperous church in the United

States might adopt a sister church in a slum area. The stronger group thereby helps the weaker, although the process is more usually one of mutual aid. Frequently a factory will "adopt" a nearby collective farm. The factory will supply educational and technical aid to the farm, and the farm, in turn, will help the factory with certain food products. The oil industry in Baku has 66 such agreements.

The highest development of competition has been the Stakhanovite movement which began in 1935. It was originated by a young coal miner and the movement was named for him. It is not a speed up plan, being based on the utilization of science to make work easier and faster. Stakhanov applied it to coal. After his accomplishments received publicity the movement spread like wildfire, and soon spirited competitions were going on between industries, between plants, and between individuals. Stalin saw in this an opportunity for increasing production by making the workers conscious of the application of science to production. Conferences were organized to spread the idea over all of the Soviet Union.

Stalin describes the Stakhanovites in these words: "They are mostly young or middle-aged working men and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, who show examples of precision and accuracy in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor in work and who have learned to count not only minutes, but also seconds. The majority of them have taken the minimum courses and are continuing their technical education. They are free of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, technicians and business executives; they are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated technical standards and creating new and higher standards; they are introducing amendments into the designed capacities and economic plans drawn up by the leaders of industry."

As a result the miners in the Donbas increased their production to double that of the Ruhr. In a shoe factory in Leningrad, output went up some fifty per cent higher than the world's record. In the automobile plant at Gorky some Ford production records were exceeded.

After observing Russian industry the British Trade Union Delegation to Russia concluded that the Soviets were not lagging behind the West in technical development. They pointed out that order and cleanliness in the factories was below the British standard, but that as far as production was concerned, felt that Russia

equalled the British. Americans who visit Russia would modify this judgment considerably, because Soviet production efficiency does not yet compare with that of the United States.

While public opposition to the basic program of communism is impossible in the Soviet Union, criticism of all aspects of Soviet life is encouraged and rewarded. Stalin not only urges every worker to criticize publicly whatever is not sound in factory, mine and mill, but he has pointed the way in his public addresses. In his report to the Party Congress in 1933 he said this: "First the Party developed wide self-criticism, concentrating the attention of the masses on the defects in our work of construction, the defects in our organization and institutions . . . In its appeal of June 2, 1928, the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign of self-criticism, calling upon all forces of the Party and the working class to develop self-criticism 'from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top,' without respect of person." The result is a perpetual stream of criticism in the papers attacking instances of inefficiency or wrong-doing.

Stalin believes that inasmuch as all the basic means of production and distribution are owned by the nation, and that unemployment has been abolished, there is more genuine *economic* democracy than in the West.

Stalin expressed this to me in the following words: "The fact that the factories and workshops of the U.S.S.R. belong to the whole people and not to capitalists, that the factories and workshops are managed not by the appointees of capitalists, but by representatives of the working class; the consciousness that the workers work, not for the capitalists, but for their own state, for their own class, represents an enormous driving force in the development and perfection of industry. It must be observed that the overwhelming majority of the factory and works managers in Russia are workingmen, appointed by the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the trade unions and that not a single factory manager can remain at his post contrary to the will of the workers or the particular trade union.

"It must also be observed that in every factory and workshop there is a factory council, elected by the workers, which controls the activities of the management of the particular enterprise. Finally, it must be observed that in every industrial enterprise regular production conferences of workers are held in which

all the workers employed in a given enterprise take part and at which the work of the manager is discussed, errors and defects are noted and rectified through the trade unions, through the Party and through the organs of Soviet administration. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that all these circumstances radically alter the position of the workers as well as the state of affairs in the various enterprises. While, under capitalism, the workers regard their factory as a prison, under the Soviet system the workers regard the factory as something near and dear to them and in the development and improvement of which they are vitally interested."

Whether or not one accepts this, it must be admitted that the workers have received many real benefits. Hours have been reduced. Prior to the war the seven hour day was the rule. Now, due to the need for restoring the devastated areas, eight hours is the temporary standard, but the intention is to shorten the hours as soon as possible.

This is illustrated by a letter I received recently from a British citizen, Arthur Watts, whom I came to know in Moscow, and who had represented the Friends in Russia. When the War broke, he entered a factory in Moscow as a worker. In the spring of 1946 he wrote from a Sanitarium in the Caucasus declaring that most of the old privileges for the workers had been restored:

"In my case all this means that I receive: 1—a reduction in working hours, 2—twelve months pay for eleven months work and for the next three years an additional months pay in compensation for holidays I didn't have during the war, 3—one month's holiday every year, 4—a pass to a sanitarium for a month at the cost of \$36. This includes transportation, full board and room, all entertainments—dances, movies, etc.—, a very thorough medical examination, mineral water baths, electrical treatment, etcetera.

"At first I hesitated to accept a pass to a sanitarium 1250 miles from Moscow as I feared the overcrowded trains would be too much for me. I found, however, that a special car was provided. On the train I met people from all over the U.S.S.R. going to the various sanitariums. Here in this sanitarium is a still more representative crowd of: directors, workers, generals, soldiers, sailors, doctors, Russians, Tartars, Estonians, Armenians, Jews, Rumanians and Jugoslavians. In fact, I have never before met with such a varied collection of peoples."

From 1937 to 1940 cash wages in the Soviet Union rose 34 per cent. Real wages also increased, although not quite so sharply. In spite of the fact that Russia was concentrating on machinery and armaments, the quantity of consumer goods was going up prior to the war. Double the amount of socks and stockings were available. Fifteen times the amount of candy was on the market. Since the quantity of available consumer goods was growing, it is therefore clear that real wages improved considerably. Edwin S. Smith, a member of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board, who has made an intensive study of Russian labor conditions, believes that "the *rate of improvement* of the conditions of the Soviet worker during the last 25 years far surpasses that recorded in any other country at any time."

One can only understand what all of these developments mean in terms of individual lives by seeing the Russian factory system in action. I visited one of the large war plants in Moscow late in 1944. It was called "Fighter" from the fact that its workers had taken part in the revolutionary outbreak of 1905. The factory was now turning out mortar shells, drills, compressors, and air hammers.

Entering the plant we saw a huge sign: "All our strength to uphold our heroic Red Army, our heroic Red Fleet. All the strength of the people to destroy the enemy. Forward to Victory!" There was also a huge cartoon showing a huge Nazi boot trampling upon and crushing men, women and children.

We were ushered into the office of the chief engineer, Zinov Spairo, an alert, vigorous man of 40. I noticed that he had not only been awarded the Badge of Honor but also had the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. He had graduated from Moscow Technical School in 1930, and before securing his present post, spent four years working in a lathe factory. During the war he virtually worked 24 hours a day, living, working and eating in the plant.

He explained that prior to the war the factory had been engaged in making pumps and compressors, largely for the oil industry. The necessary shift to war production was a gargantuan task, since the best and most experienced workers were taken for the Army. Youngsters, old people, wives, mothers and sisters came to take their places. The new workers, forty per cent of them women, had enthusiasm, but were untrained and inefficient. To meet the emergency every experienced worker became an instructor.

To add to the difficulties, the Germans, in August 1941, had dropped a good many bombs on the plant, completely destroying the roof. In spite of everything production increased steadily month by month. As one laborer told me, "We worked as though we were the only factory supplying the front and as though the entire war depended upon our output." Soon they were turning out more than ever before and with fewer workers.

We went into the foundry. Huge furnaces were spitting molten steel. An endless revolving chain was carrying moulds for bombs. One minute elapsed from the time the liquid steel was poured until the casting frame was turned upside down and a bomb casing dropped out. A new frame for casting was inserted immediately as the chain moved endlessly on. I noticed women even in the foundry. One was operating a huge travelling crane.

The plant engineer said that the "flow" system was part of the secret of their success. Instead of having moving belts in most of the factory, the bombs rolled on their way from one machine to the next by force of gravity. The number of processes had been reduced to 14, and a long and tortuous path of 687 yards had been decreased to 122. I timed the bombs from casting to finished product—just 20 minutes.

The energy of the workers was remarkable. "What have you done to make them work so fast?" I asked. "Patriotism alone does much," replied the engineer, "but 'socialist competition' has been introduced everywhere. All factories making similar products compete with each other. They strive for better organization, greater output, improved quality, reduced costs. This plant competes with 32 rivals in the oil industry for the best record each month. Seventeen times since the war started we have won first place, and never have we fallen below third. Every time we win, the factory gets 200,000 rubles. Forty per cent goes for cultural activity. Sixty per cent is given for premiums, divided between engineers and personnel. The best workers are given certain norms and if they exceed these they receive more."

Spairo pointed out a girl by the name of Grusha Sesshev, 22, who was turning out twice her norm. "When she goes off her shift we have to put two workers in her place," he said. "Such a girl not only gets extra wages but additional coupons for food products as well."

As the war progressed all sorts of difficulties beset the plant. Travel conditions became so difficult that eight hundred workers came to live in quarters erected by the plant. Others commuted on an electric line built in five months during the war. The regular coal supply was cut off, so the factory began to use coal dust mixed with oil. Food was scarce, so the factory started operating a farm of about 200 acres. They now have 90 pigs, 15 cows and many chickens. In the summer of 1944 they raised 350 tons of potatoes besides cabbages, carrots and other vegetables.

At the time of our visit, all the workers were eating one meal a day at the plant cafeteria, and about 40 per cent of them were eating all meals there. Cafeteria prices were on a sliding scale, determined on the basis of salary received. Three meals taken at the plant cost about a dollar a day.

I was curious as to how many of the workers belonged to the Communist Party. "About twenty per cent," the engineer said, "but this does not include the Communist youth; I don't know how many members they have. Everyone belongs to the trade union which handles all our social insurance and rest homes." He also told me that there were 1,000 Stakhanovites in the plant, all of whom regularly overfulfilled production standards.

Control in the plant was shared by the Party Bureau, the trade union, and the Directorate. There had been no friction between them and, of course, no strikes. The factory committee is elected by the workers. Each shift meets to nominate candidates. Workers have the right, and exercise it, to speak for and against those named. Voting comes later, with the secret ballot being used.

Everyone in the plant had one day off per week. Annual vacations had been cancelled during the war, but were to be resumed as soon as the war was over. The factory had a free medical clinic with three doctors, a free dental clinic and drug dispensary. Mothers had the usual Russian arrangement for keeping their babies and young children in a plant nursery, and received time off for nursing babies.

The plant had the "cultural" activities usual to every farm and factory in the Soviet Union. Dances and moving pictures were given several times weekly. The plant circulating library had 20,000 volumes. A trade school had been set up near the factory, and a Stakhanovist school in methods of increasing production

was being operated within the plant. There was the usual wall newspaper prepared by the workers. One big poster on the bulletin board was headed: "What we Komsomols (Young Communists) agree to do for the liberated Don Basin." Under this, "We will make two compressors after work; we will repair one compressor after work; we will repair motors in the electrical shop after work; we will send them three transformers; we will collect and send 1,000 books; we will raise and give them 100,000 rubles."

On a large signboard were pictures of 14 of the best workers, as well as a list of "absentees" and "lazy fellows." There were two girls among the "best workers." One was the young and pretty Valentine Ezotova. From her appearance it was hard to imagine that she was the best rod worker in the plant. I learned that she had been working in a Moscow office when her home village in Smolensk Province had been invaded by the Germans. Her father, suspected of guerilla activities, had been starved to death by the Germans. Her mother had been saved, more dead than alive, by the recapture of the village. When Valentine heard of her father's death, she left her office job and applied for work in the plant. She realized that it was not exactly women's work, but burned to do something to repay the Germans for their crimes. In a short time she outstripped all her fellow workers. She was made head of the "front" brigade. Although not strong, she studied means of saving movements and reducing time. She effected a whole series of small economies, such as where and how tools were placed, how boxes for forms were arranged, and how a hold was packed. She reduced the number of workers in her brigade in addition to increasing production. Her system was used as a model for the entire plant.

I was very much interested in the factory newspaper, *Fight*, which was put out by "the Party Bureau, the

trade union, and the directors of the factory," and used by everyone to give praise and blame. One article was headed "Why I Didn't Fulfill My Norm." The worker complained that he had been placed on one of the hardest lathe jobs when he first came to the plant, for which he had had no practical training. The foreman instructed him during working hours, interfering with his output. He urged that instruction be given before the shift began. Another article criticized the laundry management. The librarian asked workers to remember that "books are social property and difficult to obtain. Protect them and return them promptly. Give others a chance to read." An article on the back page, headed "Their People", was a take-off on "insiders" who get the white bread others are properly entitled to.

Perhaps the "Fighter" plant is better than the average—but it does represent something of what the Russians are aiming at.

On various occasions while in Russia I have discussed unions with Omelchenko, editor of the trade union newspaper *Trud* (Labor). He maintains that there is no reason why trade unions should not cooperate with the state. The vital question is whether such cooperation "is in the best interests of the working class." He says that in Russia the government, in cooperation with the unions, has abolished exploitation and unemployment. The health of the workers, mother and child welfare, and maintenance in old age have been advanced farther than in the West. He says, "At the same time our trade unions are materially independent of the state. They exist and carry on their functions with their own funds, obtained from membership dues. The working people of our country have every ground for regarding their trade unions as the most democratic in the world." One does not have to accept this entirely nor overlook many shortcomings to recognize that the trade unions are performing invaluable services to Russian labor.

CHAPTER XII

Nationalism Without Tears

THE SOVIET UNION, which after India and China has the largest population of any country in the world, has the special distinction of having the greatest variety among its citizens. Although "Russian"

is commonly used as a synonym for Soviet citizen it is not a very satisfactory one, for "Russia", or, more accurately, the Soviet Union, is a fantastic mosaic of races and cultures with 175 nationalities and over 125

different languages among its two hundred million inhabitants.

The best solution Tsarism could find for this problem, since it was a matter of the Russian Empire exploiting captive peoples, was rigid oppression. The contrast between what I witnessed under the rule of Tsar Nicholas II in 1916 and what I saw nearly thirty years later was as that between total darkness and sunlight. The Empire was rightly called the prison-house of nations. Everywhere was illiteracy, abject poverty, disease, and exploitation. It was illegal for the various nationalities to have schools in their own language. The wealth of the land was sucked away while industry was kept in a primitive state. The richest agricultural lands were taken over by the Russian nobility. The dissolute rulers lived in great pomp and luxury, protected by Tsarist troops. National enmities and prejudices were deliberately fostered by Tsarist officials as a weapon against movements for freedom. One national group was sent to police another, and boundary lines were often arranged to cut nations in two.

In Bokhara I found the Tsar supporting the Emir in exploiting his own people so that the Tsar in turn could exploit the country. The masses were kept in virtual slavery. The Emir maintained a huge harem while his subjects were ruined by unjust taxation. The Emir had a doctor for himself and his harem, but the people were forced to depend on witch doctors and healers. I saw the battlements where the Emir barbarously punished his enemies by having them thrown hundreds of feet upon the stones below.

One week after Lenin and the Bolsheviks took power in 1917, a government decree proclaimed the rights of equality and free development for all national groups within the borders of the Soviet Union. The largest and most populous nations were organized into Union Republics. Within each one may be smaller national groups organized into autonomous republics or regions. Each group and nation, no matter how small, was given every opportunity to develop its own culture.

Perhaps the complexity of the situation will best be conveyed by considering some of the Union Republics. I have visited every one of them, and the welter of differing languages, customs, and peoples almost passes belief. The Russian Republic is the biggest, with an area twice the size of the United States and a population of 114 million. It would seem that this Republic

could outweigh the others, since it has more than half the population of the Union, but, as a matter of fact, no law can be passed except by a majority vote of the representatives of all the Republics. Next comes the Ukraine, the southland "bread-basket" of the Union, with 42 million people. It is about the size of Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana combined. White Russia is the third largest of the Republics and has over ten million population. It is called "White" because the people are more blonde than the Great Russians.

Uzbekistan, with a population of six million, ranks fourth. I visited most sections of this Republic in the days of the Tsar. The people were kept in bondage, and were both ignorant and superstitious. All the women wore long, black veils to hide their faces. Today all this has changed. The people are literate, women have been granted equal rights, the veil is abolished, and Uzbekistan has become the great cotton center of the U.S.S.R. Decent homes have replaced the filthy mud hut villages. The Moslems have been allowed to continue their mosques, but Islamism no longer has the force of a state religion.

Kazakhstan is the second largest Republic in size, with an area of more than a million square miles, and fifth in population, coming just 150,000 below Uzbekistan. Half of the land is desert, but Soviet science is reclaiming it. The people used to be nomads, but there are now large cities and considerable industry. In 1916 there was only one newspaper and three secondary schools in the whole area. Today there are 200 newspapers and 600 secondary schools. When I was there during the Tsar's rule, the population revolted against conscription. On my visit during World War II, I found that instead of fighting against service the population had rallied as one man to fight the Nazis—who were still a long way from Kazakhstan. They felt that Soviet rule had given them something to fight for.

Achievements in the republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are particularly striking due to the previous backwardness of the region. Reporting from Samarkand, W. H. Lawrence, distinguished *New York Times* writer, said that it was his "considered judgment that more progress has been made in the twenty-one years since Soviet rule was firmly established here in 1923 than in all the other years since Alexander the Great first captured Samarkand in 329 B.C."

The remaining eleven Republics are: Azerbaijan, oil center of Russia; Armenia, the first Christian state; Turkmenia, a desert state; Tadzhikistan, land of Iranian shepherds; Kirghizia, where live herdsmen of the hills; Karelia, land of the far north; Moldavia, bordering on Rumania; the three Baltic Republics—Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia; and Georgia, seat of one of the world's most ancient civilizations. Incidentally, the Georgians have always been among the most fiercely independent. If, today, they are jokingly asked how it seems to be under the Russians, some will reply hotly, "We're not under the Russians. It's our Djugashvili [Stalin] who rules the Kremlin. The Russians are under us."

Each republic has its own constitution, its own elected officials, its own cabinet, its own courts, its own educational system, and, in theory, its right to secede from the Union.

For the first time in the history of Russia the hundreds of diverse nationalities have been joined together in a strong and peaceful political union. No matter what has been said about the Soviet Union, it has never exploited the small national groups within its boundaries. Where, under the Tsar, a thousand hates and animosities were kept at fever pitch, equality has brought harmony and eager cooperation. Today there is no country which has less racial discrimination than the Soviet Union. Joseph Stalin devised and carried out the policy which not only provides a humane and admirable example for the world, but which also has made the Soviet Union internally strong.

It is no accident that Stalin took the lead on this question. As a child and youth in Georgia he saw the evils of Tsarist policy at first hand. He began studying the question of the treatment of racial minorities at an early age. The fruit of his study was the book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, published in 1913, in which he advocated "the right of nations to self-determination and independent political existence." When the Bolsheviks seized power, Stalin was immediately made Commissar of Nationalities. From the very first days of Soviet power his recommendations on the subject guided the new government.

In all the long history of mankind tyrants, and some pseudo-scientists, have championed the idea that a nation is a product of common blood or "race." Hitler was the latest, and most successful, advocate of this theory. Stalin, long before Hitler was even a corporal,

was fighting the master race myth. In his book Stalin wrote, "A nation is an historically evolved community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture."

Stalin believed that every nation had the right to join with others to provide for increasing security and happiness for its people; or it had the right to leave such a union and become independent. He felt that the various nationalities in the Russian Empire could be bound together, but only if their grievances were removed. What were these? Stalin formulated them as follows:

"A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.

"A minority is discontented because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.

"A minority is discontented . . . because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience, liberty of movement, *et cetera*. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.

"Thus national equality *in all forms* (language, schools, *et cetera*) is an essential element in the solution of the nationality problem."

These ideas, formulated so long ago, were put into practice—and they worked. It was his idea that if all the various nationalities joined together to use their coal, iron, oil, and agricultural resources, not to make a few wealthy, but for the common good, they could be prosperous and strong. But every minority wishes freedom even above prosperity, so Stalin said, "The Party therefore demands complete equality of rights in educational, religious, and other matters, and the removal of all restrictions on national minorities.

This policy has resulted in abolishing illiteracy in a short quarter of a century, and has raised new leaders among every group in the Soviet Union. Great intellectual wealth, that would before have been wasted and lost, has thus been added to Soviet resources. Examples of this may be found in any of the agricultural villages, where the folk were once called "the dark people" because of their backwardness and ignorance. In a typical village only seven educated, semi-skilled persons were produced in the last half century of Tsarist rule. In less than half the time under the Soviets more than four hundred people from this village have acquired

some kind of professional skill from engineering to surgery.

Giving the minority peoples their languages has accomplished similar miracles. Each group has gone to school in its mother tongue, and dying cultures have revived and flowered. Groups that for centuries had no alphabet or literature of their own, have been given one and now have their own books for the first time. Forty such languages have been reconstituted by Soviet philologists. Thus the Karagas and the Giliaks now have alphabets and read their ancient folk lore and songs in print, and, also for the first time, they can be reached by modern knowledge. The result has been a creative out-pouring of great riches into the common treasure-house of the mind and spirit in the Soviet Union.

In one talk with Stalin I asked for his opinion of the chief ways in which the Soviet Union differs from other states in the treatment of national minorities. This was his reply:

"The principal distinction is that while in capitalist states national oppression and national enslavement prevail, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics both one and the other have been radically abolished. In capitalist states, side by side with nations of the first rank, privileged nations, 'sovereign' nations, we have second rank nations, 'non-sovereign' nations, nations which do not enjoy equality, which are deprived of various rights, principally of sovereign rights. In the U.S.S.R., however, all the attributes of national inequality and national oppression have been abolished. In the U.S.S.R., all nations are equal and sovereign, for the national and State privileges which previously were enjoyed by the Great Russian people have been abolished. We do not, of course, speak of declarations of national equality. All bourgeois and Social Democratic parties have made not a few declarations concerning national equality. What is the value of such declarations if they are not carried out? The thing to do is to abolish those classes which are the bearers, the creators, and the conduits of national oppression. In Russia these classes were the landlords and capitalists. We overthrew these classes, and by that abolished the possibility of national oppression. And precisely for the reason that we abolished these classes real national equality became possible in the U.S.S.R. This is what we call application of the idea of self-determination of nations including even the right of complete

separation. Precisely for the reason that we carried out the self-determination of nations, we managed to eliminate mutual suspicion between the toiling masses of the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R. and unite these nationalities on a voluntary basis into one Federal State."

But not only nations are protected by Soviet policy. Minority groups, too, receive the full protection of the law. Article 123 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 provides that: "Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an irrevocable law." Further, this Constitution states: "Any direct or indirect limitations of these rights, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, shall be punishable by law." These laws are strictly enforced, although the question seldom arises in the Soviet Union today.

One of the ugliest features of the Tsar's regime was the officially sponsored persecution of the Jewish people. At that time Jews were forbidden to live in certain cities. In other places they were forced to live in the "Pale," terrible sections reserved to them alone. Only tiny "quotas" were permitted to receive any higher education. In the army a Jew could never go any higher than a private's rank. In the villages Pogroms were organized in which countless Jews were systematically killed and tortured.

Stalin has repeatedly condemned, along with other forms of race prejudice, anti-semitism. Russia has steadily been building a society which is free of the dangerous germs of race hate. Jews, as well as all others, are free to live where they wish, go to universities and technical schools, and secure any job for which they are fitted. Since the Jews were a scattered people and could not properly preserve their language and culture when a minority among other groups, the District of Biro-bijan, a fertile area as large as Holland and Belgium combined, has been established for those who wish to live there.

The Soviets have done so thorough a job in stamping out anti-Semitism that some in the West have charged that the Jews are running Russia. This story is in a class with most anti-semitic propaganda. It is not true and never has been. There are some four million Jews

in the Soviet Union. Over a million, mostly women, children and old people, were evacuated from the war zones to Uzbekistan because it was felt that they faced special danger from the invader. Untold thousands who could not be evacuated or remained behind to resist the enemy were mercilessly tortured and killed. There is absolutely no limitation on the number of Jews who can occupy high positions, but, as a matter of fact, there is only one, Kaganovitch, on the Political Bureau. Many Jews head state factories and farms, others occupy leading scientific and cultural positions. A great many won the decoration of Hero of the Soviet Union for bravery during the war. The Jews are equal, but they do not dominate—and the idea of domination would, to both Jews and non-Jews in the Soviet Union, sound so strange as to be considered quite idiotic.

It would not be correct to say that anti-Semitism is completely non-existent in Russia. The Soviet Union is bordered on the west by many states where anti-Semitism is an ancient curse. Then, too, the Nazi radio reached into Russia. The germs crept into the dark corners of a few minds. While I was in Moscow in 1944, I became acquainted with a Jewish family whose only son was about eleven years old. The father told me that his son had been stopped by some other children on the way to school and been called names because he was a Jew. The boy ran home in tears. The other boys and their parents were hailed into court and given a severe lecture by the judge. My Jewish friend was quite incensed that they had not been sent to jail. This is an isolated instance, but it is a clear demonstration that Constitutional provisions against race prejudice are being enforced.

The color of one's skin is another thing which is not considered important in the Soviet Union. The Union's nationalities display nearly every variety of human skin pigmentation from the swart Georgian and white-blonde Karelian to the golden-skinned Mongols. The Soviets not only do not discriminate against the Negro but, acutely aware of his treatment elsewhere, lean over backward to do him honor. Russian newspapers are fond of recalling that the famous poet Pushkin was part Negro. Frequently the hero in a play will be a Negro. Paul Robeson, the American singer, was so impressed by the absence of discrimination that he sent his son to the Soviet Union for part of his education.

I have several vivid memories of experiences with

Negroes in the Soviet Union. In 1938 I was leading a tour for the Bureau of University Travel to Russia. At Rostov-on-the-Don we were to take a trip out of the city to see one of the collective farms. It so happened that in the hotel where our group was staying, there chanced to be also the Dean of Fisk University at Nashville, Tennessee, a Negro. He was a man of culture and charm. Hearing that we were to visit a collective, he asked if I would object to his accompanying us. I told him we would be delighted to have his company. The next morning when he appeared at the bus, two responsible business men from one of the Southern states precipitately decided that they did not care to make the trip. I found out afterwards that the idea of travelling in the same vehicle with a Negro, no matter how eminent, was too much for them. The Russians went out of their way that day to show us everything. They particularly did honor to our Negro guest. Special dances were staged, I think, solely for the benefit of the Dean.

In Moscow this past year one of the American newspaper correspondents was a Negro by the name of Smith. He told me that his color, far from being a handicap, was a decided advantage. Some time ago several American engineers who were discourteous to him when they met on a train were, as a result, expelled from the Soviet Union.

Stalin long ago predicted that this policy of complete racial equality ". . . could not fail to have its effect on the enslaved East and the bleeding West . . . the October Revolution is the first revolution in the history of the world that has broken the sleep of the toiling masses of the oppressed nations of the East and drawn them into the struggle against world imperialism . . ." There is no doubt but that this policy does exercise a strong magnetic influence upon the peoples of the East, as well as on Eastern Europe.

The field of race relations is one area in which the West can humbly learn from the Republics and peoples of the U.S.S.R. The welding of so many diverse peoples into one powerful union where all remain equal is in many respects the grandest peace-time achievement of the Soviets. The Soviets have shown that one of the most plaguing problems facing modern man, the need for peaceful reconciliation of seemingly conflicting national aspirations, can be successfully solved. The right kind of nationalism can bring laughter instead of tears, culture instead of bloodshed.

CHAPTER XIII

Culture is for All the People

FOREIGN visitors in the Soviet Union often have a hard time understanding what a Russian means when he speaks of "culture." The word is heard frequently, and those who think of it solely in connection with "old masters" and symphony concerts will be often puzzled. The Russians, having so recently emerged from a period when illiteracy was general and life so hard that there was no problem of leisure, think of all the things which go to make living more enjoyable as "culture"—and it is probable that this is the very best definition of the word.

A basic tenet of Sovietism, which does not conflict with American ideas on the subject, is that education, culture, or whatever one wants to call it, is for all the people. Music, painting, the theatre, literature, science, play, and education are all designed to develop the widest possible participation of the Soviet people. The Soviet citizen, appreciating that this is the first generation of their country in all history to have had such an opportunity, responds with an enthusiasm and a seriousness that is awe-inspiring and bodes well for Russia's future.

Soviet citizens often stand in long lines to buy books or newspapers. To understand how much a change that represents one should have had a taste of Russia under the Tsar. When I was in Russia in 1916, learning itself was considered subversive for the common man. It was only with great difficulty that I secured General Kuropatkin's permission to start a Y.M.C.A. Club in Turkestan for members of the First Siberian Regiment. Permission was eventually granted but Kuropatkin warned, "No reading material is to be furnished, we don't want the soldiers to think, but to obey."

I had been told when I arrived that 72 per cent of the Russian people were illiterate, and that ignorance among the subject nationalities in Turkestan was even greater. Only one Kirghizian out of a hundred could

read or write. It was officially supposed that the proportion of literacy was higher than the average in the army since only the young men were drafted. I soon found that Tsarist statistics were unreliable. Many soldiers who were claimed as literate could not write home. We had to hire a man to sit all day in the club and take down letters for the soldiers. The messages were brief, but there was always a long waiting line.

When I visited the front in World War II, I could not but marvel at the contrast. The Red Army was a highly literate Army. In a single year several hundred million letters were delivered to the modern Russian troops. In six months of 1945 alone, forty-five million copies of Moscow newspapers went to the Russian soldiers.

Illiteracy was not the only factor in maintaining backwardness under the Tsar. All students were indoctrinated to unquestioning obedience to Throne, Altar and Empire. Prejudice and superstition were fostered. Contemporary social problems and modern science were prohibited subjects. History bore little relation to reality. For instance, after the war with Japan and the loss of Port Arthur, text books continued to list Port Arthur as a Russian naval base. Even Russia's greatest thinkers and writers were forbidden in the schools. The reading of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* was prohibited in the secondary schools. Years later, under the Soviets, more than forty million copies were published and sold!

There was, however, even under Tsarism, a hidden educational system which was teaching thousands more realistically. This system, which was to have such profound effect on Russia, was the underground revolutionary movement. This movement, whatever its faults from the Western point of view, did promulgate a respect for learning, an appreciation for science, a desire for knowledge which have left a permanent

impress upon the country. When asked to name the three most important tasks for the rising generation Lenin said, "First study! Second, study hard! Third, study more and still harder!" These are tasks which the new Russia has taken much to heart.

When the Soviets came to power they were faced with every sort of problem. The Bolsheviks tried to do something for education but, for the first few years, their energies were spent in coping with the problems of civil war, intervention, the blockade and famine. I was in Moscow at the time, living with a Russian family, one member of which was a young school teacher. She was violently hostile to the Bolsheviks and refused to continue her work in the public schools, even though the Bolsheviks invited her to do so. Thousands of other teachers also went on strike.

Teacher opposition and the activity of counter-revolutionary elements led to extreme educational experiments. The children were given authority over the teachers and planned their own studies. American innovations in progressive education, including the Dalton plan and the project method, were very popular. Text books were largely discarded, partly because those available were tainted with Tsarism and partly because new educational theories said that "life must teach." To understand the problems of labor, the children worked for an hour or two a day. Propaganda filled the schools. The children knew all about the class struggles, Karl Marx, and the evils of capitalism, while certain other things were neglected.

Gradually, however, as new teachers were trained and conditions became more stable, the schools swung back to tested and tried methods of education. The authority of the teacher became supreme; rigid requirements for lessons and work were instituted; text books, examinations and grades were once more part of the educational system. To be sure, the students still have a school council which helps enforce discipline and they still go on excursions, but only two or three times during a term. Propaganda continues, and there is an inordinate emphasis on Marx, Lenin and Stalin. History books have been altered to conform to the orthodox view of Trotsky and the opposition to Stalin.

The first task, and major achievement, of Soviet education in this period was the abolition of illiteracy. The job was a formidable one. A fair example of the obstacles which had to be overcome was the fact that many nationalities did not even have alphabets. Alphabets

had to be worked out. Latin alphabets were introduced for many of the non-Slavonic peoples. Even Chinese, Mongol, and Turkish-Russian citizens began to have their text books written in the Latin alphabet. These innovations made possible the publication of books in 111 different languages by 1938.

By 1945 the Soviets had actually taught one hundred million citizens to read and write, a world record. Contrast this with India. Although the British have controlled that country for decades, illiteracy is still as prevalent as it was in pre-Revolutionary Russia. To achieve the feat of abolishing illiteracy, the Soviets considered every institution as part of the educational system and the whole populace as pupils. Every factory, farm and office had its school. Adults who could read and write were encouraged to lead voluntary educational circles in homes. By 1925 some fifty thousand schools for adult illiterates had been formed. By 1940 there was only ten per cent illiteracy remaining, and this was entirely among older people. Today illiteracy has been virtually abolished.

Education is compulsory for children from seven to fifteen. Only the war prevented the school age from being raised to eighteen. By 1940 over twenty-five million children were attending school. By the time the Nazis invaded there were 170,000 schools with over forty million students, including adults. This meant that every fifth person in Russia was attending school.

Progress made in some of the backward national republics was even more phenomenal. In Armenia the number attending school was 68 times larger than in 1914 in Azerbaijan, 35 times; in Khirgizia, 172 times; in Turkmania, 37 times. In Tadjikistan, where under the Tsar there were no schools at all, 22,000 pupils were enrolled.

Beginning with the year 1943-44, the government decided to try the experiment of separate education for boys and girls in the first ten grades. This has been put into effect in seventy-two of the larger cities. This change may have been due to the war, since the boys were trained for military work. It is also claimed that the physical and intellectual development of boys and girls is so different that separate schools may be advantageous. It is too early to say whether or not this plan will be retained.

The present system of education begins with the nursery schools for babies and children up to three and a half years of age. These "schools" are under

the supervision of the Health Department and have been established in nearly every place of work. During the war they had a tremendous growth. Nurseries for mothers who are on the night shift have been added. Here the children are even bathed and given breakfast. Meals are supplied in all nursery schools.

The rest of the educational system falls under the Commissariat of Education in each Republic. It begins with the kindergarten, which takes children from 3½ to 7, and the "ten year school" from 7 to 17. The ten year school was supposed to have become standard and compulsory for all of Russia, but the war interfered. Most of the smaller towns and rural communities still have the old seven year school. After finishing the required schools the student may go to a Teknikum or technical high school where he can take a four year course in science, education, medicine or the arts. In 1940 Labor Reserve Schools, similar to our vocational and technical trade schools, were established. These include railway schools, industrial schools for metal and oil workers, and six month craft schools. By mid-1942 these schools had enrolled seven hundred thousand students. The students worked eight hours a day in addition to their studies. They received full board and room plus one-half the regular wages for skilled workers on a similar job.

Finally there is higher or university education. While in Moscow recently I met Dr. Kaftanoff, Director of Higher Education for the Russian Republic. Among other things he said that "Prior to the Revolution there were only ninety higher educational institutions in all Russia, with 112,000 students. By 1928 we had 152 with 175,000 students. By the outbreak of war we had over 700 with 550,000 students. Even during the war we took in from 150,000 to 180,000 new students each year. This necessitated a teaching personnel of 52,000."

Educational opportunities in the universities are only limited by ability. Scholarships have been established which not only pay tuition but room and board and all expenses. All students with a rating of "excellent" and most students with a rating of "good" receive these stipends, which range from 140 to 300 rubles a month in undergraduate work. Graduate students may receive as much as 700 rubles a month. Dormitory rooms cost only 7 to 12 rubles a month, and meals can be managed for as little as 4 rubles a day.

Dr. Kaftanoff told me that 95 per cent of today's

students receive these scholarships. This means that any Soviet boy or girl, if he or she can make the grade scholastically, can study for any profession they may desire. Under the Tsar, roughly sixty per cent of the students came from the wealthy classes. Today about half of the university student bodies come from the urban workers, and the bulk of the remainder from the peasantry.

The governing body of Soviet universities is a council made up of the faculty together with a representative of the Party and a representative of the students. New teachers are elected by this council, using a secret ballot. The university director has veto power, but his adverse action may be appealed to a higher educational commission.

An interesting sidelight on the Soviet universities is provided by Dr. Kaftanoff. He told me that English was now the most popular foreign language study and the United States the most popular country among students. Many Russian students would like to take advanced courses in the United States.

The Soviet youth has shown such zeal for professional education that the government began to fear that it would not secure enough talented technical workers in industry and agriculture. They tried to divert some of the stream by inducing young people to enter the Labor Reserve schools. Tuition fees for secondary schools and universities were established for all who could afford to pay. This is one instance where the new Constitution has been ignored. Article 121 provides that education must be free. In practice, however, little has been changed. Families of soldiers are exempted from the charge, and there are few families in Russia who are not families of soldiers.

Outside the traditional educational system, and supplementary to it, are the Suvorov Schools which were established during the war. They supply a general secondary education but have two hours weekly spent on military subjects. They were established to provide special advantages to boys whose fathers had been killed in the war and the sons of those who had particularly distinguished themselves in action. It has been said that these schools indicate the re-establishment of a hereditary caste in Russia. This is not true. During my last visit to Russia I visited all types of educational institutions, including the Suvorov School at Kalinin. During 1944, I was told, there had been 12,000 applicants for admission. Only seventy could be admitted.

The overwhelming majority of the boys attending the school told me that they did not intend to pursue a military career. On graduation they will attend the regular universities and compete on equal terms with other students. It is hard to see how this would create any sort of a hereditary caste.

Even the war did not really interrupt Soviet education. In 1944 the state appropriated over 51 billion rubles (more than ten billion dollars at the official rate of exchange) for education, public health and social welfare. In 1945, 66 billion rubles went for these purposes. This was in the midst of the greatest war in history, when Russia was fighting for survival.

The universities worked at full speed all through the war years. Students in science and medicine were exempt from military duty. I saw the Leningrad schools carrying on while German guns sounded on the outskirts of the city. Even when the enemy blockade was virtually complete a second medical college was started. Nothing was permitted to interrupt the schedule. Students and faculty retreated to the lower stories of the building when bombing became severe and enemy shells fell too close, but they did not stop work. Between lectures they worked on fortifications, helped clear away debris, and gave first aid to the wounded. In spite of such conditions, or perhaps inspired by them, nearly half of the students passed with honors and one third of the rest came through with high marks. What happened in Leningrad was typical of Soviet education in wartime, and typical, too, of the high regard for education shown by both Soviet leaders and citizens.

The hunger for learning extends far beyond the limits of the educational system. Many persons who do not go on to the universities continue their studies on an individual basis. John Scott, an American who worked for several years in a Soviet factory, gives these impressions of his fellow workers in his book, *Beyond The Urals*: "Every night from six until twelve the street-cars and buses were crowded with adult students hurrying to and from schools, discussing Leibnitz, Hegel or Lenin, doing problems on their knees, and acting like high school children during examination week in a New York subway. These students, however, were not adolescents, and it was not examination time. They were just the run of the population of the Soviet Union making up for several centuries of lost time."

The tremendous intellectual curiosity which the Revolution unleashed is reflected in the wide circulation of books. In 1913 only 26,000 titles were published in Russia with a circulation of 86,000,000 copies. In 1939, 45,000 titles were published with a circulation of 700,000,000. There is another and more significant difference in these figures—Soviet publishing has never been able to fill the demand for books. A book by a prominent author such as Mikhail Sholokhov or Konstantin Simonov will be issued in editions of from 400,000 to 900,000, and these editions will be sold out within a few days.

The Soviet reading audience is a serious one. There is no difficulty in selling "non-fiction" in Russia. The works of Voltaire, Aristotle, Darwin, Newton, Plato, Pavlov and others are published in editions running up into the hundreds of thousands of copies, Literary classics meet with an even warmer reception. Byron, Balzac, Heine, Goethe, Hugo, Dickens, Zola, Rolland, Anatole France, Shakespeare, and Schiller have been published in editions up to a million copies.

The insatiable thirst for books has made writing one of the most lucrative professions in the Soviet Union. Soviet writers sign contracts and are paid royalties much the same as in U. S. publishing, but the average Russian edition is much larger and the return consequently greater. Mikhail Sholokhov, the Cossack novelist who writes of peasant life in the Don region, is probably the wealthiest man in Russia today.

The growth of newspapers has been equally phenomenal, and the supply equally short of the demand. Under the Tsar only 859 newspapers were published, with a total circulation of 2,700,000 copies. Today there are over 9,000 newspapers with a circulation of 38,000,000. Tsarist newspapers were usually in Russian. Newspapers are now published in all of the many languages in the Union. American readers would find most Soviet newspapers intolerably "heavy." A murder, unless it has political implications, is not considered a fit subject for an article, rating at most a few lines. On the other hand, a scientific discovery, the first performance of a new symphony, the anniversary of a celebrated writer or musician, a report of the achievements of a shoe factory are all considered most newsworthy. Any editor who would publish the details of a sordid divorce case would probably lose both the paper's readers and his job.

A good idea of the cultural interests of the Russian people can be gained from the statistics for 1940, the year before the Hitlerite invasion. Eighty million people attended theatrical performances in 850 theatres—this does not include attendance at motion picture theatres which was many times greater. Forty-four million people attended symphony or chamber music concerts.

Music has shared in the vast popular interest in culture. In the Soviet Union a composer of demonstrated merit can devote all of his time to composing and receive his compensation from the state. All composers belong to the Union of Soviet Composers. There is no comparable organization in the United States or Great Britain. It is an agency which secures performances and contracts for publication, commissions composers to write music, is a fraternal mutual aid society, and a professional guild. Composers may win membership by submitting their work; if it is of high quality or shows promise the new member is admitted.

Soviet music is organized under a section of the All-Union Committee of Art, which receives its funds through the regular government budget. A portion of this money is set aside for the Music Section which uses it to support orchestras, publication of scores, and commission works from composers. A composer may require six months to complete a work. He submits his request and is then given an advance of from 8,000 to 18,000 rubles. If the work is adjudged to be of very high quality he may receive another payment equalling 50 per cent of the first advance. These monies are not deducted from future royalties and are thus not advances in the usual sense of the word but subsidies. When the music is completed the composer signs an agreement for publication, usually retaining radio and orchestra rights.

The composer Khatchaturian received an advance of \$3,600 to write his 2nd Symphony. He received \$4,000 more when he signed the contract for publication of the score. He signed another contract for radio and concert rights by the terms of which he received \$40 to \$70 for each performance. It took him three months to write the work. Since there are seventy symphony orchestras in the Soviet Union the composer could count on a high return. When Khatchaturian received one of the Stalin prizes for his achievements he gratefully turned it back to the government to purchase a tank.

Stalin believes that the fruit of his policy of free

scholarships to every young person of ability has been an enormous increase in invention and scientific discovery.

Science decayed under Tsarism. Although the Russian Empire encompassed every variety of natural wealth many things were imported during the Tsarist period. The granite blocks used to pave the streets near Moscow's Bolshoi Theatre were actually imported from Sweden. Clay for making pottery was brought from Germany. In 1916 a Russian scientist, showing how little even Tsarist science knew of the wealth of Russia, reported that the Empire was deficient in supplies of helium, potassium, nickel, and cobalt.

Under the Soviets, science, now in the service of all the people, has discovered just how rich Russia is. In twenty-five years the academies of science have sent out more than 500 expeditions to prospect for mineral deposits, to discover power resources and to study soil fertility. More than 300 scientists from 60 institutions have investigated natural resources in the Urals alone. There they discovered more than 800 varieties of minerals and more than 12,000 deposits of various ores. This national inventory is still going on, but the Soviets now know that their potassium deposits exceed all known deposits in other parts of the world by thirty five times. Helium can be manufactured in as great quantities as may be necessary. In nickel, even without the recently purchased Petsamo mines, Russia takes second place. Cobalt, in great quantity, has been found in the Urals and several other regions.

It is often said that under a socialist economy there will be no rewards for inventors. Stalin, however, enacted a law providing that from the moment that an invention is recognized as useful the inventor will be paid. He does not have to wait until it is actually utilized.

Russian students and scientists are continually being urged to discover and invent. The record shows that they have been doing both. Laboratories and research facilities are readily available to qualified persons. Even during the siege of Leningrad, Professor Alexander Verigo, director of the Radium Institute there, was given assistance and material to continue his research and experiments involving ionized air. Frequently scientists, workers, and students refuse to accept payment for valuable discoveries. A Russian by the name of Tregor invented some railway appliances. The govern-

ment offered him 75,000 rubles. Tregor refused to accept the money, replying "I am working not for profit but for the Soviet Union."

The record of discoveries shows that stimulus for scientific work is not lacking in the Soviet Union. Even a quick summary of recent work shows the astonishing range and remarkable accomplishments of Soviet science.

Georgi Babat has recently invented an automobile which receives its power from wires laid beneath the concrete of the roads. The machine thus gets its electricity without contact with the wire. This may presage the scrapping of overhead wires and contact conductors.

In the field of agriculture one of the most startling developments is the growing of colored cotton directly from the soil. Thus far many shades of green and brown have been obtained. This cotton makes dyeing unnecessary and the colors do not fade.

Russian doctors and surgeons have made remarkable discoveries. Alexander Bogomoletz's work in developing anti-reticular cytotoxic serum, which stimulates the system through the connective tissues of the body, is well known. His serum has been widely used at the front, and was found particularly effective for chronic tubercular and non-healing wound conditions.

A woman scientist, Professor Polrovskaya, decided to experiment with the use of live plague microbes rather than the usual dead ones as an anti-toxin for pulmonary plague. After nine years of experimentation she succeeded in developing a means of preventing pulmonary plague.

The Soviets lead the world in soil science. Their soil map of Australia is considered to be better than the one the Australians themselves made.

Many Soviet scientists have become world renowned. Vladimir Komarov is famous in the field of botany. Peter Kapitsa has received recognition, including the Benjamin Franklin Medal from the United States, for his work in the field of low temperatures. He is the leading Soviet physicist, and is said to be at work in the field of atomic energy. Leonid Mandelstam has discovered the phenomenon of a combined diffusion of light. Nikolai Kurnakov has investigated the theory of physiochemical analysis. Alexei Favorsky has elabo-

rated a new theory of chemical synthesis and a whole series of industrial processes. S. V. Lebedev is the inventor of Soviet synthetic rubber. Alexei Bakh is the founder of modern Soviet biochemistry.

To encourage science and discovery the Soviet Union spends colossal sums for the maintenance of scientific research institutions of all types. One billion three hundred million rubles were spent for this purpose in 1944. This, together with additional expenditures for university training of scientists, will account for the sum of 4,400,000,000 rubles in 1946.

Soviet research goes forward in several types of institutions: 1. the academies of science, both all-Union and those of the individual republics, 2. research institutes under the various peoples' commissars, 3. research institutes in the universities. In 1939 the Soviet Union had 700 universities and 908 research institutes staffed by 26,246 scientists.

All forms of cultural endeavor are given added support by the so-called Stalin Prizes. These prizes are individual grants given by the government to artists, writers, composers, scientists and inventors in recognition of outstanding achievement. Any work of exceptional merit may lead to this reward. A Stalin Prize has been awarded a history of philosophy. The number of prizes given varies from year to year, apparently being limited only by the number of achievements deserving this exceptional recognition. During 1942, in art and literature, there were 45 first degree prizes of \$20,000 each, and 23 second degree prizes of \$10,000 each. In the same year there were 24 first degree prizes of \$40,000 each and 20 second degree prizes in science and over 2000 in 1946. In the latter year there were 183 Stalin Prizes.

The Soviets have embarked on a bold course of developing the brain power of the masses of people. It is difficult to see how this can have any other effect than the ultimate broadening and humanization of Soviet institutions and concepts. That popular education is necessary to democracy is a good old American idea—and it is probably just as true and just as logical to think that popular education, no matter how controlled in the beginning, must lead to more democracy.

CHAPTER XIV

Living Under Socialism

AMERICANS most often want to know about the human aspects of life under socialism. This usually arises in the form of a question about how the "average" person lives in the Soviet Union. Many people take it for granted that there is some drab level at which nearly all Russians live alike. Actually the Soviet average is just as hard to isolate as the American average—although the extremes in modes of life are not quite so far apart in Russia.

The extent of the difference may be shown by three of my Russian acquaintances. Alexei T., Vladimir C., and Anna S. are typical, though not average, Russians. It happens that they live in Moscow, but their counterparts could be found in most Russian cities. Alexei T. is a wealthy writer, Vladimir is a well-paid bank executive, and Anna is a worker at the Hotel Metro-pole. Anna is not a skilled worker and is not in essential industry, so her salary and level of living are considerably below that of many, perhaps more representative, Soviet workers.

Alexei, whose books sell in enormous editions, has a spacious, beautifully furnished apartment in Moscow, with a study, a large living room, several bedrooms, bathrooms and a well-equipped, well-stocked kitchen. In addition to this, he has a pretty *dacha* or country house in the woods outside the city. He used to go there whenever completing a book, but during the war the *dacha* could not be used during the winter months because the heating system needed repairs which were not available even to a person of his importance.

Vladimir lives in a large, two-story house, which was inherited from his father, and is situated on the outskirts of Moscow. Surrounded by a lawn and shrubs and flowers, it resembles a suburban home in the United States. The house is well furnished, and has modern conveniences, including a private telephone. During the war, as Moscow became crowded with

refugees from the invaded areas, it was decided that all citizens with available space would have to help relieve the acute shortage of living quarters. Vladimir rented the lower part of the house and moved upstairs with his wife and two children. They still had plenty of room. Like most city dwellers in private homes, Vladimir had a difficult time getting fuel during the war—there was sufficient fuel but transportation was hard to come by.

Anna lives in a comfortable, but crowded, one room apartment which she shares with her grown son and daughter. The apartment house could be described as average for many Russian cities, although most people are not, except under wartime pressures, so crowded. There is no private telephone, but a buzzer calls Anna to the house telephone downstairs. Anna has a little primus stove on which tea and light meals may be made, but cooking is done in a kitchen shared by the six families on her floor.

Housing is, and always has been, one of the major problems in the Soviet Union. The Soviets have had all they could do, while concentrating their energies on building up industry, to construct enough houses to get the majority of people out of pre-revolutionary hovels and provide an absolute minimum of space for them. There has always been bad overcrowding, although many thousands of comparatively modern apartment buildings have been erected. I have known one couple who decided that they could not get a divorce because separate housing was not available. Then, in the face of this serious shortage, more housing was wiped out by the war. Cities which ranked among the finest in the country were completely razed by the Nazis. It is certain that housing will be a major category in Soviet planning for at least the next twenty years. The housing that does exist is usually equitably shared and at low cost. On the average the Russian

people spend only four and three tenths per cent of their income for rent.

The emphasis in Soviet housing before the war was on huge apartment structures of from 8 to 10 stories. The buildings were supplied with self-operating elevators, and often had a tenants' meeting hall or club room which was run under the auspices of the house committee. The usual apartment consisted of a living room, a bedroom, and bath. A few also had kitchenettes, but most were served by group kitchens used by a number of families on the same floor. The Soviets now feel, however, that apartment house living is far from ideal, and, wherever and whenever possible, will encourage the construction of private homes of the two-family type.

A unique feature of Soviet housing is that each enterprise is expected to take a certain responsibility for its own workers. During the war, when families were moving back and forth, giving up and later hoping to reclaim apartments, the entire legal staff of a factory would often be employed in trying to untangle the problems of the workers. Management responsibility is taken seriously by both the unions and the government. Trade unions take strong action against management whenever it is felt that the utmost has not been done to provide adequate living quarters. In 1944, Nosvo, Director of the gigantic Magnitogorsk works, and Dymshits, head of the Magnitostroi project, were both entitled to huge cash premiums for far exceeding quotas set up for their enterprises. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions saw to it that both were deprived of the bonuses for failing to pay proper attention to the housing of their workers.

There is considerable disparity in the kind of food available to Anna, Vladimir, and Alexei, although all have sufficient food and a wholesome diet. Alexei eats most of his meals at home, and his income permits his servant and cook, a woman beyond the age for factory work, to buy many scarce and expensive items in the open market. He occasionally eats at the Club of Professors and Intellectual Workers, where excellent meals are served. Both Vladimir and Anna, as is general in Russia, eat the main meal of the day at their place of work. Nearly every enterprise has a restaurant or cafeteria where substantial meals are served at low prices. Workers may, under certain circumstances, eat all three meals at such restaurants. These eating places are inspected and kept up to par

by the trade unions, and action is taken when conditions are unsatisfactory. Osadchi, Director of the mammoth Pervouralski Novotrubny factory in the Urals was recently deprived of a large bonus because of unsanitary conditions in the dining rooms of his plant.

Vladimir and Anna supplement their ration allowances for home eating, but by different means. Vladimir's income permits him to buy some food in the open market. Anna and her son and daughter raise their own vegetables, mainly potatoes, on a plot of land near the edge of Moscow, working on it during their free days. The government provides such land free to everyone who desires to raise a garden. The produce may be used by the family or sold or traded on the open market. This is an important supplement to family income—in fact I have known families who changed jobs to be nearer to, and thus be able to spend more time on, their gardens.

In visiting Russia on successive trips from 1921 to 1939 I saw the great rise in the general living standards of the people—a rise which was halted, and to some extent reversed, by the war. In 1921 the people were starving. If a crust of bread or a potato was thrown in the street, people would scramble for it. By 1939 everyone was well fed. Street vendors were selling ice cream and eskimo pies. Store windows were piled high with consumers goods and food was abundant. I remember going into a worker's home as the result of striking up a chance acquaintance. I was invited to remain for dinner. They had borscht soup—made from beets and meat, and a delicious meal in itself—followed by veal cutlets with potatoes and carrots. Finally they served *blini*, griddle cakes filled with jam, and tea. Food was not generally this good during the war, but will improve as soon as the fertile lands of the Ukraine are put into cultivation again.

Neither food nor housing have been considerable problems, even during the war, in the rural areas. Neither do any considerable variations in standards of living apply to the countryside. The peasants live in individual homes, usually spotlessly clean, where life centers around the kitchen which also serves as a living and dining room. The peasants have nearly always had plenty of food. I was offered feasts of fresh milk, eggs, vegetables and chicken in many homes. Most peasant families have their own gardens and many have individually owned cows, pigs, and chickens. Meat and sugar were scarce everywhere in Russia during the

war, but the peasants had enough of all other foods. Peasants, although they had plenty of money, had more trouble in purchasing shoes and suits than any other items—the Red Army's needs came first.

Alexei has an automobile and chauffeur. This is not due to affluence on his part, but the result of his work on an important government commission which makes great demands on his time. Vladimir is lucky enough to live on the subway line, and travelling within Moscow by subway is fairly pleasant. A subway ride costs less than ten cents, and the trains, since they run frequently, are not badly crowded. The subways are spotlessly clean, well-lighted, and each station is an individual gem of architecture. The subway system, which now serves only the more important parts of Moscow, will soon be extended. Anna counts the fact that her apartment is near her work as one of the advantages which partially compensate for overcrowding. She can, if necessary, walk to work. Riding the packed buses and street cars of Moscow can only be considered an ordeal. Most Soviet citizens look forward to the day when they can have private automobiles, and it will probably not be many years before workers with good production records will be getting them.

In all other respects, except perhaps for clothing and varying ability to buy certain luxury items, the lives of Anna, Vladimir and Alexei are not greatly different, in spite of the difference in incomes. In medical care, educations, recreation, and entertainment, they, and all Russian citizens, have just about equal privileges and opportunities. Their general outlook on life is similar, although their tastes may differ. The various unions play an important part in all their lives.

Each trade union has a Labor Protection Committee which enforces regulations regarding health, safety and working conditions. These committees have the right to examine company books, check on safety devices and appoint safety inspectors. Union-appointed inspectors have the right to go to any part of a plant at any time, day or night, and can fine the management for any violation of the rules.

The unions administer social insurance which includes maternity benefits for all women workers, sickness and accident benefits and loans, rest homes, sanatoria and holiday resorts. Workers who do not belong to a trade union receive only half of the sickness and accident benefits and are not entitled to borrow from unions or go to the various union rest homes. The

budget for social insurance was twelve billion rubles in 1942, three billion of which went for pensions. This huge sum is secured by a government tax of slightly more than three per cent on the total wage bill of each industry.

All health services are free, and are constantly being made more thorough as more doctors are available. Twenty-five thousand doctors graduate from Soviet medical schools each year under the free education program. Practically all doctors and nurses are employed by the state, but after hours they may engage in private practice. The Soviets put a great deal of emphasis on preventative medicine. Five thousand health officers are attached to physical culture circles and clubs. The Commissariat of Health maintains about six hundred health resorts to which workers can go without charge—these are open to union members and non-union members alike. From my observation in the Soviet Union, socialized medicine does not guarantee either bad or good hospitals. You find both kinds, just as you do in the United States. Socialized medicine does seem to assure earlier treatment and a broader range of treatment. Soviet medicine is well equipped to handle epidemics and get quick action on problems where large scale and expensive research is involved. World War II was the first war in which Russia has engaged without a typhus epidemic, except in areas under the Germans.

All working mothers must take a leave of 35 days before childbirth and from 42 to 46 days afterwards. This leave is with full pay. In addition, as part of the government's effort to raise the birth rate and compensate for the terrible population loss during the war, Soviet mothers receive the following:

				In Lump Sum	Monthly
				(at birth of last child)	
Mothers with three living children 400 rubles					
"	"	four	"	1,300	80 rubles
"	"	five	"	1,700	120 "
"	"	six	"	2,000	140 "
"	"	seven	"	2,500	200 "
"	"	eight	"	2,500	200 "
"	"	nine	"	3,500	250 "
"	"	ten	"	3,500	250 "

Mothers with ten living children receive 5,000 rubles on the birth of each succeeding child. The monthly allowance is paid for children one to five years old. Widowed or unmarried mothers receive special allowances.

Since homes are crowded and entertaining is apt to be difficult an intense social life has grown up outside the home. Nearly every person belongs to a club of some sort, one that reflects his or her interests. There seem to be clubs for everything—swimming clubs, athletic clubs, camera clubs, music clubs, theatrical societies, literary discussion groups—the range is apparently endless. Many of these clubs are affiliated with schools or factories and expert instruction is provided for the members.

The unions also play a large role in furnishing a lively and stimulating social life. In 1941 the unions owned 6,400 club houses and "palaces of culture" as well as 15,000 libraries and 10,000 moving picture machines. In the same year the unions spent 627 million rubles for education. They had 11,000 dramatic, choral, orchestral and dancing circles. In addition they spent 134.5 million rubles to promote sports.

The modern Soviet citizen is not far behind his American counterpart in his love of sports of all kinds. In the Tsar's time I found that the soldiers had never seen a football, never heard of track events and tennis. When I gave a volley ball to soldiers in Turkestan in 1916, the only thing they could think of doing with it was to hurl it at each other's heads. Today every school and university has courses in athletics. A student can choose from football, tennis, track, skiing, skating, swimming, boxing, wrestling, gymnastics, basketball, volley ball, hunting, fishing, motor cycling, and even horse racing. In the winter of 1945, six million people participated in ski competitions. Tens of thousands took part in hockey meets, mostly promoted by the trade unions. Hockey is so popular that thousands of people will stand out on a zero day to watch a contest. The Dynamo Stadium in Moscow holds eighty thousand spectators, and is constantly filled for some athletic event or other.

Russian liking for the theatre probably exceeds that for sports. Plays, operas, ballets and pageants attract large and enthusiastic audiences. The theatres are not confined to a few of the larger cities. Good theatres offering lavish and often very fine productions, will be found in all parts of the country. The demand for seats usually exceeds the supply. Blocs of tickets are allocated to trade unions and clubs so that everyone gets a fair chance to purchase them. Theatrical companies from the capitals are often sent to the larger collective

farms and pioneering areas to supplement the omnipresent movies.

In one, perhaps unsuspected, respect, many Americans might find the Russians a bit stuffy. That is in their moral outlook. This may come as something of a surprise after the deluge of false propaganda, when the Soviets first came to power, about "free love" and "nationalization of women". There were certain excesses among Russian young people, particularly intellectual groups, after the Revolution, but this was frowned upon by the Communist leaders, who are often almost puritanical in their private lives and attitudes. I saw recent examples of this when I was last in the Soviet Union. Some American relief shipments contained playing cards. The Russians did not like this at all. Cards are, I found out, associated with gambling in their minds. During the war the writer Konstantine Simonov published a volume of love poetry written to his wife. It was tender and intimate, but perfectly respectable. Stalin is supposed to have said, "This volume should have been printed in two copies only, one for himself and the other for his wife."

In June 1944 a conference of 1,508 students took place at which the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communists gave a lecture on "The Moral Outlook of the Soviet Student." What especially interested me was that, by closing my eyes, I could easily imagine myself to be back in the United States attending a Christian Association Conference. A student by the name of Sherovski asked, "What is the moral purpose of our lives?" The answer was, "To serve our country, to devote ourselves entirely to the common good." The students were urged to "work hard," "to learn as much as possible from the teachers and respect them." The lecturer said that one thing which prevented students from acting "as their conscience tells them is lack of will power." One student asked how to develop it. He was told, "Watch your every action, and do not be indulgent either towards your own weaknesses or towards those of your comrades." Social service work was lauded as developing character.

Service has been the repeated theme of thinkers and leaders. Stalin on one occasion said that "It is not property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, that determines the position of every citizen in society. Conscientious effort in the service of the people and country is the source of moral prestige." The writer Dubrov-

sky in his authoritative book, *Soviet Ethics*, puts it this way, "The chief measure of personal merit is honest, productive labor for the good of the people."

An article on education which appeared in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in September 1944 develops Soviet moral conceptions in more detail: "Our country suffers serious harm if the quality of teaching is lowered, if less demands are made on school children, and if ignorance, lack of culture, laziness and carelessness are encouraged."

"The teaching of subjects in the Soviet school cannot be formal and divorced from life. It must be permeated with a lofty 'idea content' and inspired by the great ideas of communism . . . Our patriotism is fundamentally opposed to the hatred of humanity which permeates fascism. . . .

"Very great importance also attaches to developing in our young people communist morals and norms of conduct in society, such as friendship, integrity, care of one's mother, respect for seniors. The school must bring up physically and spiritually healthy children of clean morals, children who are purposeful, intelligent, and disciplined."

These attitudes have been exemplified in such recent

changes in Soviet law as those making it more difficult to secure divorces and restricting abortions.

The vast majority of Russian people like living under Socialism. In 1939 the individual Russian really felt that he had begun to taste the fruits of the Soviet order in terms of increased well being. Occasionally one would find a former factory owner who was gloomy. He would readily admit that conditions for the workers had vastly improved, but would say that his own condition had deteriorated. But most of them felt like a worker who talked to me in Kiev. "In 1932 I would never have believed that we could be so well off as we are now, but it is nothing to what we are going to have in the future. Then we shall have an automobile for every prosperous peasant and worker. New apartment houses and individual homes will mean that we shall live on a scale equal to yours in America."

The war postponed the future when they could "live like Americans" for the Russians, but they remain optimistic, and more than ever attached to their form of government. Recent letters which I have received from Russian friends say that already food and clothing have become fairly plentiful, prices have been cut from a third to a half, and life is easier. One concludes with these words: "The future looks bright."

CHAPTER XV

The Future of Religion in Russia

THE matter of religion in Russia, as with most questions concerning the Soviet state, is a confused snarl of surface paradox. The foremost Soviet leader was trained as a priest, and yet his name has become a synonym for lack of religious belief. Some claim that the churches are closed and the priests persecuted; yet others report the churches open and crowded. The Soviet Union is called a "nation of atheists," yet, in 1941, there were 30,000 flourishing religious societies with over 58,000 priests and ministers. Russia is pictured as a state where the people only do as they are told, yet when the head of the Russian Atheist League closed down his organization, he complained that two-thirds of the people in the villages were still Christians.

Even in religious matters more fundamental, concerning such vital issues as the basic Christian ethic, there is no agreement. Bolshevism is commonly pictured as the antithesis of Christianity. Yet Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, declares, "The communist puts the Christian to shame in the thoroughness of his quest for a harmonious society. Here he proves himself to be the heir of the Christian intention . . . the communist struggle for community, contains an element of true religion, and as such demands Christian recognition." The former United States Ambassador to Russia, Joseph E. Davies, says, "The Christian religion could be imposed upon Russian Communism without violating the economic and political purposes of Communism, which are based, after all, on the same

principle of the 'brotherhood of man' which Jesus preached."

There is a story regarding Tolstoy which may well provide the key to the riddle of religion in the Soviet Union. The great Russian writer and philosopher once asked a fellow writer, Maxim Gorky, who became a Communist, whether he believed in God. Gorky said that he did not. Tolstoy replied, "You say you don't, and you believe you don't; in reality you do. Every word you write tells me so. It is not what a man says, or thinks he says, but what a man is, that speaks the truth; your whole being tells me you believe in God."

Religion in Russia has, as I well know, gone through dark days. None were darker, in my observation, for true religion (if by religion one means something more vital than the surface forms and public observances) than the time of the Tsar. The church then was subordinate to a state official who was realistically described as "The Tsar's Eye." Many of the priests were in effect a sort of super secret service. They were expected to, and did, report their parishioners to the police. They rarely preached and when they did their sermons were censored. Priests were actually unfrocked for expressing extremely mild liberalism. Church and empire were so interwoven that it was impossible for anyone to favor any democratic reform without incurring the displeasure of the Church and possible excommunication. The writer Tolstoy, a deeply religious man, was among those excommunicated.

It is necessary to know how deeply the Church was woven into the malignant fabric of Tsarism to understand what happened when Tsarism was destroyed. The reformists, as well as the Bolsheviks, had learned to hate and distrust the church as an arm of Tsarism, and, in itself, an aggregation of oppressive wealth. Stalin, confronted by blind tyranny and a church which fought the people instead of serving them, became an atheist. The same thing happened to most enemies of Tsarism. Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, a Bolshevik leader, now dead, made this statement, "When I was a child the holy of holies for me was God and Country." As he grew older, experience convinced him that, "the words and thoughts of the religious intellectuals for the greater part are poetical lies about life as it is, they do not have relation to their acts and their actual life."

So it came to be that, during the Revolution, the church lands were confiscated and the Patriarch Tikhon of the dominant Greek Orthodox Church declared that

all Communist leaders were "condemned to hell fire." For a time the church became a rallying ground for counter-revolutionary forces who cloaked themselves in the robes of religion. Possibly one thousand priests and forty bishops died in the Revolution. During the famine the government seized some church treasures for relief work. Some priests resisted.

Hostility between church and state continued through the first decade of Soviet power. Some churches were torn down, and others were turned to other uses. Near the Kremlin a shrine was dismantled and in its place an inscription "Religion is the opium of the people" was carved in the wall. An atheist society, The Union of the Godless, was formed to prove to the people that religion was a superstitious myth. Its magazine carried full page caricatures of Christ, some quite shocking. A few great cathedrals, like St. Isaac's in Leningrad, were turned into museums showing every variety of religious malpractice, from burnings at the stake to Indian fakirs. Even at that time, however, the Bolsheviks carefully preserved every religious edifice or shrine that was of historical or artistic value.

The Commissioner of Education, Lunacharsky, once said, "Religion is like a nail, the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood." This is an excellent description of the Russian experience. The church was prohibited from all activities except formal worship. It could no longer relax amidst its wealth, but had to win support from the people. Priests were debarred from voting. The result was that the church was cleansed. Priests and parishioners alike became sincere believers in the simple gospel of Christ. The census of 1937 showed that the overwhelming majority of the people still believed in religion and did not hesitate to say so. The Bolsheviks modestly refrained from publishing the figures!

The anti-religious campaign never went to the lengths that many people imagine. The Churches were open all through this period. On one occasion during the early days the Soviet Government even loaned us a Volga River steamer on which, besides recreational and agricultural experts, we carried a priest who held services all along the river. Later, in 1927, we conducted, with Sherwood Eddy, a public debate on religion in the Soviet capital. But if the uninformed overestimate the amount of religious persecution, they also underestimate the present religious revival.

The present, and, by all signs, permanent, attitude of the Soviets is indicated by the section on religion in the new Constitution. Article 124 reads: "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all citizens."

During my most recent visit to the Soviet Union I attended service in the great Bogavlenski Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Moscow. I stood at a vantage point behind the altar. Its massed golden ikons glittered with precious stones. Alexai, acting Patriarch of Russia, followed by a half dozen other priests wearing golden robes and golden crowns encrusted with diamonds, rubies, and emeralds, was conducting the service. The church was so crowded with worshippers that it was almost impossible for anyone to move. Among the throng were students, soldiers and officers in uniform, and many women of all ages, some holding children and babies.

I had been standing for two hours listening to the magnificent choir when Patriarch Alexai came through the great golden doors. They closed slowly behind him, and one of the priests motioned me forward to meet the Patriarch. I told him of my acquaintance with Patriarch Tikhon during World War I and of my visits with his late predecessor Sergei.

Alexai shook hands warmly and, speaking in English, said, "The church in Russia has been through a revolution since the time of Tikhon. God has led us a long way, but we are coming out into the light." After we had spoken of all that Russia had been through, the Patriarch expressed the view that the Revolution had been a great forward step in the history of the Russian Church. It had divorced the church from the state. "It purged us," he said, "of those false elements who were merely serving power and position. Now the people are flocking back to religion and we have the opportunity of the centuries to bring Christ back into the hearts of the people."

From my observation I could not but marvel at the great change in the status of the church. Now all priests can vote and take a normal part in community life. The atheist society has been disbanded and its offensive magazine is no more. The leading Metropolitan Bishops have automobiles at their disposal. The people are pouring money into the churches. I talked with a choir

member who received five times as much for singing in church on Sunday as she did for her factory work for a week. The Soviet Government now has a Commission to help forward religious organizations. The church has its own printing presses and its religious journals. Theological seminaries are being opened to train new priests.

Pondering the far-reaching significance of this change in the standing of the church, I asked Patriarch Alexai the reason for it. He said cryptically: "We realize that God is back of what is happening in Russia today."

His reply gives the secret of the tremendous change in religious life. It is not so much because the state has changed its fundamental belief as that the Greek Orthodox Church has been reconciled to its new position. To a considerable extent thinking men in the Church consider the change advantageous to it. Then time and war, especially the war, have healed many wounds in Russia. Today, to all appearances, the Church is as deeply pro-Soviet as any other part of the Russian social structure.

Let me illustrate by a conference I had with the late Patriarch Sergei. White-haired, with a long snow-white beard almost covering the sacred golden symbol hanging from a chain about his neck, he typified ancient Russian mystical authority. Yet he was a scholar of eminence who knew Greek, Hebrew, Latin, and Finnish. In his early career he was a missionary in Japan. Following the Revolution he was once arrested and held for a short period, but from 1926 until his death in May 1944 was Metropolitan of Moscow and later Patriarch. He told me that the war had made a most profound difference in their attitude towards the State. He showed me a telegram which he had sent to Stalin in 1942 on behalf of the Church. It read, "Heartily and with prayer I greet you personally as the leader appointed by God of our cultural and military forces. You lead us on to victory for the welfare of our country and to a glorious future for all our people. Let God bless with success and glory your great deeds for the sake of our country." At the end of 1943 he sent a message to the Soviet Government: "We deeply value the sympathetic cooperation of our leader and the leader of all the people, the Head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, in meeting the needs of the Russian Orthodox Church. As against our modest labors his is a world of service. We give to the Government our sincere thanks and glad promise that encouraged

by this cooperation we will multiply our share of the work in the general activity of the people to save our country."

This was no lightly taken attitude on the part of Sergei or the Church which he represented. Special services held in the churches on the 26th anniversary of the Revolution heard a message from Sergei in which he asked for prayers for the Soviet leaders. In this message he said that the prayers must not be an external form of doing obligatory duty to the government. That would, he continued, be sacrilege. Such prayers must be said with internal faith and rise from a deep desire that the prayers be granted.

The Church took a very active part in the war. It provided millions of rubles worth of warm clothing for the soldiers. It also donated eight million rubles for tanks. These tanks were named after Dmitri Don-sky who saved Russia from the Tartar invasion in the Fourteenth Century and was later canonized as a saint. The churches also raised large sums for the Red Cross—in Leningrad over 5½ million rubles, in Gorki more than 4½ million, and in Saratov over 2½ million.

But the Church proved its loyalty and its identification with the people by more than money. When I was in Odessa the Orthodox clergy of the city invited me to a dinner. All through the war and occupation they had been feeding the people. They refused to bow to the will of the Nazi occupationists, and at the risk of their lives offered prayers for the Red Army. The Dean of the Orthodox Cathedral defied the Nazi curfew law to visit Russians dying from enemy inflicted wounds. The penalty for such disobedience was known to be death. On his way home late one night, he was challenged by a German sentry who thrust a rifle in his face. The priest, clothed in his religious vestments, told the German, "I have been administering the last sacrament to a dying man, if that means my death go ahead and shoot." The German soldier, with a muttered warning, lowered his gun and allowed the priest to pass.

In the Crimea a Russian officer told me of the heroism of a patriotic Orthodox priest who had remained in occupied territory. The German army wanted to take a decisive point overlooking Sevastopol. They seized the priest and dressed him in his golden cassock and golden cross. They made him march at the head of a column of picked Nazi troops as they attacked. The muzzle of a gun was at his back. The distance between the two lines was so short that everything

could be seen and heard on both sides. As the priest marched he began singing one of the beautiful melodies so dear to the hearts of devout Russians. He sang in Russian, and the words were strange, "Brothers, don't spare me. Think of your native country. For Christ's sake shoot me down and drive the Fascist beasts from the sacred soil of Russia!" The Red troops hesitated. The heroic priest raised his cross high above his head, then called in a clear and ringing voice, "Shoot now!" A volley of shots sounded and the priest died a martyr's death, but not a German escaped. The Red Army troops were so enraged that they counter-attacked and drove the Germans from their positions.

This patriotic passion of the Church has demonstrated to the Soviet leaders that the priests no longer look backward to the Tsar but are reconciled to new times. This does not mean that the communists have become religious converts—far from it. But they recognize the value of the church. Instead of persecuting priests, they have been decorating them. Patriarch Alexai was awarded the "Defense of Leningrad" medal. All through the blockade he remained in the danger zone, encouraging his followers to fight for the city with all their strength. In Moscow seventeen priests received that city's defense medal. Two priests in Tula, Fathers Turbin and Ponyatski, received high medals. In Kursk, Father Pavel Govarov was decorated for outstanding services as a guerilla.

Among the most radical new developments is that the Government has now permitted a two-year course of instruction in every diocese and an advanced theological seminary in Moscow and in Leningrad. It is the first time since the Revolution that theological education has been permitted. Nothing could more eloquently testify to the changed relationship between church and state.

While visiting the Novodivichi Monastery in Moscow I went into the students' dormitory of the Greek Orthodox Theological Seminary. I was soon surrounded by some thirty of the students. One was a grey-haired priest of 65 who had come for a refresher course, but the others were young, most of them in their early twenties.

I talked with Andre Leokevitch Grudiev, twenty-four years of age. He was a Kuban Cossack whose father had died in the civil war fighting against the Bolsheviks. After finishing the eight year public school he had been drafted in the Red Army. I asked him what the sol-

diers thought of religion. He told me, "The younger fellows had no use for God while they were in training. They never attended religious services. But when they came to the front line trenches, and saw men dying all about them, they turned back to a genuine faith. I was able to do a lot of religious work in the regiment."

The fact that Grudiev was not killed made a deep impression on the other soldiers. They knew him to be deeply religious. When wounded in the arm he seemed miraculously saved from death. On another occasion a bullet aimed straight at his heart went through his book of psalms and did not cause a wound. Once, while crossing the Dnieper River against a hail of shot and shell, he leaped from the boat as it neared the shore, shouting to the others to follow him. A few seconds later the boat was struck squarely by a German shell and blown to fragments. This escape led his comrades to accept religion. Grudiev then applied for admission to the Theological Institute and was released from military service to attend.

After our talk, I attended a religious service in the beautiful miniature chapel on the roof. The students, clothed in the traditional gleaming robes, officiated.

Later I was introduced to Tokhon Dimitrovich Popov, the distinguished, gray bearded Rector of the Seminary. He wore a second gold cross, awarded for study at the Seminary in the days of the Tsar. Popov was born in the Voronesh District, and went to religious school at the age of seven when he was left an orphan. His scholarship attainments led his teachers to collect money to enable him to attend the theological seminary. After six years study he went to the Krius Orthodox Academy for four years, graduating in 1900. Still later he received his doctorate in Theology for a thesis on the religious writings of Tikhon Za Daisky. From 1913 to 1918 he was professor of theology at the Voraishi Agricultural Institute. From the time of the Revolution until his present appointment, he served as a parish priest.

Rector Popov explained that there were twelve professors in the Seminary, divided between the Pastors' School with a two year term and the Higher Theological course of three years. The students represented many professions. One had been an engineer, one a teacher in an industrial institute, another an instructor in a teacher's college. Theological training is provided free, and the students are supplied with books and room and

board. They also receive free uniforms. Lectures are given in the evening. This leaves the day free for study or outside religious work. English is an obligatory subject.

One of the most interesting classes is the "History of Russian Religious Thought," the first of its kind in Russia. The professor was Anatole V. Vidermikov, a graduate of the Moscow Philological Institute and former public school teacher. Vidermikov places much emphasis on the study of Tolstoy's religious life and thought. To understand how much of an innovation this is, one must remember that Tolstoy was excommunicated because of his scathing criticisms of the church under the Tsar.

The official Government commission dealing with the church is called the Council for Religion. It has a fine three-story stone building in central Moscow. The chairman, George Karpov, is a man of 47 who has had a long career as a Communist Party worker. He told me that he believed there was far more interest in religion now than before the war. "The purpose of this commission," Karpov said, "is to help the various religious groups with their material needs. We helped the Church secure the building for their Theological Seminary. Now it is too small: we will get a better one. We assist them to secure buildings for religious worship. This year alone, in areas never occupied by the Germans, we have opened 250 new churches. One of these is in Baku, another in Tashkent. It isn't easy, getting the buildings, but if enough people want a religious service we arrange it. We now have fifty Greek Orthodox churches open in Moscow alone."

Karpov predicted that the church would play a bigger role than ever in post-war Russia, and expressed the hope that American churches would send a religious commission to observe developments. In response to my question about whether the churches could now have Sunday schools for children, he said, "The Greek Orthodox Church never had them in all its history. But perhaps now that there is no religious instruction in the schools we should permit it. Thus far the Church has not requested it."

The Chairman made it clear that the Communist Party has not changed its attitude on religion. He expressed this personal opinion: "I don't believe it is possible to belong to the Communist Youth Organization and the Church at the same time. The Communist Youth Organization would probably not expel a mem-

ber for religious activity, but they would try to educate him to see the light that the church as a relic of superstitious practices is unscientific."

It is when one turns to the problem of relations between the Soviet Government and the Vatican that a different situation is apparent. The dominant religion in Russia, the Orthodox faith, is not friendly to Catholicism and does not recognize the authority of the Pope. The Roman Catholic Church has been and still is violently hostile to Communism and the Greek Orthodox Church.

This situation has eased somewhat in recent years, mostly in terms of a few concessions from the Soviets. Roman churches are now allowed to conduct services, but the priests are not permitted freedom of movement from one city to another. In Moscow the Catholic Church was crowded when I visited it. It is headed by a priest from the United States, assisted by Russians. In Odessa the Soviets permitted Catholic priests who were brought in by the Germans to remain and conduct religious services. In Lublin the Catholic Bishop had been appointed on one of the Government commissions. Units of the Polish Army operating under the Russians all had their Catholic priests who told me they had complete freedom. Stalin has publicly stated that he is prepared to reach a settlement with the Catholic Church.

Still, there is no question but that the Soviet Government is fully cognizant of the Vatican's hostility to their form of government. They are very much aware of the intransigent attitude of certain American Catholics. There has been no change in the attitude of the Pope and his advisors as there has been on the part of the Patriarch and Orthodox priesthood. So mutual suspicion between the Vatican and Moscow remains.

The Protestants, particularly the Baptists with their humble faith, have fared better. Baptist organizations throughout Russia have been maintained in all years of Soviet rule. Recently they have been making rapid progress. They have a fine building in the heart of Moscow, and I attended a number of their services. Never in my life have I seen a Protestant church so jammed with people. Every inch of space was used. The congregation not only packed the pews, but every foot of the aisles as well. Standees lined the walls and filled

the vestibule and galleries. Over the pulpit and on either side of the church were huge banners in Russian: "God is my strength," "One Lord, one faith, one baptism," and "Jesus said come unto me and I will give you rest."

The Sunday morning service lasts from 10 to 12. There are the usual hymns, prayers, Bible readings, and choral selections—but, in addition, two complete sermons by different pastors. The sermons are flaming evangelistic appeals about the necessity of carrying the spirit of Christ in one's heart. The earnestness and sincerity of the parishioners was amazing. I talked with one fine-appearing man who comes twenty miles to attend the morning service, although he worked, at that time, twelve hours every week day in a war plant. American pastors might be willing to endure some hardships to secure such devotion.

In the last months of 1944, a four-day conference of Baptists and Evangelical Christians was held. There were forty-five delegates from all sections of the country including Siberia and the Caucasus. The chief decision was to unite the Baptists and the Evangelicals into an All-Union Council with headquarters in Moscow. I talked with the Reverend R. E. Shidkov, head of the Council. He seemed most optimistic about the growth of the Protestant sects. He refused to say a word about any difficulties but said, "The fields are white unto the harvest."

It can readily be seen that vast changes have taken place regarding religion in the Soviet Union. There are still many difficulties. Young people in Russia have been brought up for the most part in ignorance of religious values. No great religious revival seems likely. Nevertheless, a new era has begun. Many churchmen are optimistic about opportunities for the future. Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev expressed this recently when he wrote: "We see that the years which have passed since the Revolution have not been lived in vain. Much of the inertia, the greed for material treasure, the petty vanity, has been swept away by the hurricane of the times. Today . . . we see the face of the generation which has grown up in these years. It is the face of a true human. I repeat the universally known truth of the gospel: 'A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit . . . Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.'"

Part Three

One World— and Stalin's Russia

"Our foreign policy is clear. It is the policy of preserving peace, and developing trade relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anyone, much less of attacking anyone. We stand for peace and defend the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are ready to return blow for blow to the war-mongers. Those who desire peace and seek business relations with us will always have our support. But those who attempt to attack our country will receive a devastating rebuff, in order to teach them not to thrust their pig's snouts into our Soviet garden."

JOSEPH STALIN, 1935.

CHAPTER XVI

World War II was Preventable

THE WAR just ended may well be termed, when people are a generation wiser, the Unnecessary War. The tragic truth is that it need not have been. It was isolationism plus the wilful, blind, and reactionary actions of a small group of powerful men that led us down the road to war. Many years ago, President Wilson said that Allied treatment of Russia was "the acid test" of our intentions. So it proved to be. The attitudes and actions of Great Britain and the United States toward Russia started the train of events the end of which we have seen. An opportunity now exists to start over—either on a new and more hopeful path, or just over, repeating past errors.

The American who above all others saw Russia as it really was in the years after the fall of Czarism was Col. Raymond Robins of the American Red Cross. While Kerensky was in power, the Allies demanded the impossible of him. Says Col. Robins, "I make this deliberate statement: that Allied policy and demands on Kerensky, acting from indoor influence and the boulevard influences, disregarding or not knowing the outdoor Russia, crucified Kerensky, destroyed his power and overthrew the provisional government." General Knox, Chief of the British Military Mission, refused any solution as moderate as Kerensky, preferring a Cossack military dictator.

After the Bolsheviks seized power, Col. Robins proceeded to get acquainted with Lenin. He found that the Soviet leader was willing to put American officers at the border to stop raw material from going to Germany. General William V. Judson, head of the American Military Mission, conferred with Trotsky on the possibilities of carrying out this plan. Col. Robins asserts that because Judson did this, "one of the most intelligent and courageous things done in Russia, he was summarily recalled by the United States Government."

Then the Soviets offered to give a United States Railway Commission, already in Japan, absolute control of the Trans-Siberian railway with enough military assistance to enforce their power. Russia offered this commission the use of 50 per cent of all rolling stock to facilitate removal of raw materials and munitions from the areas and cities that the Germans would get if, as later happened, they were able to advance. Col. Robins declared that the only reason this sensible and friendly offer was not accepted was the belief in Allied circles that the Soviet Government "represented thieves, murderers, and German agents; that it must necessarily fall in a short time."

In January 1918, the American Ambassador requested Col. Robins to tell Lenin that if the Bolsheviks, who were being forced by circumstances to negotiate for peace with Germany, ever decided to fight on the side of the Allies, he would recommend that they receive the economic and military support of the United States. When the Germans arrogantly refused just peace terms, Lenin gave Col. Robins a document stating that the Soviets were willing to fight Germany if they could get any definite assurance of Allied support. Bruce Lockhart, then representing the British Government, advised acceptance of the offer. The American Ambassador cabled the State Department, urging acceptance. The head of the National City Bank, which had a two hundred million ruble investment in Russia, also favored this policy.

Lenin delayed the Fourth All-Union Congress of Soviets for two days, hoping for word from the Allies, and then delayed the decision of the Congress another two days, hoping to avert ratification of what he termed "the shameful peace," "the robbers' peace." Late at night, on the second day of the Congress, Lenin leaned over to Robins, who was sitting on the platform near

him, and said, "What have you heard from your government?"

"Nothing."

"What has Lockhart heard?"

"Exactly the same thing."

Lenin grimaced and said bitterly, "I told you the Allied governments would not prefer the peasants and workmen's revolutionary government, but would really prefer the German Kaiser. Now we shall have to ratify the peace." It was ratified.

Col. Robins returned to America to urge cooperation with the Soviet Union. President Wilson refused even to see him. Col. Robins spoke widely in the United States, pleading that the interventionist war against Russia be halted, that the Allied embargo which was killing Russian women and children should be lifted, that America and Great Britain work with Russia instead of against her. Every plea was ignored by the officials responsible for U. S. policy.

Instead of acting with vision and cooperating with revolutionary Russia the Allies decided to attack Russia from all sides, supporting every would-be tyrant and dictator who aspired to rule and could organize a band of mercenaries. This was done under the mistaken impression that Soviet Russia could be easily defeated. The American Ambassador, David R. Francis, who called the Russian people "rabble" in his reports, maintained to me that Lenin and Trotsky would be overthrown within two months of the time the Allies invaded Russia. He did everything he could to arouse American public opinion against the Soviets. To his dying day Ambassador Francis maintained that if only the United States and Britain had sent a few more troops to Russia the Soviets would have fallen.

There were some protests. Senator William E. Borah spoke up in the Senate: "The people of the United States do not desire to be at war with Russia. If the question were submitted to the people of this country, there would be a practically unanimous voice against war with Russia . . . While we are not at war with Russia, while Congress has not declared war, we are carrying on war with the Russian people, we have an army in Russia, we are furnishing munitions and supplies to other armed forces in that country." But the undeclared war continued.

Russia was bled white, her railroads torn up, her industry and agriculture wrecked and disorganized. The new government of Russia soon lost any faith it may

have had in the integrity of Allied promises. Other countries were drawing conclusions too. The Japanese took part in the invasion of Siberia, and had a practical lesson in looting and rapine which was to stand them in good stead when they later attacked China and Manchuria.

The first World War ended Nov. 11, 1918, but intervention went on. According to the French Foreign Minister there were, on March 26, 1919, some 369,000 Allied troops in Russia. The Soviets were being attacked by British, American, French, Japanese, German, Czecho-Slovak, Rumanian, Italian, Greek, Chinese, Turkoman, Punjabi, and Senegalese soldiery. American troops fought, amid the ice and snow of northern Russia, in Archangel and Murmansk. But in Siberia, the commander of our troops, General William S. Graves, feeling that the British and Japanese had aims which were not in accord with his understanding of his mission, refused to use American troops for their furtherance. Nevertheless, he admitted that our troops aided the anti-soviet forces and that we incurred "by this act, the resentment of more than ninety per cent of the people of Siberia." Some British troops mutinied, asking why they should continue to fight after the war was over. Troops that did fight, puzzled and lacking incentive, did not fight well. A social worker described the retreat of one group of Americans as a rout, in which they lost everything they had to the Bolsheviks. Frederick Moore, Captain of Intelligence of the A.E.F. in Siberia, reported, "Ninety-five per cent of the people in Siberia are Bolshevik." They weren't, but they resented foreign intervention in Russian affairs.

Everywhere in Russia the Allies met disaster. They finally decided to withdraw, but continued to supply arms and ammunition to forces opposing the Soviets, regardless of the character or program of these forces. General Mannerheim, who had just finished fighting on the side of Germany, and who was destined to be on the same side in World War II, was among those given aid. His forces slaughtered all captives as a matter of policy. It was later reported that some fifty thousand men were so executed.

The one accomplishment of this campaign was to sow the seeds of bitterness against the Allies, and create mutual suspicion on both sides which was to last right down to and through the outbreak of World War II. In fact Germany and Hitler were secretly supported

and appeased in many quarters as a bulwark against "the danger of Bolshevism."

It is entirely possible that if the Allies had accepted the Soviets in place of the Tsar and supported a Soviet drive against Germany, the whole course of modern history would have been changed. Certainly, with Soviet and Allied cooperation, Hitler would never have come to power. Even had this happened, the march of aggression would have been halted in its early stages.

From the hour that the Soviets began to govern, the press of the Western world has engaged in a campaign of falsehood and vituperation which has rarely, if ever, been equalled in history. This propaganda had reached ridiculous heights by the time I returned to the United States after World War I. The *New York Sun* of April 4, 1919 carried this story: "German troops are resisting a Bolshevik offensive in East Prussia"; and, in an adjoining column, "At the moment Bolshevism is being organized and commanded largely by German officers and agents." That these items were contradictory did not seem to bother the editor. Equally fantastic items were published at the time. The *New York Sun* of January 6, 1919 said, "Not content with revolutionizing the whole social and political system of Russia, the Bolsheviks are busying themselves with crazy experiments in education . . . Each principal thoroughfare of this town is described as a faculty of law, economics, history, literature, science, etc." On succeeding days the *Sun* published these headlines:

January 8, 1919, "Trotsky Puts Lenin in Jail."

January 15, 1919, "Lenin Now Fears Bolshevik Doom."

January 25, 1919, "Red's Leader Seized As a Spy. Take Trotsky Prisoner."

Walter Lippman made an exhaustive investigation of all Russian news published in the *New York Times* from March 1917 to March 1920. His researches proved that the news was frequently distorted, biased, and hopelessly incorrect. He concluded, "The Russian policy of the editors of the *Times* profoundly and crassly influenced their news columns." A few examples of *Times* headlines will show what Lippman meant.

May 25, 1919, PETROGRAD AFIRE AS FALL IMPENDS.

May 28, 1919, FOREIGN REDS OUST BOLSHEVIKI.

Actually the *Times* reported the evacuation of Petrograd twice and its fall three times. In point of fact it

had not been on fire, evacuated, nor had it fallen. In the fall of 1919 General Yudenitch started a drive towards Petrograd. Whatever General Yudenitch did the *Times* editors went him one better. The headlines read:

October 18, 1919, ANTI RED FORCES NOW IN PETROGRAD STOCKHOLM HEARS.

October 19, 1919, ANTI-BOLSHEVIKI GRIP PETROGRAD: END OF REDS SEEN.

October 20, 1919, PETROGRAD'S FALL AGAIN REPORTED: MOSCOW LINE CUT.

Actually, of course, Yudenitch never captured the city.

When I returned from Russia the notorious "nationalization of women" story was being circulated in the United States by a government official. Actually the "decree" was a fictitious slander, and when a non-Bolshevik paper in Moscow published it, the newspaper was fined 25,000 rubles and closed forever.

At about this time, too, the Committee on Public Information of the U.S. Government was circulating the so-called Sisson Documents. These documents, supposed to have been found in Russia, were presumed to prove that Lenin and other Soviet leaders were German agents. They were later proved to be forgeries.

Another false charge which was current when I returned in 1919 was that the Bolsheviks were executing large numbers of people simply because they had higher intelligence than the Bolsheviks thought desirable. General Brusiloff, a good friend of mine, received an accidental wound from a shell splinter during the Revolution. On my return I found that the *New York Times* had reported testimony before a Senatorial Committee that the General had been shot by the Bolsheviks while in bed!

American policy, swept along on the flood of misinformation, never had a chance to right itself. The American Consul in Moscow once remarked to me, "If you know the worst possible move the Allies can make in the Russian situation, you can depend upon it they'll do it." His remark proved an accurate forecast of our policy toward Russia. For sixteen years the United States refused even to recognize Russia—as though it could be made to vanish by ignoring its existence.

A detailed history of propaganda against Russia would require a special volume. Suffice it to say that a quarter of a century later, on my way to Russia in 1943, I found that the day of fantastic stories was by

no means over. I was solemnly assured by a high labor official in England that fifty million Russians were in concentration camps. He apparently had not stopped to think that it would have been impossible for Russia to wage successful war against Germany if this were true. After Russia was attacked, the *Hearst Journal* said, "Russia is doomed". Columnist George E. Sokolsky said, "We must be prepared for the shock of the elimination of Soviet Russia from the war altogether."

It was on the basis of fears and fallacies rather than facts that most of the world made up its mind that Russia would be quickly defeated by Hitler. Hitler would not have attacked had he known the truth. But the United States Army staff was equally mistaken, and so were British military experts. America even sent a military mission to Iran to be ready to enter Russia when "the badly beaten Red Army would ask for help." This mission never visited Russia, and was finally recalled to the United States. It is a very serious thing when people allow fantasies to determine state policy—to say nothing of military strategy!

Propaganda, antagonism, falsehood on one side stimulated counter measures in Russia. Had we maintained friendly relations with the Soviets from the start it seems probable that the Communist International would either not have been formed or would not have been given the go-ahead signal to work in every Allied country. The Soviets were determined, by one means or another, to present their case to the world. It cannot be denied that as soon as the United States recognized the Soviet Union the latter wrote a proviso into the treaty undertaking to refrain from propaganda in the United States, and as soon as the Allies began to cooperate with Russia the Communist International was disbanded.

If there is anything genuine about the Soviet Union it is that country's, and its leader's, desire for peace. The Soviet plan for developing Russia depends on peace. The threat of war has been an unwanted obstacle to everything Stalin and the Soviet people desire. Soviet foreign policy has been consistent. Lenin wrote of it, "We shall not stop at great concessions and sacrifices in order to maintain peace. But there is a limit beyond which we cannot go. We shall allow no mockery of the peace treaties, we shall allow no attempts to disrupt our peaceful labor."

Compare this with a statement made by Stalin many years later. He said, "Our policy is a policy of peace

and of strengthening trade relations with all countries . . . We have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the warmongers. We shall continue this policy in the future with all our might and with all our resources. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but we will not surrender a single inch of our territory to any one. That is our foreign policy."

Although the League of Nations, in keeping with the anti-Soviet orientation of the Allies, excluded Russia, Stalin hoped that something might be done through international cooperation, outside the League if that was made necessary. The Soviet Prime Minister, A. I. Rykov, announced that "the Soviet Union was ready to propose, support, and carry out the most complete program of disarmament for the whole world simultaneously." The Soviets pushed their proposals before the Preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference and then in the Disarmament Conference.

Maxim Litvinov appalled the delegates by suggesting the immediate demobilization of half of all armed forces and the destruction of half of all arms and ammunition and the complete stoppage of all military and naval construction. The last thing that the European powers expected at a disarmament conference was a genuine proposal to disarm! Both Lord Cushendun for Great Britain and Hugh S. Gibson for the United States opposed the plan. But the Soviets were sincere. They knew that Russia was much less likely to be attacked if the other powers were not armed to the teeth.

Stalin and the Soviet leaders redoubled their efforts for collective security after Hitler came to power. With the support of France, the Soviet Union accepted an invitation to join the League of Nations in 1934. The Soviets joined with interesting reservations, expressed by Litvinov in his opening address:

"The Soviet Union is entering into the League as the representative of a new social-economic system, not renouncing any of its special features, and—like the other States here represented—preserving intact its personality . . .

"Had we taken part in drawing up the Covenant of the League, we would have contested certain of its articles. In particular, we should have objected to the provision in Articles 12 and 15 for the legalisation, in certain instances, of war . . . Further, we should

have objected to Article 22 on the system of mandates. We also deprecate the absence in Article 23 of an undertaking to ensure racial equality.

"All this, however, has not been important enough to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the League, especially since any new member of an organization can be morally responsible only for decisions made with its participation and agreement."

Japan invaded Manchuria—and the League merely appointed an investigating committee. Russia immediately gave as much aid as she could to China. Later Great Britain issued a report white-washing Japan. Conservative statesmen in Great Britain and France welcomed Hitler's rise to power because they hoped Germany might attack Soviet Russia. In 1935 Russia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with France followed shortly thereafter by a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia. Both treaties provided that military assistance would be given if either were the victim of "an unprovoked attack on the part of a European state."

The situation continued to grow more critical. Italy invaded Abyssinia. Russia asked for drastic action but the most she could get was some mild sanctions against trade. Russia then lived up to the sanctions only to find out that neither France nor Britain did so. The growing prestige of fascism inspired General Franco to rebel against the Republican Government of Spain in 1936. Italian and German troops came to assure his victory.

Again and again Litvinov pleaded for collective action and collective security. He set forth Soviet ideas in a speech in 1937:

"It may now be considered an axiom that the passivity of the League during the Manchurian conflict had its consequences a few years later in the attack on Abyssinia. The League's insufficient activity on the case of Abyssinia encouraged the Spanish experiment. The League's failure to take any measures in Spain encouraged the new attack on China. Thus, we have had four cases of aggression in the course of five years. We see how aggression, if unchecked, spreads from one continent to another, assuming greater and greater dimensions each time. On the other hand, I firmly believe that a resolute policy of the League in one case of aggression would have spared us all the other cases. And then, and only then, all States would see that aggression does not pay, that aggression is not worth while."

If these ideas seem commonplace it is only because history has made the world accept them. At the time Litvinov, speaking for Russia, was almost a lone voice. His one and every plea was rebuffed.

Hitler moved against Austria and began to threaten Czechoslovakia. Litvinov, speaking in terms of great urgency, again made practical proposals:

"First and foremost arises the threat to Czechoslovakia, and then, as aggression is infectious, the danger promises to grow into new international conflicts . . . The present international situation puts before all peaceable states, and big states in particular, the question of their responsibility for the subsequent destinies of the peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe. I can say on behalf of the Government that, on its part, it is ready as before to join in collective actions which, decided jointly with it, would have the purpose of arresting the further development of aggression and removing the accentuated danger of a new world shambles. It agrees to proceed immediately to discuss practical measures."

England regarded that offer as "inopportune." As the crisis deepened, the Soviet Union reiterated its intention to live up to its pledges regarding France and Czechoslovakia. Still England refused to block Hitler's plans. Later, France, falling into the orbit of the Chamberlain regime, also refused to honor her treaty with Czechoslovakia.

Eduard Benes, President of Czechoslovakia, told me that the Soviet Union then sent word that it would fight alongside Czechoslovakia, the two alone if necessary, against Hitler. "Then why did you not fight?" I asked. Benes's reply came quickly, it was something to which he had given much thought. "I realized that if we did, we would have been isolated and left alone with the Soviet Union to face the entire might of Nazi Germany. The Conservatives in Great Britain and other countries would have been quite willing to see us both crushed."

The Munich Pact was the death knell for any hope of concerted action in Europe. The Soviets felt that they had tried every possible way to awaken the world to the danger it faced. Stalin was certain that the Soviet Union had been purposely isolated to invite an attack upon it. On April 8, 1939 Litvinov, ill, and sick at heart, resigned as Foreign Minister, and was succeeded by Molotov. Little more than a week later the new Soviet Foreign Minister proposed to Britain and France

that a triple alliance be formed against Nazi aggression. France, at last alarmed, was favorable to the idea, but Great Britain rejected the offer.

At about this time I spoke before a convention of British teachers in Wales. The Liberal Party leader, Lloyd George, shared the platform with me. After the meeting I asked him whether Chamberlain would take action against Hitler. Lloyd George was bitter in his reply, saying that Chamberlain was betraying Great Britain by refusing Russian friendship. He predicted that "If Chamberlain does not reach an agreement with Russia in the next two or three months he will force her into the arms of Germany and we will have to fight alone." In a later conversation Lloyd George said that the only thing Russia could do was to come to terms with Germany if Britain refused to cooperate.

On May 31, 1939, Molotov made one last, but doomed, effort to get action against Hitler, repeating the Soviet offer for a triple alliance against Germany. Chamberlain then made a move which in Soviet eyes could not but appear insulting and contemptuous, and which could not but be marked in Berlin as an invitation to attack Russia. The envoy sent to Moscow was a minor official, William Strang, who had little or no authority. The futile negotiations dragged on for weeks. Stalin became more and more convinced that Great Britain hoped Hitler would attack Russia. He carried on a desperate struggle to gain time in which Russia could prepare for the fight which was now inevitable.

Stalin's outlook during this period was contained in a statement which he made in March 1939. In the light of subsequent events his words seem nothing short of prophetic:

"Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain . . . Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938

Japan seized Canton and at the beginning of 1939 the island of Hainan.

"Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn a population of over 500,000,000 into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia to Gibraltar . . .

"The policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: 'Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims.' But actually, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work, not to hinder Japan say, from embroiling herself in a war with China or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deep into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, 'in the interests of peace' and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. Cheap and easy!"

Stalin was determined that this would not happen to the Soviet Union. It could only be prevented by stalling for time, and time could be gained only by momentarily stalling Hitler off. On August 24, 1939 the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany was signed. It was the fruit of the failure of Allied diplomacy, just as Hitler himself was a product of the earlier failure of Allied diplomacy. The Soviet leaders had no illusions about the durability of the pact—every muscle was strained in preparing for the day when Hitler would violently break it.

Three decades of failure, misunderstanding and disillusion created an atmosphere of suspicion, fear and distrust on both sides. It has not yet been overcome by either the Soviets, or the Allies. It remains a major stumbling block in the way of peace.

CHAPTER XVII

Does Stalin Want to Communize Europe?

THERE are not many people who doubt that the Soviet Union desires peace. There are many who wonder what Russia means by "security", and some who are convinced that Soviet talk of "security" is but another way of demanding a communized Europe, and a few who hope others will fight, with arms if necessary, any change in Europe which they conceive to be "communistic."

No hard and fast answers can be given on this subject. One can only examine the record and try to reach certain tentative conclusions. The factor most often left out of discussions of this matter, and one which must be kept constantly in mind, is the undeniable attraction which certain Soviet ideas have for people living in countries near, or adjacent to, the Soviet Union. Minority groups dream of equality. The collective farmers in the Soviet Union live much better than the peasants of Eastern Europe. Small nations in the Soviet Union are not denied industrial development. The Soviets have made progress and increased opportunity while life in some of the states surrounding her has stood still over decades. Sovietism will exercise great influence in nearby countries—regardless of whether or not the Soviets follow a "hands off" policy. This influence will probably grow rather than lessen over the next decade, for, while western Europe is in the throes of economic dislocation and disorder, the Soviet economic set-up permits a swifter and more orderly reconstruction and economic recovery.

Stalin is convinced that socialism will, in time, emerge in the other countries of Europe, but he believes this must be done, if it is to represent anything stable or permanent, from within by the people of each nation. Stalin does not consider it wise, or even possible, to impose Communism on any country. He strongly insists, however, that the countries surrounding

Russia must never again allow themselves to be used as the anti-Soviet catspaws of other powers.

In my interview with Stalin, I asked, "Conservatives sometimes admit that Soviet Russia has faithfully kept her economic obligations, but they charge that she has violated her pledges in regard to propaganda. How do you answer this?"

Stalin laughed, "The false reports about us would be humorous if they were not evil and injurious. Some seem to think we spend all our time in propaganda and quarrelling among ourselves; that our chief occupation is issuing secret orders and killing each other; hence we have little or no time for constructive work, or even to raise families.

"Such charges are utterly ridiculous. We can and do forbid any of our government representatives abroad from carrying on propaganda, but we cannot prevent all our citizens from doing so any more than you can prevent some of your citizens from joining the I.W.W."

This matter also came up in Stalin's talks with Roy Howard, the American publisher. Stalin then declared that while the Soviets would like to see changes in surrounding states, they felt "that is the business of the surrounding states . . . I fail to see what danger the surrounding states can perceive in the ideas of Soviet people if these states are really sitting firmly in the saddle." Howard then asked if this meant that the Soviet Union had abandoned its plans for world revolution, and Stalin retorted, "We never had such plans . . . You see, we Marxists believe that a revolution will also take place in other countries. But it will take place only when the revolutionaries in those countries think it possible or necessary. The export of revolution is nonsense. Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made it, and now we are build-

ing a new classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated."

There is no question but that this has been Stalin's attitude over a long period of time. It was one of his main differences with Trotsky. It is the reason for working to make the Soviet Union self-sufficient. However, stories from non-Soviet zones which the Red Army freed from the Nazis have caused some question as to whether or not the Soviet attitude on exported revolutions has changed.

I visited Rumania after the Russian occupation. All the government authorities and the common people testified to the fact that Russia gave freedom to the democratic elements in Rumania to govern themselves.

I also visited Finland. An election was held after the Russians had freed it from the Germans. As far as I could find out, no one charged that the election had been influenced by the Russians. The electoral results showed the Finnish Communists to be in the minority. Similarly in Hungary and Austria, the Soviets permitted governments to be formed which are not communist by any stretch of the imagination.

Western suspicion has been especially aroused by happenings in Poland, in Germany, and recent events in Iran. The situation in each case deserves extended analysis.

There has been particularly gross exaggeration on the subject of Russian activity in Poland. I was inside liberated Poland. I saw and talked with the President of new Poland, Mr. Boleslaw Bierut, with the Prime Minister, Osobka Morawski, and with General Rola-Zymierski, Minister of War. I also had an interview with Mikolajczyk, formerly Premier of the Polish government-in-exile, and now a member of the Polish cabinet.

I had received my background on the Polish question from members of the Polish government-in-exile when I was in London in 1943. I was entertained at dinner by the Minister of Information of the London group. Present at the dinner were some Poles who had been imprisoned in Russia. They told me what they considered worst in their prison experiences. It so happened that I had for a time been Director of prisoner of war work in Canada for the World Committee of the Y.M.C.A. and their description of conditions did

not show the Russian camps to contrast unfavorably with those of Canada. They had been put to work, but that was a policy I had continually urged upon the Canadian government.

At the end of the dinner, I asked how America could help Poland. Their reply was, "If America really wants to help Poland, don't have a second front in France." I was appalled. Their attitude was so twisted that they were perfectly willing to prolong the war, endanger the chances of victory, and bring death to countless additional American boys, not to mention continued slavery and death for Nazi occupied Poland.

All the evidence I secured showed that the Polish group in London was more interested in doing something against Russia than in doing anything for Poland. This made it easy to understand why they had accepted and spread the Goebbels story about the murder of 10,000 Poles in Smolensk. Their unhesitating acceptance of this Nazi propaganda caused the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish government-in-exile in 1943. It will be remembered that the Germans captured Smolensk on the night of July 15, 1941. Almost two years later Goebbels broadcast to the world that the Russians had killed 10,000 Polish prisoners there, and that their bodies had been found in the Katyn Forest. The Polish government-in-exile immediately gave credence to the Nazi allegation by asking the International Red Cross to investigate. It seemed a preposterous charge. If the Russians had really killed the Poles it would have been known by the people of Smolensk and the Germans would certainly have found out about it almost immediately. It was not the sort of thing that the Germans would have kept quiet about for two years. The Red Army retook Smolensk on September 25, 1943, and the Soviet Government immediately instituted an investigation of the massacre.

I visited the Katyn Forest with American, British, Chinese, and French correspondents. Dr. Victor Prozorovsky, Director of the Moscow Institute of Criminal Medical Research, showed me about. The ten thousand bodies had been dug up, and the Russians were systematically examining everything found on them as well as performing autopsies. Eleven doctors were working continuously. I watched some of the autopsies, which were very thorough. The bodies, including the internal organs, were remarkably well preserved. The doctors said that this alone was sufficient to prove the falsity of the charge.

The Russians found letters on the bodies dated after the Germans occupied the city, thus proving that the victims could not have been killed at the time alleged. We talked with a Russian priest whose parish was in the Katyn Forest. He had been driven out of his church by the Germans, and then the building had been surrounded by barbed wire and S.S. men. The priest declared that the Germans had killed the Poles there. A Russian who had served under the Germans testified that the German authorities had ordered the death of the Polish prisoners. The diary of the Mayor who fled with the Germans contained clear evidence that the Germans had committed the murders. However, the fact which impressed me as much as any other, was that the corpses still had their fine leather boots. I had seen, travelling at the front, that it was general Russian practice to remove the boots of the dead. It seemed unlikely that they would have made an exception in this case, and left ten thousand pairs of good boots behind. Every correspondent who visited Katyn Forest came away convinced that it was another Nazi atrocity.

Another charge circulated by the London group was that the Red Army refused to help the Poles who revolted in Warsaw. This uprising was staged by General Bor, who headed the section of the underground loyal to the London group, on orders from London and without consultation with the Red Army, with General Berling, commander of Polish troops in Russia, and without informing Allied military leaders in England. The result was the virtual destruction of Warsaw, and the loss of 250 thousand Polish lives. The Nazis, as soon as the uprising started, began systematic razing of the city, block by block.

In Poland I talked with Polish generals and War Minister Rola-Zymierski. They agreed that the Red Army knew absolutely nothing before the uprising. It started on August 1, but it was not until two women, without the permission of General Bor, made their way through sewers and across rivers, reaching the Red Army on September 12, that the Russians had definite word of the uprising. These two women did not represent Bor's Army, but were from the Peoples' Army which held the northern part of Warsaw and had co-operated in the uprising in the belief that it had been undertaken in cooperation with the advancing Reds. They gave the Russians details as to where the insurgents were located. Red Army planes immediately dropped food and ammunition. The Red Army had

long before decided that it would be too costly to take fortified Warsaw by direct assault, but did, when informed of the uprising, change its plans to the extent of smashing through to Praga on the bank of the river across from Warsaw.

Rola-Zymierski said that it would have been impossible for the Russians to have taken Warsaw by frontal attack without staggering losses, and that even then the attempt might not have been successful. Warsaw was captured months later when the marshes froze and it became possible to encircle the city, as the Red Army staff had planned to do from the beginning. Zymierski believed that Bor had undertaken the costly adventure in the hope that Warsaw could be liberated without Red aid. Others believed that the London Poles had planned to come to Warsaw if Bor was successful and set up an anti-Soviet regime.

The evidence does show that Bor had more confidence in the Nazis than in the Russians. General Tarnova, who commanded Bor's Home Army Security Troops, told me that he knew when the uprising started that the Red Army would be unable to help. He went on to say that the Red Army had done everything possible to save the Polish forces in Warsaw. When the end came the Russians made arrangements for the Polish troops in Warsaw to retreat across the Vistula under cover of Russian artillery fire. Bor ordered that this not be done, and that all Polish troops surrender to the Germans rather than go with the Russians and continue the fight against Germany.

All the time I was in Moscow it was known that the Russians were willing to have Mikolajczyk of the London government-in-exile become Premier of the new government in Poland. Mikolajczyk went back to London to arrange this and a possible merger of the two groups. As a result he was ousted by the London group. They were interested in only one kind of Polish government—one that would be anti-Soviet above all else.

Evidence of the desire of Stalin to solve the Polish difficulty was revealed by the extraordinary mission of Father Orlemanski, a Catholic priest prominent in Polish circles in the United States. Orlemanski believed in Polish freedom, but also believed that Poland should have friendly relations with the Soviet Union. So passionately devoted was he to the cause of Polish independence that he conceived the idea of going to Russia to work for the establishment of a free Polish govern-

ment and to secure guarantees of freedom for the Catholic Church in Poland. He presented the idea to the U.S. State Department, but was told that "The Soviet government will never permit a priest to come to Russia now."

Soon after this, Father Orlemanski saw the Soviet Consul General in New York and expressed a desire to visit Russia. A few days later, much to his amazement, he received a personal message from Stalin inviting him to come as a guest of the Soviet Government. He flew by special plane from Alaska to Moscow. I was there when he arrived and learned the inside story from Russians, from Professor Oscar Lange of the University of Chicago who accompanied him, and from others.

Father Orlemanski saw Stalin in the Kremlin for three and a half hours on May 5, 1944, from 10 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. Stalin told the American priest that he believed in an independent Poland and was willing to have the Polish people elect their own government.

Orlemanski asked him why he had arrested and persecuted priests. Stalin replied immediately, "If you were trying to help the people and give them health and happiness that was their right and the priests opposed this program, what would you do?" Orlemanski didn't reply but pushed the matter further, "Why did you execute or imprison so many of the clergy and close the churches?"

Stalin answered, "The priests together with the Tsar's government were oppressing the people. When I tried to free them, the church joined forces with the counter-revolutionary elements. We could not have continued as a free government had we not arrested the priests who were actively trying to overthrow our government." Stalin went on to say that today he was not unfriendly to the church. "Some of my best citizens are religious people."

Orlemanski turned to the problem of Poland. Stalin said that he was willing to have officials of the London Polish government-in-exile join a united government in Warsaw. He also expressed willingness to call up the Vatican and attempt to reach an agreement with the Pope. He offered Orlemanski the opportunity to remain in Poland as an observer. He then turned to the American priest and said, "What can I do to settle the religious question?"

Orlemanski replied, "I want to go back to my hotel and think the matter over." He returned on the follow-

ing evening with the following questions: "First, are you willing to cooperate with the Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, wherever and whenever it should become necessary for the salvation of souls and the protection of the Holy Mother Church? Second, are you willing to step in and help the Holy Father against aggression and persecution of the Holy Mother Church, especially in Poland, the Ukraine, and White Russia?"

Stalin answered "Yes" to both questions, and then suggested that the questions and answers be made public. Orlemanski said that he thought it best to deliver them to His Excellency, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington for transmission to Pope Pius XII. Stalin assented and signed the document giving the questions and answers.

Thus it can be seen that Stalin not only expressed a desire to settle the Polish matter but in addition the problem of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Kremlin. Orlemanski returned to America, but was unable to get any agreement or action on either matter.

The world had to wait for over a year before Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow to mediate in the Polish dispute. The government eventually recognized by Great Britain and the United States represented exactly the compromises that Russia had been willing to set up for two years. It cannot be successfully proved that Russia did not live up to the Yalta agreement on Poland, though the world was flooded with propaganda to the contrary.

The present Polish government merely recognizes an inescapable fact; namely, that the future welfare of Poland depends on friendship with the Soviet Union. This was clearly stated in the manifesto which the Polish Committee of Liberation issued when it first formed a government: "History and the experience of the present war show that only the building up of a great Slav dam founded on Polish-Soviet-Czechoslovak accord, can serve as a safeguard against the pressure of German imperialism . . . An enduring alliance with our immediate neighbors, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, will be the fundamental principle of Polish foreign policy."

There has never been any secret about Soviet aims in Germany. They were implicit in Molotov's radio address to the Soviet people on the day that Hitler invaded Russia. He said "This war has been forced upon us not by the German people, not by the German

workers and peasants and intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of blood-thirsty fascist rulers of Germany." Stalin has repeatedly said that the German people cannot be destroyed. But the Soviet Union is determined to root out Nazism, and the big industrial combines and Prussian war-lords who brought Nazism to power.

Stalin feels that Germany must never again be permitted to build up a gigantic industrial machine capable of turning out armaments. To this end the Soviets have dismantled many factories in Germany and shipped the machinery to Russia as partial compensation for the tremendous destruction wrought by the Nazis. They did this regardless of who owned it. In the Berlin area, for example, they removed machinery and products from eleven American owned factories, including plants of the Ford Motor Company, Anaconda Copper, and the International Telegraph and Telephone Company. The Soviet Union believed it was within its rights in doing this under the Potsdam agreement.

For months the United States press was filled with stories about how the Soviets were stripping the country of all machinery and plundering the countryside. These stories were partly the fault of the Soviets themselves. Credence was given to a great deal of misinformation by the fact that the Soviets permitted no outside correspondents in the Soviet zone. Finally five American newspaper representatives were taken on a 700 mile tour in the zone, being permitted to see anything they wished and talk freely and in private with the inhabitants. Russell Hill, correspondent for the *New York Herald-Tribune*, said that the trip should end all the unfavorable rumors. He declared it was false that the Russians "were removing all machinery and livestock from their zone." On the contrary, everything he saw showed that the Soviets had carefully left enough of everything to provide for "tolerable standards of living." There was no evidence of looting. Careful Soviet planning had brought a greater degree of industrial revival than in the United States zone of occupation. The big estates were being divided among the common people. Germans generally had little complaint against Red troops.

From other evidence it was clear that the Russians had re-opened German schools far more quickly than the other occupying powers. Actually it was the representatives of the West acting against the Russians that assured the big Berlin banks a high rate of interest

and blocked the anti-fascist government of the city from taking over the fire insurance business. It has also been the American, British, and French representatives, again in opposition to the Russians, who have slowed organization of the German trade unions.

Russia, as it happens, is fortunate to have her zone of occupation include the most fertile food producing sections. She should, therefore, be able to provide reasonable living conditions for the German people more easily than the Allies, who control the more highly industrialized regions. It would not be surprising if, as time goes on, the people in the Russian zone lean towards Communism in the elections. Stalin does not wish to have a Communist government set up in the occupied areas now. He would prefer a liberal democratic coalition of elements friendly to Russia—officials who would not be secretly plotting war against either Poland or the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has helped impose a hard peace on Germany, but she is willing to have the German people form a democratic government along lines acceptable to the Allies. Germany can thus advance as far as she wishes within the framework of the new boundary, providing that advance is genuinely peaceful. The Soviet Union has a long-range policy of winning the friendship of all democratic elements—but this is not allowed to compromise her aim of preventing the rearming of Germany.

Iran is not part of Europe, but the questions raised by the Iranian-Soviet controversy are pertinent to any discussion of Soviet aims in border regions. The charge has been made that the Soviets have helped Iranian Azerbaijan to revolt against the Central Government.

Some facts are now available on Azerbaijan. The people of this province do not speak Persian but a language of their own. In all the past five centuries there has scarcely been a time when these people did not want their independence. Revolts to attain freedom have broken out periodically.

This is not the first time that Azerbaijan has made the headlines. The subject came up in Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaign for the Vice Presidency in 1920. During one of his speeches a voice from the audience interrupted to ask, "What are you going to do about Azerbaijan?" The Vice Presidential candidate hadn't the slightest idea where Azerbaijan was, asked that the question be repeated, hoping to gain time to think. The same question was repeated. The President, telling

the story long afterwards, said he still did not know anything about the place, but an inspiration came to him. "How many in the audience know where Azerbaijan is?" Not a hand was raised, and Roosevelt continued, "Such lack of knowledge proves what I've been saying. We need a League of Nations."

A desire for independence is even more understandable in the light of conditions in Iran. The Iranian government was recently described by a leading British periodical as "among the worst in the world." The government in the past was influenced by the British-controlled Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The government cannot be said to represent more than a very small fraction of the Iranian people. The elections in June 1946 will bring more democracy.

Conditions that I saw in Iran in 1944 are almost unbelievable. Thousands of people were in rags. In the capital city of Teheran there is no running water except that in the gutter. At one corner someone will be dumping a bucket of sewage, and at the next another citizen will be taking out a bucket of water for drinking. I spent a day on a relief mission, visiting the caves and hovels of the city with the wife of the American Minister. The government was doing nothing, and it remained for the wife of a foreign diplomat to organize medical relief. In addition to other disease we saw three active cases of typhus in that one afternoon. Dr. Bennett Avery, U.S. Advisor to the Minister of Health, reported 320,000 cases of malaria last year. The child mortality rate is over fifty per cent.

The people living outside the city are in a condition of virtual peonage. Roughly one per cent of the land is owned by the common people. On the other hand, some wealthy homes resemble Arabian Nights palaces.

While in Teheran I asked one rich merchant prince how much money he was spending on his campaign for public office. He named a fabulous sum, over eighty times as much as his potential salary as an official. When he left the room, I asked his secretary, "How can he afford to pay so much to buy the election when the salary return is so meagre?"

"Very simple," replied the secretary, "After his election he will simply go to the Minister and get authority to buy opium and other forbidden articles and in six months he will recoup over a million."

The American Army encampment in Teheran had barbed wire around it and bombs planted in the ground so that anyone trying to crawl through would be blown

to bits. This effectively circumvented the starving from reaching American supplies. Conditions were generally so bad that even some middle class people told me that Iran would be better off with a new government, even one patterned on Soviet lines. And the Iranians are traditionally both anti-Russian and anti-British. Recently, however, a strong popular movement has developed which is friendly to Russia.

None of these conditions, of course, excuse Russian interference—if there was Russian interference. They do, however, show that conditions are such as to lend credence to the Russian note sent to the United States. This note declared that the democratic upsurge in Azerbaijan was not an uprising against Iran. It was rather a movement based on the Iranian Constitution which allows autonomy, or is supposed to allow it, within the Constitution. The Soviet note claimed that whatever disorders have occurred are the result of autocratic and reactionary officials attempting to suppress a democratic movement by force. The Central Government of Iran had one infantry regiment, two infantry brigades, and two regiments of police in the province at all times.

A new element in the situation was revealed when a new premier, more friendly to the Soviets, was elected by the Iranian Parliament. When Premier Ghavam announced he would negotiate with the Russians before pushing the matter before the UNO, an illuminating dispatch came from London and was published in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of January 28, 1946. It said that "Britain has no intention of allowing the new Iranian Premier to make substantial concessions to the Soviet Union." This, it should be pointed out, is about the leader of a legal government who has decided that matters in dispute could be settled by peaceful agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran. It is a good illustration of how some of the difficulty in Europe arises as the result of differences in British and Soviet aims rather than from Soviet conflicts with her neighbors.

What, then, does the Soviet Union want in the countries which surround her?

First of all, friendly governments. Russia would prefer not to have communist governments now, but does not object to communist control if that is the genuine desire of the majority of the population of the country concerned. I saw an example of this last in the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, now Soviet

Republics. On my visit there I found that the workers and peasants, who make up a majority of the population, were all in favor of being part of the Soviet Union. The middle classes wanted to be independent, but admitted that they had an oppressive dictatorship before the present government. The propertied classes wanted to do away with Soviet rule so that they could get back their factories and property. Every person I met, without exception, preferred the Republics to the German occupation. These countries prospered after they became Soviet republics, and it is likely that popular support for the present status will increase rather than lessen.

Second, the Soviet Union will encourage the trend towards mild socialism in these countries. It hopes that the big landed estates will be divided and that basic industries will be nationalized. The big landholders and industrialists have, in the history of Eastern Europe, been the source of fascist and anti-Soviet activity. Division of the estates and nationalization of big industry has real popular support in these areas. Osobka-Morawski, Premier of Poland, told me that they would follow that program in Poland. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have adopted similar programs.

Third, the Soviet Union hopes all German minorities in this area will be returned to Germany whether they want to go or not.

Fourth, the Soviets will demand that all fascists, collaborationists, and persons known to have cooperated with the Nazis against the Soviet Union be imprisoned, executed, or expelled from these countries.

Fifth, it is likely that freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press will more resemble the Russian pattern than that of the West.

Sixth, Russia is willing to have free elections because she is confident that the common people in these countries will support a program which would abolish unemployment and usher in an era of security for the average citizen. But this does not mean that forces considered fascist by the Soviets will be allowed to organize behind fake parties or candidates.

In appraising this program it would be both unwise and unfair to judge it wholly in the light of our standards. It must be remembered that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, these countries have not had democracy in the past. Czechoslovakia is genuinely democratic by our standards, and that is the one country in the region where no one has found fault with Soviet actions. If all the countries bordering the Soviet Union were Czechoslovakias, there would be no problem for anyone. The Soviets would certainly be satisfied. However, the other nations in the region cannot be expected to transform themselves overnight according to an ideal pattern.

CHAPTER XVIII

Russia and the United States

THERE IS, between Russia and the United States, a long and enduring tradition of friendship. It was broken only once, by the Allied intervention following the Revolution of 1917. This is today generally recognized as a serious mistake on the part of the United States and Great Britain. Except for this occasion history has oddly joined the two countries—now the two most powerful nations on the globe.

Russia has given the United States needed help in several periods of crisis. In the Revolution of 1776, when we were struggling desperately for independence, Russia assisted the United States through the League of Baltic Kingdoms which was opposed to England.

Again, during our War of 1812, an offer of mediation was made by Tsar Alexander I. During our Civil War certain European powers planned intervention on the side of the South. Russia blocked their plans by sending her fleet to America. Russia sold the United States the whole of Alaska for the paltry sum of seven million dollars. Had she refused to sell it might have been construed as an unfriendly act.

The United States, despite her general isolation from European politics, has more than once displayed friendship to Russia. During the Crimean War, when some of the European powers attacked Russia, America expressed her sympathy. Even during the period when

there was most official hostility to Russia, groups of American workers purchased tools and supplies to send to the struggling young Soviet Union. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union formed a company known as the Russian-American Industrial Corporation which sent tools and machines to set up much needed modern textile plants. This investment was later repaid by the grateful Soviet clothing industry. During the famine of 1921-1922 the American Relief Administration saved thousands of Russian lives.

In both World Wars the United States has been allied with Russia. America welcomed the Revolution of 1917 even if she opposed the Soviet government and waited sixteen years before recognizing it.

While understanding between the two countries has never been more important, there are elements which render that understanding difficult. There are business men whose desire for expansion and profits make them ignore the rights and feelings of others. There are doctrinaires (not all of them in one country) whose zeal for a certain social system blinds them to other ways of life.

There are many who seek to choke off any inquiry leading to better understanding of Russia by Americans. Remnants of Nazi-Fascist outfits still cling to the hope that a wedge can be driven between America and the Soviet Union. Trotskyite partisans, who fled from Russia long ago, do not hesitate to fabricate and falsify in order to discredit the Soviet Union. Socialists, bitterly hostile to the Communists in this country, allow their political animosities to color their estimate of one sixth of the world. Some reactionary vested interests are haunted by a vague feeling that Communism in Russia somehow menaces their position. The yellow press is frequently a vehicle for this point of view. There are journalists who do not know the Russian language but are perfectly willing to attempt a book on the Soviets after a few weeks visit. (Note, by way of contrast, a man like Bernard Pares, who devoted a lifetime to the study of Russia. After the Revolution he was hostile to the Bolsheviks, but his fundamental understanding of Russia and careful study brought him slowly to a deep appreciation of their positive achievements.) The leading lights of this group are the professional "red baiters," most of whom have had some unhappy personal experience in Russia and have never been able to be quite sane about the subject since. Most of them have not visited the

Soviet Union for many years but continue to write and lecture as "authorities"—at handsome fees. The small, but noisy, army of those who create misunderstanding will be discussed at more length in the next chapter. Of course their work is made much easier by the fact that most of us tend to look askance at ways of life different from our own or which do not appeal to us. We cherish the idea, a mirage in fact, that our pattern for living can and will eventually prevail over all the world.

Russian censors and writers, on the other hand, have not always helped in promoting friendship and understanding. A great deal of Soviet censorship—although some of it is founded on an entirely different conception of the press—is plain nonsense, and in its effect, harmful nonsense. Before the war, the Russian press habitually exaggerated the evils of the West. If a distinguished American made a few critical remarks about the Soviet Union, he was immediately attacked in Moscow. Soviet writers, as well as pro-Soviet elements abroad, have made the mistake of trying to whitewash everything in Russia.

If we genuinely want to build One World, destructive propaganda on both sides must stop—and we cannot say to the Russians, "You be good first, and then we'll try it." We are responsible for our own actions, and, by them, must provide an example of the way nations should act. We say that we have a superior way of life, but we ought to prove it. Any suspension of honest criticism would, of course, do more harm than good. Even honest criticism is not easy because national pride is one of the most sensitive human nerves—but it will be much easier if the cant is cleared out of the way first.

The United States and the Soviet Union have emerged as the two strongest powers on the globe. The future of the world is, to a great extent, in their hands. Crucial questions indeed are those of, can we trust Russia, and, do the Russians trust us?

My mind flashes back to the time when the Bolsheviks had just seized power in 1917. I proposed to the United States Ambassador in St. Petersburg that we secure permission to send propaganda into the German lines. He replied that the Bolsheviks could not be trusted, and that they would never grant permission. Nevertheless, the Bolshevik Commissar of War did give me permission. I was then told that authority to go to the front line trenches would be impossible to secure. This

in turn proved too pessimistic: the Bolsheviks not only permitted me to organize a group of escaped Russian prisoners to scatter leaflets along the 1,500 miles of the German front, but let me go into the German lines myself, disguised as a Russian. Then my very life depended on trust of the Russians, for I went into the German trenches with a group of Russian soldiers. I came back.

Nearly thirty years later, I visited India after spending a year in the Soviet Union. The German army had broken through the American lines in Europe. A much worried high official called me to his inner office. "Can we trust Russia?" he asked. "Why doesn't Russia drive forward and relieve the pressure on our lines? Do you suppose that the Russian generals are secretly conniving with the German staff?" I laughed and told him, "You needn't worry. Russia hates the Nazis and wants to kill every Nazi criminal. They will never rest until they have driven their armies into the heart of Berlin."

Most of our fears start at some point of difference and become alarming because we don't know the Russian people and their government. Some may say, Hasn't Russia a "crackpot" economic system opposed to our own? It is true that Russia has nationalized the basic means of production and distribution. It is a different system from ours. But, according to American tradition, what Russia does in her economic life is her affair.

Then it may be said that Russia is trying to overthrow our society by the Communist International. The International did exist, and was especially active in the period when the United States refused to recognize the Soviet government. It used to hold regular international congresses in Moscow, but none have been held since 1935. The organization has been dissolved and is dead. Communists, to be sure, still carry on in America, but they are a pitifully small group, and receive no aid from Russia. Both numerically weak and vacillating in policy, they represent not the slightest threat to our institutions.

The similarities and actual points of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union are much more substantial than the fears which receive so much attention. I think it is accurate to say that Russia and the United States are much more alike than they are different, although they often approach problems from the opposite sides of logic as well as geog-

raphy. Both countries desperately want peace and the opportunity to build their own societal structures. Both, by different means, seek the happiness and welfare of the greatest number of people. Both countries place the greatest emphasis on education and schools. America has perhaps the better trained educators, but Russia has an enviable record in abolishing illiteracy and broadening educational opportunity. One of the strongest reasons for believing that the Russia of the future can be trusted is that the Soviets are building the brain power of the people even faster than they are increasing the horse power of their industry.

Both the United States and Russia have no colonies and want none. While America is further advanced in industrialization, the Soviet Union is well advanced toward that goal. Both countries believe in the greatest possible use of technology. In the world of trade, Russia and America have no basic conflict.

In trade with America the Soviets have a record of fair and honest dealing. In making an investigation of this question, I wrote to all American firms doing business with the Soviet Union. Without exception they reported that she had scrupulously fulfilled contracts. When the U.S.S.R. first began to do business with the United States, contracts often provided for payment in ninety days. Amusingly enough, some of these firms would then turn around and sell these promises to pay at sixty cents on the dollar to be certain that they got their money back before the Soviets "blew up" or repudiated their obligations. Today, Russian promises to pay are never sold at a discount. A Russian agreement is considered as good as a gold bond. From a business standpoint the U.S.S.R. is trusted as much or more than any country in the world.

Given any kind of chance, Americans and Russians like each other. During the recent war, when aviators of both countries met at American bases in the heart of Russia, the Americans found the Russians friendly and easy to know. They felt at home together. Both were open, frank, and natural. Americans would fly in from Italy and within fifteen minutes of the time they arrived, would be out throwing a baseball. Russians would soon be out in force to watch the game.

Most Americans who have had a chance to know the Russians, and who arrived in Russia without preconceived notions about the way Russia ought to be run, came away with a good opinion of them. Most of the American ambassadors have felt that Russia

could be trusted. The same is true of British representatives to the Soviet Union. Sir Stafford Cripps told me he had implicit trust in Stalin. This is the consensus of opinion among allied diplomats. It coincides with the opinion of the various heads of our Red Cross Missions to Russia starting with Col. Raymond Robins in 1917.

General Spaulding, who worked with the Lend-Lease mission to Moscow, is a strong believer in Russian integrity. General Dwight Eisenhower has repeatedly put his trust and confidence before the public; for example he says, "Our liaison with Russia has always been as close and intimate as necessary to meet any situation at any particular moment. They have given me the information I desired, willingly and cheerfully. I am completely satisfied. After the war was over, and on the basis of contact with many Russians, Eisenhower said, "I find the individual Russian the friendliest person in the world."

Prominent American business leaders, such as Eric Johnston, President of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Donald Nelson and Wendell Willkie, have testified as to the Russian desire to cooperate. Wendell Willkie said, "The Soviet government gave me every chance to find out what I wanted to learn. It permitted me to examine in my own way its industrial and war plants, its collective farms, its schools, its libraries, its hospitals, its war front. I came and went as freely as though I had been making a similar trip through the United States, and I asked questions, unexpected questions of unexpected people, without limit or interference."

Now, what do the Russians think of America and Americans?

The attitude of the Russians, both the average citizen and the Soviet leaders, toward the United States, is very friendly. In all my travels I have never met one who did not speak well of America. Some will be frankly critical of our racial intolerance, unemployment and lynchings—which have been overemphasized by Russian newspapers in the past—but they realize that the good things about America outweigh the bad. They do their best to emulate many things American from efficiency to Eskimo pies. They even plan to copy our skyscrapers, although their proposed tallest building in the world has been held up by the war.

This Soviet admiration for America has a long history. The Bolshevik leaders were dismayed by the offi-

cial American reaction to their revolution. They had thought, probably naively, that Americans would certainly understand a bold program of industrial expansion. But even in the days when there were no official relations between the two governments, Soviet leaders expressed their hopes of understanding and cooperation.

I had a long interview with Anastase Mikoyan, Foreign Trade Commissar, in 1927. At that time Mikoyan said, "One of the best means to check all the falsehoods which are being spread against the Soviet Union by all its enemies is the maintenance of direct contact between American business men and the Soviet Union and their visiting our country, where they can see for themselves the vast possibilities for economic rapprochement between the two countries. This is especially true since there are no antagonistic interests and no direct cause for conflict involved.

"The experience of many Americans, who have visited this country for business purposes, has shown that upon their return to America they gave up their former prejudices against the Soviet Union and, while they did not hide the shortcomings which still exist in our economic structure, they none the less fully contradict all the assaults and calumnies spread broadcast against the Soviet Union.

"I believe that if representatives of our trade and industry will, on the other hand, visit America it will help us to better learn and know the achievements of American science and technique, as well as facilitate the establishment of normal trade and cultural relations with the United States, which will be beneficial to both countries."

This basic Soviet attitude has never wavered. Stalin, some years later, expressed it again. "We respect the efficiency Americans display in everything, in industry, in technology, in literature and in life . . . Their industrial methods and productive habits contain something of the democratic spirit. Our industrial leaders who have risen from the working class and who have been to America, immediately noticed this trait and they liked it."

It is no accident that interest in the United States among the Soviet citizens is so high that it cannot be satisfied. The government has not always been farsighted in the aspects of American life and culture presented to the people, but, despite this, the Russians have a better and broader understanding of us than

the citizens of any other non-English speaking country. The selection of American literature available in Russian published editions is representative and shows good taste.

In the past twenty-five years over 20 million books by English and American authors, translated into twenty different languages, have been published in the Soviet Union. The Russian edition of a book by an American author often sells more copies than the New York original. Jack London is the most popular American writer. Ten and a half million copies of his works, in 26 languages and 567 editions, have been published in the Soviet Union. Mark Twain is next in popularity. Millions of copies of Upton Sinclair's books have been published. Of the new writers Richard Wright and John Hersey are the most widely read. John Steinbeck's *The Moon is Down* was widely discussed while I was in Russia. The fact that John Dos Passos denounced Russia and Stalin in the United States has had no effect on the circulation of his books in the Soviet Union. His *Manhattan Transfer* seems to be in all the libraries. Among poets Edgar Allan Poe is popular, Longfellow is somewhat less read. Large editions of the works of Whitman and Edna St. Vincent Millay have been issued. Most reading Russians, and Russians are generally the most omnivorous readers I have ever seen, know some of the works of Theodore Dreiser, Pearl Buck, Hemingway, Louis Bromfield, Paul de Kruif, Sinclair Lewis, Lincoln Steffens, and James Fenimore Cooper.

Writing in English, though not plentiful, is much sought after. The study of the English language is now almost universal in Soviet schools. Ninth and Tenth grade students read Mark Twain and Jack London in the original. The large Central Library for Foreign Literature in Moscow has an excellent collection of American books and is open to everyone. American technical journals are highly valued in the Soviet Union. They are to be found in nearly every factory library and are read until worn to shreds.

The war brought Russian friendship for America to a new height. All Russians know of the large quantities of American supplies received in the Soviet Union. Practically all soldiers have had experience with these products and learned to value them highly. Russia fell in love with the American "jeep"—which was nicknamed "goat." If you ask a Russian soldier and civilian about American supplies, the person asked will immediately request that you convey thanks to the

American people and the President. If you press them for opinions they will admit that in some cases they prefer the Russian version of the product. American cane sugar was deeply appreciated, but it is not as sweet nor as good, the Russians think, as their beet sugar. Canned meat was criticized because most of the fat was removed. The Russians like fat. Sometimes the Russians were puzzled by American products—in one instance, I know, they boiled chewing gum in hopes of making it palatable. However, criticism came unwillingly. Gratitude was uppermost in their minds.

It should be pointed out here, although this has nothing to do with the Russian attitude, that it is easy for Americans to overestimate the amount of help given to the Soviet Union through Lend-Lease. The Allied deliveries of tanks, artillery, and aircraft, while needed, were insignificant compared to Russian production. One Soviet tank plant alone produced 35,000 tanks, several times the number supplied by the Allies during the war. Soviet artillery was entirely Russian, and reputed to be the equal of any in the world. Russian-made planes played the biggest part on the eastern front, although the Soviets did get 13,000 planes from the United States, about five per cent of our total production.

At the conclusion of the war Stalin had accounts published in the Russian press giving the complete details of the amount of supplies sent by the United States. On June 11, 1945 he sent the following message to President Truman, "On the day of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Soviet-American agreement on the principles to be applied to mutual assistance in the conduct of the war against aggression, I beg you and the United States government to accept this expression of gratitude from the Soviet Union and myself personally.

"This agreement on the basis of which the United States throughout the whole war in Europe, through Lend-Lease, has been supplying the Soviet Union with arms, strategic materials, and food, played an important part in and made a considerable contribution to the successful conclusion of the war against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany. I express my firm confidence that the friendly links between the Soviet Union and the United States have grown stronger during the common struggle and will continue to develop successfully to the benefit of our peoples and in the interests of stable collaboration among the freedom loving nations."

CHAPTER XIX

Propagandists for World War III

IN the light of our analysis, Stalin emerges as the chief realist among the many conflicting leaders in the Soviet Union. The anti-soviet liberals, the conservatives, the ex-Communists, the reactionaries, the Socialists, the Anarchists and the Trotskyites have been proved wrong. Stalin did not betray the Revolution. He did not become a "Bonaparte" of counter-revolution. He is not a despotic dictator like Hitler. He has encouraged cooperatives, trade unions, racial equality and economic democracy. One after another of the predictions of his opponents have proved false. They first said that the first Five Year Plan would fail; it was a great success. Then they said that the "forced" collectivization of the peasants would lead to disaster; actually in 1940 they marketed seventeen million more tons of grain than in 1913 under the Tsar. When the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht struck the Soviet Union with all the power at its command, these groups said it would be all over in a few months. Russia would be defeated. Actually no nation was more responsible for the defeat of Germany than the Soviet Union. Today she stands as the second most powerful country in the world.

The Soviet Union and Stalin are not infallible. It seems probable that Russia has been following too much a pattern of secretiveness and suspicion, inbred because of the history of world opposition ever since the birth of the Revolution. It is possible that Russia might have handled Finland with more finesse in the early stages of the World War. Russia may not be wholly free from criticism in wanting to extend her spheres of influence. Yet the negative factors must not be over-magnified. They must be weighed in relation to positive achievements. When this is done it has to be recognized that Stalin and the Soviet Union have forged ahead in spite of all obstacles and all shortcomings. History will record the final verdict.

We have seen that the second World War would never have occurred had we worked with the Soviet Union from the start instead of fighting her. Such men as Col. Raymond Robins of the American Red Cross, General Judson, Chief of the American Military Mission and Bruce Lockhart, the representative of Great Britain warned us at the time.

Armed intervention cost Great Britain alone to September 15, 1919, some five hundred million dollars and the Japanese nearly a billion yen for the maintenance of their troops in Siberia. These nations richly deserved their loss. Their aggression was deliberate. The victim of this unnecessary and criminal intervention by the Allied powers suffered the most. According to Russian estimates the damage totalled sixty billion dollars in property besides the death of some seven million people thru disease, starvation or the casualties of war. If to these costs we add those of the second World War—hundreds of billions of dollars of economic destruction, millions upon millions of lives—it is apparent that the 1918-1919 intervention of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest blunders in all human history.

Even after the initial mistake of sending troops to Russia and blockading her territory, we have already shown that the second World War might have been avoided had we listened to Foreign Commissar Litvinov, and opposed Japanese, Fascist and Nazi aggression when it began. Instead at each crucial period we were misled by false propaganda portraying the real enemy as the Soviet Union.

The heroic struggle of Russia against the Nazi invaders in the late War evoked the admiration of every honest patriot in the democratic world. General Douglas MacArthur, for instance, long a bitter opponent of Communism, Socialism or even the New

Deal, paid this tribute to the Red Army on Feb. 23, 1942:

"During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past. In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of the hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counterattack which is driving the enemy back to his own native land. The scale and grandeur of the effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history."

We reiterate surely we owe something to the Soviet Union for her effort in the cause of freedom for her country and for ours. Actually she lost fifty per cent more men than all the rest of the European allies combined and destroyed twenty times as many Germans. The destruction and damage in Russia is estimated to total 679 billion rubles. This includes the burning, looting or desecration of 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches, 237 Catholic churches, 69 chapels and 532 synagogues, the destruction of 31,850 industrial establishments, 40,000 miles of railway lines, 40,000 hospitals or medical institutions, 84,000 educational institutions, 43,000 libraries and the complete or partial destruction of 1,710 towns and over 70,000 villages.

Why is it that now that the war is over and we are safe from the octopus of Nazism ourselves, the same old propaganda against the Soviet Union and Communism has begun to spread like wildfire? It matters not that the stories are warped, grotesque, fantastic; thru subtle innuendo they convey impressions over the radio, on the lecture platform and in the press. Now one begins to hear whispers about "the coming war with Russia". Apparently the propagandists for World War III have begun their deadly work. Who and what are they? We can do no more than suggest a few groups letting those who object identify themselves.

1—Fascists and Nazis.

All the groups defeated in war hope for and some are working to make tensions and conflict between the victors. Consequently it is to the interest of every Nazi throughout the world to spread propaganda against the Soviet Union. Franco of Spain and his fascists make propagandizing against Russia their business. The defeated Japanese military clique know that if the United States could only become involved in a war with Russia, Japan could join "on the side of law and order". All these forces, their allies and lieutenants

thruout the world are ready to spread hostile propaganda at every available opportunity.

2—White Guard elements who fled from Russia at the time the Soviets took the power, or other political exiles hostile to Communism.

Collectively this group embraces hundreds of thousands. General Anders of Poland, for example, and some of his officers refuse to go back to Poland but never cease attacking Russia at every opportunity.

3—Everyone in any land who desires to perpetuate imperialism.

This group includes the economic imperialists and those who wish to perpetuate colonial exploitation. They fear that the Soviet Union is a threat to the old order. During the War many of these men were working secretly to prevent Russia from getting powerful in the Balkans or elsewhere. After the War, like Churchill of Great Britain, they proposed "ganging up" against Russia or "getting tough" with her.

4—All militarists anywhere who say that we should attack Russia now "while there is still time".

In the United States we have a generous assortment of these men. Some may be in the War Department. They believe that once friction with the Soviet Union has reached a certain point it is time to begin planning the strategy of war. So they are now doing this against the Soviet Union. America and Great Britain hold joint military staff conferences without Russian representation. The American military, not content with a huge pile of atomic bombs, continues to manufacture thousands more to the tune of five hundred million dollars a year. If the situation were reversed and the Russians were doing this we would consider that they were taking provocative action against us.

Another group belonging here are some admirals and generals who believe in arousing the people against a potential enemy in order that they may enact compulsory military training and secure large military appropriations. They believe if a red scare can be whipped up there will be more chance for money, power and better chances for advancement.

5—Reactionary champions of special privilege.

This group believes that if only the Soviet system can be totally smashed, the world will have escaped the dread danger of the "infection" of social ownership. These people were often violently antagonistic to President Roosevelt whom they characterized as an American version of Stalin. To them the New Deal

was a thinly disguised form of Leninism adapted to the psychology of the American voter.

6—Newspapers making for suspicion and hostility with Russia on the basis of false propaganda.

Some papers and syndicates are willing to take any gossip or rumor against Russia no matter how essentially absurd and blow it up to the proportions of a plot to destroy the world. It was this group that in the early days of the revolution took the completely false story of the nationalization of women and spread it around the world. Today they will maliciously spread the story that the Bolsheviks are looting American-owned factories in the Russian-occupied German sector. They omit to say that the Russians were authorized to take this property under the Potsdam agreement.

7—Propagandists ignorant or prejudiced against Russia, or who merely earn their bread and butter serving special privilege.

Raymond Swing is one of the best radio commentators in America, courageous, thoroughgoing and honest. The same cannot be said for every broadcaster. Some are propagandists in the pay of the special interests. The old saying that "he who pays the piper calls the tune" has a substantial measure of truth in it. For example, a reporter for the *Chicago Tribune* cannot long remain if he publicly supports Russia on the one hand or Roosevelt's New Deal on the other. Some writers went to Russia believing it utopia; disillusioned they swung to the other emotional extreme. The Soviet Union is worse than an American penitentiary, is one description.

8—Politicians who attack Russia to win votes by demagogic means.

Representative Dies was a good illustration of this group. He became so obsessed with hatred of Communism that on June 24, 1941, he declared, "Hitler will be in control of Russia in thirty days." Dies' campaign against American progressives failed in the end and, realizing defeat was inevitable, he finally did not even run for Congress. But any politician who attacks Russia and falsely calls his opponent a "Bolshevik" or "Fellow Traveller" falls within this category. Such men are helping to lay the foundation of World War III because they are spreading international falsehoods.

9—Sincere leaders or individuals who fall victims to the barrage of false propaganda and believe, as

did the interventionists following the last war, that the only solution is to fight Russia.

Time will tell who these people are. They will certainly not be men like ex-Ambassador Davies who have been in Russia and studied the outdoor facts impartially.

George H. Earle, former Governor of Pennsylvania and Minister to Belgium, speaking in the spring of 1946, declared the Soviet Union was "the greatest danger that ever threatened America". He promised to make "America realize what a frightful menace we have in Russia". He urged an ultimatum to the Soviet Union "to get back to her own territory, and if they refused I would use the atomic bomb on them while we have it and before they get it".

All of the above leaders and forces are contributing to the misunderstanding which imperils the peace. Many of them may be quite sincere and unconscious victims of the climate of hostile propaganda in print, over the air and on the screen. If it is reported that Russian agents have bribed someone in Canada in trying to secure atomic bomb secrets, a whole international propaganda mechanism may be set in motion to play it up. The incident is magnified out of all proportion to the realities. Joseph E. Davies, former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union correctly appraises the situation:

"Russia in self defence has every moral right to seek atomic bomb secrets through military espionage if excluded from such information by her former allies. Such exclusion is by inference hostile.

"For years all major powers have maintained intelligence services whose function it is to acquire military information available in other nations.

"If Russia had developed the atomic bomb and the United States were in her shoes, we certainly would try to obtain such information—especially if we faced a potentially hostile world.

"We can't have it both ways. Either we obtain full confidence and cooperation among the large nations or we shall find ourselves playing the old game of power politics."

Nothing that has been said implies that Russia is sacrosanct and cannot be criticized. Honest criticism based on the truth is essential. If Russian troops are slow about getting back from foreign soil it may be helpful to raise the issue provided the countries who make the objections are not doing the same thing

themselves. But those who go around complaining because Russia has recovered some of the territory which she lost at the close of the last world war, are not always looking facts squarely in the face. Take Estonia, for example. She used to belong to Russia and is now once more incorporated into the Union. Just suppose for a moment that Estonia were on Long Island accessible to a powerful Germany by land. Twice in a generation the small country had been used as a stepping stone to invasion by the German army. Does anyone for a moment believe that the United States would tolerate her independence?

There are positive forces making for friendship with the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt was such a good neighbor. As long as he was alive there was no danger of conflict with Russia. Wendell Wilkie, and Heywood Broun, the Catholic columnist, "being dead, yet speak" for international cooperation. Secretary Wallace, Eric Johnston, President of the American Chamber of Commerce, and Bromley Oxnam, President of the Federal Council of Churches, are realists about the possibilities of working with Russia. The rank and file of the American soldiers who fought in Germany are friendly to the Red Army. The American aviators who flew from Italy and Great Britain to bases in the heart of Russia, these men know the high qualities of the Russian people and will have no part or parcel in talk of war. Against these and a host of other friends, let us hope the tidal waves of false propaganda will break and recede. Yet let us not ignore the reality of the danger.

Some years ago I was staying in Washington, D. C., at a hotel where a Russian adventurer by the name of Krivitsky had committed suicide. He claimed to have been in the Soviet Secret Service and wrote sensational articles attacking Russia. At the time I talked with the Hotel Manager who had been the first to find his dead body. The dead man had left a note explaining his act as atonement for his "great sins". The manager assured me that there was not the slightest doubt the man had committed suicide. The F. B. I. was also convinced of this.

What was my amazement years later in 1946 to find someone had dragged up this old case, syndicated it all over America implying in contradiction to the facts that Krivitsky had been murdered by the Soviet Government. The newspaper account said, "he was found

murdered in a hotel in Washington, D. C. He had made the unforgiveable mistake of writing his memoirs for the *Saturday Evening Post*." Thus the truth is twisted to spread hatred of Russia.

Today we are faced with the same choice as at the end of the last war,—*one world of cooperation or World War III*. The Soviet Union is the largest land-mass in the world. It is almost three times as large as continental United States. From North to South it stretches 2,700 miles, from East to West it covers roughly 6,000 miles. United States potential manpower of military age is only a third of that of the Soviet Union. War with Russia would bring utter destruction and chaos. If the conflict comes, as we shall show in the next chapter, it is unlikely that Russia would be beaten. She would retreat mile by mile to the vast hinterland behind the Urals but never give in.

What we do now determines the future just as it did after the last war. Every one of those who advocated hatred and intervention against Russia then have been proved wrong. In fact, ultimately they brought on the war of 1939. Those who are directly or indirectly helping to bring about war with Russia now either do not know the facts or they are refusing to deal with the total world situation.

Russia does not want conflict. She desperately wants peace and will do all in her power to maintain a world of peace. The only desire of the Russian people is to rebuild their shattered territory, develop their natural resources and be happy and prosperous on a higher standard of living. They do not want to dominate the world but they do want equal rights in the world community. The Soviet Union has no colonies and believes that all those held by others should eventually be free. She does not want to dominate the trade of the world, on the contrary she wants to secure loans to purchase more and more goods from us. In her treatment of minority nationalities Russia has much to teach the rest of the world.

Any impartial student of Russia must reach the conclusion that her people want to live at peace. Will we work together in the neighborhood of nations and together build the one world of tomorrow or shall we follow the policy of suspicion, misunderstanding and hostility which will eventually set off the atomic explosion? The choice is being made now by what you and I, all of us, do and say.

CHAPTER XX

War or Peace with Russia?

IT WAS the unanimous opinion of a recent conference of lecturers on Russia that the question most often asked by American audiences was, "Will we fight Russia?" More recently the question has changed to, "When will we fight Russia?" There are not many who will say openly that they want this war, but there does appear to be a growing body of opinion, nurtured by the Hearst and McCormick press, that such a war is inevitable.

It is my belief, after painstaking study of the evidence, that the chances of such a war are remote. Although friction and disputes will occur, they are not likely to end in war in the near future. Most informed people see the issue before us. We can devote our scientific achievements and our major efforts to preventing war or we can burn up our energies and resources in preparing to fight. History points to the wisdom of the first alternative. The talk of war with Russia, since it is essentially unreal, only serves to make the task of achieving peace more difficult.

Some argue that Russia's communistic and the United States' capitalistic systems cannot live side by side. On our part it has always been American policy to recognize that the kind of economic system another nation has is not our concern. On their side the Russians believe in the possibility of the peaceful cooperation and co-existence of the capitalist and socialist systems. Their socialism (it is not communism, and never has been) does not interfere with our capitalism. Actually it is trying to copy our efficiency and methods. This necessitates huge purchases from our large corporations.

The most frequent cause of war is conflict of economic interest. That is not present here. Neither country is competing with the other to secure the trade of the world. On the contrary, Stalin told a U.S. Congressional Commission late in 1945 that he desires to purchase six billion dollars worth of American goods. He is willing to pay with manganese, platinum, lumber, furs, gold and such other raw materials as the United States desires. Thus Russia and the United States have every economic incentive to be friends.

The two countries have no conflict over territory. Neither wants any of the territory belonging to the other. Both want collective security and world peace. Neither the United States nor Russia went into World War II until they were attacked. As General Eisenhower has stated, Russia's foreign policy is dictated by one overwhelming desire—for security. She wants a chance to rebuild. A territory equal to the distance between New York and Tulsa, Oklahoma has been devastated by the enemy. Her cities have been destroyed, her factories blown up, her country districts laid waste. Russia wants peace, more peace and only peace. The American people also do not want any more wars. Our soldiers want to come home.

For all these reasons it seems most unlikely that there will be war between Russia and the United States. Some ask if Great Britain might not become involved in a war with Russia and drag the United States into the conflict. It can be said with assurance that neither the British Labor Party, now in power, nor the masses of the British people would tolerate such a war. As Professor Laski, Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the British Labor Party told me, the British Isles would be faced with wide-spread strikes and possible mutiny if an attempt were made to fight Russia.

Even if we make the far-fetched and unlikely assumption of a war between Russia and the Western democracies, the West could not conquer the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union could not conquer the West. It would be tragedy superimposed on futility.

A war against Russia is suicidal because a victorious outcome of an invasion of Russia is impossible. No country has ever been able to invade it successfully. Napoleon tried it and, even though he succeeded in taking Moscow, he lost the war and his empire. Hitler tried it. He thought he had the finest army of modern times. It had defeated the combined British and French armies with ease, yet Russia annihilated his armies.

It may be said that the Western powers now have the atomic bomb. But, when I was in Russia I knew

that her scientists were working on the problem of atomic energy. They have abundant supplies of uranium. It is conceded by the American experts that the secret cannot be kept more than a few years, if that.

Look at any map and note how difficult an invasion of the Soviet Union would be. Russia embraces one sixth of the land surface of the earth. It covers eight million square miles and has well nigh perfect defences in depth. Russia's armies can retreat thousands of miles and remain undefeated. Such a war of invasion could easily last for years—and Russia would last through it.

The U.S.S.R. could be defeated only if she were in the midst of widespread civil war, or if large sections of her population were so disaffected that they would welcome a foreign power. All the evidence goes to show that there is no such dissatisfaction within Russia. The Russian soldiers and civilians fought off the Nazi attack with unsurpassed determination and courage. The morale of this young nation, this young people, broke the *Wehrmacht*. Russian soldiers will fight in the face of certain death when their country is invaded. The Russians love their land with fanatic devotion.

The Soviet Union has three times the manpower of military age that the United States has. More than half the population is under twenty-five. Furthermore, this population is increasing twice as rapidly as that of America. The vitality of Russian youth is well known. I saw Col. Cutler, head of the Department of Surgery of Harvard University, shortly after he returned from the Red Army Front. He said, "I should hate to have my son fighting the Russians. They have better physiques, and can stand more hardship than our boys. Obviously they make better material for an army than our men."

In potential military power Russia is unbeatable on her home soil. She has the population, the material resources, the technology, and the economic-political organization to win a defensive war.

There is not a scintilla of evidence to show that Russia would want to invade either England or the United States at any conceivable future time. There is every reason why she would not want to. But, if one conjures up the fantasy of such an invasion, then it can be said with assurance that Russia would fail.

In the light of these facts it would be advisable for people to drop the futile and dangerous talk of war with Russia. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson

told me that "It is absolutely unthinkable that we should fight Russia. It would destroy both of us and would be the end of the road." That statement completely sums up the truth of the matter. If we don't want war we must find the way to peace. That requires understanding on both sides.

As a starting point, it is necessary to understand Russia's fierce, almost obsessive, desire for security—and it is Russia's pursuit of security which has caused most of the misunderstandings since World War II ended. It is impossible for the West to understand this desire of Russia's completely, because none has suffered as she has. The fifteen million Russian dead weigh heavily on the Russian mind. Russia knows the most terrible invasion in history. Let me give just one illustration—the Death Camp at Klooga which I visited in September 1944. This was the last prison camp the Germans held in Esthonia. The Red Army was advancing fast, and the Nazis had to decide whether to kill or leave the three thousand prisoners to be rescued; they chose mass murder.

When I went into the barracks everything was in the greatest confusion. Here under one bed was the body of a woman, next to her lay a small girl of about six, shot through the head. Other bodies lay in confusion on the beds and in the aisles.

Going out of this barrack I walked about a quarter of a mile to find five foundations for log crematories, each about thirty by twenty-five feet. Four had been burned, but one remained standing, thus I was able to see the construction. The logs had been raised a few feet from the ground and brush piled underneath. Prisoners were marched to the place and made to lie face down on the logs, then they were machine gunned. Afterwards birch logs were laid on the bodies and a new batch of prisoners marched on. After these had been killed, more logs were piled on, and more prisoners marched on. When the pile was high enough, the Nazis covered it with gasoline and set fire to it. The heat had been so intense in the center that all the bodies had been disintegrated, but on the periphery only the hair and clothes of the victims had been burned off. I counted over one hundred naked bodies still lying there. A mother with a small baby was among them.

As they had marched down to be killed, some of the stronger prisoners had broken through the ring of Nazis. The bodies lay where they had fallen, scattered

over a quarter of a mile radius. Here was one in a brook, the water gently swaying it back and forth. Here was another in a culvert, where the prisoner had tried to hide. Behind a tree there was another. I walked toward it. The Nazi guard had been so enraged that he had taken his bayonet and hacked the head off the bullet-riddled body.

This is only one tiny bit of what Russia suffered. Is it surprising that she wants, desperately, to make sure of having friends at her borders? No one can understand Soviet policy in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Balkans without having sensed Russian feeling that what happened once must never be allowed to happen again.

With that as a basis, understanding, and eventually true cooperation, can be built step by step. Russia is afflicted with certain "infantile diseases," to use a term coined by Lenin. One of these may be a tendency to exaggerated reverence for their outstanding leader, another may be the disease of conformity to accepted patterns of their orthodoxy. The West can cause these disorders to become more deeply ingrown, or can help to cure them. Our cooperation can help the Russians to broaden themselves.

Since America, if unemployment is to be prevented, needs markets and Russia, if devastated areas are to be restored needs goods, trade between the two is mutual aid. Economic relations beneficial to both nations are among the best foundations for friendship. Russian business was extremely helpful during the depression years. In 1931 she imported 90 per cent of the world export of tractors and took 55 per cent of the machine tools exported from the United States. In 1932 she imported 81 per cent of all machine tools exported from England and 74 per cent of those from Germany.

Exports to Russia from the United States in 1938 totalled \$69,691,000 and in 1939 came to \$56,023,000. These amounts could be greatly increased if we were to grant long term credits. Stalin would like to secure a credit of at least six billion dollars. The question which bothers Americans is, how could Russia pay this back? It would not be difficult if the United States were willing to accept Russian exports.

First of these could be gold. Russia could use up some of her gold holdings, now reported to be at the two billion dollar level. While the exact figures are not definitely known, it is thought that Russia is now

producing some 245 million dollars worth of gold annually.

Russia could also ship us crude glycerine, anthracite coal, copper, chrome, platinum, oil, lumber, manganese, flax, aluminum, tungsten, medicinal herbs, fish and caviar. Russia can also export manufactured goods to third countries which have a favorable balance with the United States. If the tariff on dressed furs were lowered, Russia could export only this more profitable kind and thus accumulate a larger favorable balance.

Finally there is the Bretton Woods plan, with its machinery for financing international trade. This will be a big help in expanding American-Soviet interchange. All of these factors make it seem not unreasonable that the United States could, with safety, extend a long term credit of several billions for the rebuilding of the Soviet Union.

In my interview with Stalin, I asked what he thought of opportunities for American capital in Russia. He replied, "In view of American technical skill and her abundant surplus capital, no country in the world is so well fitted to help Russia as America. Our Russian salaries and wages are low. The unsurpassed technique of America and the needs and tremendous population of Russia would yield large profits for America if they cooperated. If you ask American firms now doing business with us how they are treated, you will find that they have not been hampered, but are really making large profits . . . You can ask all Europe; and you will find that once Soviet Russia signs a pledge she keeps her bond."

More recently Stalin reiterated, "Soviet production of raw materials for export to the United States will adapt itself to what the U.S. requires. We can furnish any quantity you wish, if we can get the equipment to produce it. That is the reason we are interested in long term credits. We can get along without them, but it will be slower."

When Senator Claude Pepper saw Stalin not long ago he asked for a comment on American Soviet relations. Stalin replied, "In war our two countries have been held together by a common tie, the war against the common enemy. Now that we are again the victors and we are no longer bound together by that tie, we shall have to find other ties equally strong. That will not be easy, but as Christ said: 'Seek and ye shall find'".

The comradeship of war has brought the West into the closest contact with the Soviet Union. This contact should not be permitted to deteriorate. Lend-Lease built up a great reservoir of good will in Russia. I did not find any Russian who was not aware of our aid and who was not deeply grateful. The various Russian Relief societies have done incalculable good. Up to the end of 1945, the American Society for Russian War Relief alone delivered to the Soviet Union roughly fifty million dollars worth of supplies. How deeply the Russians appreciated this may be judged by the fact that Edward Carter, President of the American Society, and Fred Myers, Executive Director, both received the coveted award of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

Canadian Mutual Aid to the Soviet Union in the last year of the war amounted to \$97,633,000, over three times that of the previous year. Shipments included raw materials, foodstuffs, and munitions of war. After the epoch making defence of Stalingrad, Great Britain presented a memorial sword to that city. This was exhibited widely throughout Russia. Later, Toronto, Canada, proposed to Russian authorities that she act as "sister city" to Stalingrad and help in the reconstruction. York Mills, one of Toronto's suburbs, asked to have the same relationship with a corresponding suburb of Stalingrad. In 1945 Canada held a "Friendship With Russia" week. During this period, mammoth meetings were held, addressed by Russian delegates to the San Francisco Conference, and collections were made of clothing, money, and other articles for the reconstruction of Russia.

Quite another form of friendly cooperation, the first international radio championship chess match, was conducted in 1945, between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet team won a sweeping victory, losing only two matches out of twenty.

The exchange of labor delegations, student groups, athletic teams, musical artists, scientific and medical workers will create good will on both sides. In 1945 the Soviet Union celebrated the 220th anniversary of the founding of the Russian Academy of Science. They invited a delegation of twenty from Great Britain, nearly as many from the United States, and others from France, Canada, Poland, Hungary, Australia, Belgium, India, Sweden, Bulgaria and other countries. The delegates were entertained at government expense. They were taken to the best Soviet laboratories, and in

the course of the celebration an elaborate banquet was given them at the Kremlin with Generalissimo Stalin in attendance. The holding of this great scientific conference so soon after the war is additional evidence of the desire of the Soviet Union for greater international cooperation in all fields of human endeavor.

All these bridges of friendship can have an enormous effect on the peace. There can be no question that such exchanges help break down the isolation from which the Soviet Union has suffered. Unless such efforts are nullified by outdated power politics and narrow nationalism they should play a distinctive role in the peace.

A new world war will not be the result of a crisis thirty years from now. That war, or lasting peace, will develop naturally from the actions of the nations now. Are they willing to pay the price of a world of peace? The time of decision cannot be other than now. The time is short. Either we build one world or face catastrophe. No country can be safe unless all are safe.

We are living in a neighborhood world, part of the great world state of humanity whether we like it or not. World organization offers the sole possibility of peace and happiness.

At the moment it is popular to say that the atomic bomb will force us to make enduring peace. The Associated Press, for example, says, "We stand on the threshold of peace, ironically imposed on a mischievous world by fear of the most awful weapon ever devised."

This is a great fallacy. Wars never end through fear of terrible weapons of destruction. Chancellor McCracken of New York University, nearly a half century ago, said, "When military invention perfects the flying machine, to which Dr. Langley is devoting his time and energy, so that it is able to drop explosives of untold power upon any ship, then it seems to me the nations will receive a very strong impulse to the learning of war no more." He was mistaken. Wars have never been so terrible or devastating as they have become since the airplane was invented and perfected.

The hope for peace rests with international organization supported by an informed public opinion. One great obstacle in the way of cooperating with the Soviet Union in matters of common concern has often been the lack of an integrated, clearly defined American policy. Russia always has a clear policy. So does Great Britain. We sometimes drift along without well

defined ideas of what we want or how we intend to get it.

If the Big Five—China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—genuinely work together for justice among nations, we can build peace. Of course, old habits of trying to secure national special privileges at the expense of other nations are not dead. Great Britain wants to retain Hong Kong, France wants Indo China, the United States wants bases in the Pacific. As for Stalin, Western diplomats privately expressed great surprise at the modesty of his demands in the Far East. Unless workable solutions can be found for all these problems the atom bombs may catch up with all of us.

The problem of post-war security is not, by any means, one sided. Russia is as willing to cooperate with the Western nations as they are to cooperate with her. On the other hand, if we go out for seizure of strategic bases, spheres of economic interest desired by profit makers and political puppets, we will be in no position to protest similar action by others. America cannot afford to support a British anti-Russian program designed to protect British power and wealth.

We would be well advised to make the Security Council a genuine force for peace. We should place the secret of the atomic bomb under its control. Not to do so, is in effect saying that we do not trust the only organization in existence which has the slightest chance of saving the world from chaos and destruction. We would also be well advised to throw all major questions of world policy into the Security Council. If a Western Bloc is formed, in an attempt to isolate the Soviet Union, it may very well be that it will be the Western Bloc which will be isolated. For the Soviet Union, with her laws against racial discrimination and her enlightened treatment of minorities, will command the sympathies of colonial peoples throughout the world. The Soviet Union also, to many of the small nations, facing problems for which there is no "business as usual" answer, represents a protective tolerance to new ways in economic and social organization.

America and Great Britain must, of course, stand for the right as they see it, but it must be remembered that the Soviet Union has an equal claim to setting forth the right as she sees it. Our insistence on "the right way" must be within a framework of adjustment and understanding with the Soviet Union. No "holier than thou" attitude about Poland, Rumania, Austria,

Hungary and other "sore" spots will bring peace. It is quite possible that if we had lost fifteen million lives that we might be taking much the same stand as Russia has. On the other hand, if Russia had our historical background and our social order, she would probably be doing much as we do. Necessity challenges every civilized nation to step outside its habitual thought patterns in order to envisage the situation and temper of the other nations. The next decade can be merely another armed truce between wars. It can also be the period in which a warless world is won. The latter alternative is possible only if we learn to appreciate and respect the differences between nations. Then world government may really be possible.

In an address on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Soviet power, Stalin spoke very frankly:

"It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in the ideologies and social systems of the various countries that constitute the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility, and the expediency of joint action on the part of the members of this coalition against the common enemy who threatens to enslave them? Certainly not."

These words apply as well to an era of peace.

Again, in November 1944, Stalin said, "The peoples of the U.S.S.R. respect the rights and independence of the peoples of foreign countries and have always shown their readiness to live in peace and friendship with them. This should be regarded as the basis upon which the ties between our country and other freedom loving people are expanding and growing stronger.

"The Soviet people hate the German invaders not because they belong to a foreign nation, but because they have caused our people and all freedom-loving peoples incalculable misfortune and suffering. There is an old saying among our people: 'The wolf is not beaten because he is gray, but because he devours sheep' . . .

"The ideology of the equality of all races and nations which has become firmly established in our country, the ideology of friendship among nations, has achieved complete victory over the ideology of brutal nationalism and race hatred."

If the Russians and all other nations live up to this ideal, it is possible for mankind to build a world of law between nations. This is the only road to enduring peace.

CHAPTER XXI

True or False: A Summation

THERE is almost as much misinformation about Russia current today as at any time since the Revolution. This is particularly so in the United States. Often the truth is colored and distorted, consciously or unconsciously, by prejudice or merely a native American distrust of something different, something alien to our own way of life. I am not a "fellow traveller" nor one who glorifies the Soviet way at the expense of the American. Rather, what I have attempted in this book is to examine the Soviet way as a means of aiding in bringing about a better, more comprehensive understanding of the Soviet Union in this grim, postwar, atomic world.

Summing up, I am listing below some of the most familiar comments on Russia with brief remarks of my own which represent the truth as I see it.

1. *"Russia is preparing for war".*

In his 1946 May Day speech Stalin stressed the necessity for continued military preparation. In this he was only following the lead of America. We insist on a two ocean navy, the continued manufacture of atomic bombs at a cost of hundreds of millions, and our President insists on peace time military conscription. Stalin also underlined the demand of all peoples for peace. No disarmament is possible unless all nations disarm. Russia interpreted the offer at Paris by Secretary Byrnes, of a four power military alliance to guarantee the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany for twenty-five years as "a paper screen to conceal a retreat", as Tass, official news agency, put it. Mr. Byrnes had pledged, "No European nation need fear German resurgence." The Russians are not so sure. How can they tell what the attitude of a new administration in the United States might be? In any event, they are taking no chances.

2. *Russia is a menace to world peace.*

I have shown that there are no basic causes for conflict between the Soviet Union and the United

States. As for Britain, its people are overwhelmingly friendly towards Russia and the Russians. They are baffled by current American talk about war with Russia.

3. *Communists have never yet cooperated with anyone.*

General Deane, in charge of the United States Military Mission in Russia during the war testifies otherwise. It is a matter of record that Russia gave America three airplane bases in the heart of Russia. Gen. Eisenhower says: "Our liaison with Russia has always been as close and intimate as necessary to meet any situation at any particular moment. They have given me the information I desired willingly and cheerfully I am completely satisfied."

Cooperation will grow as fear and suspicion are removed. In international relations we must never forget that people molded by radically different environments will always have differences.

4. *Russia is aggressive and imperialistic.*

It is easy to dismiss Soviet actions thus, as the enemies of Russia are well aware, and we must be wary not to fall into such a trap. Again and again United States diplomats have been taken in by "Rightists" who are really Nazis at heart and are working for economic imperialism. Actually the keynote and the driving force behind Stalin's foreign policy is the desire for security. The Russians have paid dearly to defeat Hitler. They are determined that it shall not happen again if they can possibly help it. Russia is also unwilling to accept the old British, French and Dutch empires. She is opposed to the Colonial system. She champions the oppressed masses of common people.

5. *Russia has stamped out religion.*

This, of course, is not true and never has been. It is true that the Soviet Government endorsed the separation of church and state. In the early days of the Revolution the Communists were hostile

to the church. Today as we have shown, the Russian churches have the greatest opportunity they have ever had. Religious leaders abroad cannot afford to ignore the verdict of the Russian Greek Orthodox Church which is on the spot and knows the situation at first hand. Though it has suffered bitterly from the Revolution yet it is now favorable to the continuation of the Soviet system.

6. *Russia is suspicious of the western democracies.*

That is true and partly our own fault, but the causes of Soviet suspicion of us can and *must* be removed. A definite policy, firm to be sure, but friendly, on the part of Washington and London is the first step. Lack of a foreign policy based on peace through equal justice for all nations and all peoples on the part of the United States and Britain has probably done more than anything else to baffle international understanding and cooperation since the defeat of Hitler. That is why we must adopt a policy now—before it is too late. Stoyan Gavrilovic, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Assembly, summed it up thus: "Unhappily, there is a different background behind the Russian and the Anglo-Saxon peoples. We do not always see the same thing the same way, but each in our own way is essentially striving toward the same thing—peace and the wellbeing of our people."

7. *Russia is trying to divide Britain and the United States.*

Such ridiculous statements are parroted chiefly by the foes of Britain in the United States and vice versa. America should stand for justice, co-operating with whatever nation champions it.

8. *Churchill fears Russia.*

In his Missouri speech, the British war leader and present leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons gave enemies of Russia unexpected encouragement when he appeared to urge a virtual Anglo-American military alliance against the Soviet Union. People everywhere were disturbed and alarmed, for arch Tory though he be, Winston Churchill still exerts wide influence. Subsequently, however, in London he sounded a different and more reassuring note: "The supreme hope and the prime endeavor is to reach a good and faithful understanding with Soviet Russia through the agency and organization of the United Nations."

9. *Russia wants to dominate.*

The best answer to this comes from Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador and Russian delegate to the United Nations Security Council:

"The strengthening of the results of victory, the building of an enduring peace, are possible only if the relations between all sovereign peoples who have brought into being the United Nations organization are founded upon the principles of equality and mutual recognition of their interests. This goal cannot be achieved if any one country or group of countries, however strong its position may be, economically or in any other respect, tries to impose its will upon the other countries . . . In the past such attempts invariably met with failure. A striking example of this truth is offered by German fascism. Similar attempts in the future will be equally unsuccessful."

10. *Russia's dictatorship and public ownership hampers production.*

Russian factories are not as efficient as those in America but during the war they achieved real miracles of production. Russia's economy has no unemployment or depressions, therefore over the years her production has gone up while that of Great Britain and the United States has gone down, as one can see from the following statistics:

Production in the United Kingdom

	1913	1938
Coal	287	Decrease of 20%
Pig Iron	10.2	Decrease of 33%
Steel	7.6	Increase of 27%

Production in the United States

	1911-1915 average	1938
Coal	529	Decrease of 27%
Pig Iron	27.5	Decrease of 30%
Steel	28.4	Decrease of 0.3%

Production in the Soviet Union

	1913	1938
Coal	29	Increase of 358%
Pig Iron	4.2	Increase of 250%
Steel	4.2	Increase of 328%

11. *Russia hides behind an 'iron curtain'.*

In a deadly, all-out war and the mopping up that followed, the Soviets restricted foreign correspondents. Still American and British newspaper men were in Russia all through the war and travelled many thousands of miles over the country. Today the iron curtain is a myth. Russia will welcome anyone with a real reason for going there—except known or suspected enemies. Russian visas may still take time and trouble to obtain. So do American visas. Our government checks up just about as carefully on all seeking entry here. And with reason. Russian censorship, often very irksome, will, I predict, be modified when the West makes Russian fears and suspicions groundless.

12. *Russians refuse interviews to foreign correspondents.*

Ilya Ehrenburg, distinguished Soviet writer, answered this one himself at the Overseas Press Club during his recent visit. He conceded that Soviet officials avoid interviews with foreign correspondents, adding the explanation that it is not a question of discrimination or secrecy but merely of custom. Russians do not even give interviews to their own reporters.

13. *Foreigners rarely got to the Russian front in the war.*

This also is true. One reason was given by Ehrenburg. The Russians were extremely reluctant to run the risk of having any foreign correspondents or observers killed. Their battles were the bloodiest of all the fronts. Still as an American correspondent, I reached every front before the German dead were buried and Minsk while the fighting was still in progress.

14. *Russian censorship hides the truth.*

I am the first to acknowledge the real need for a radical revision of Soviet censorship policy. I am opposed to censorship everywhere. But it must be remembered that falsehoods, forgeries, and black propaganda about Russia have been deliberately circulated all over the world. Soviet restrictions are directly related to their suspicions of the rest of us. On the other hand, strict as the Russian censorship is, the oft-heard charge that all foreign observers see only what the Russians want them to see is an absolute untruth.

15. *The Russians are as ruthless as the Nazis.*

Russians gave stern treatment to the Nazis, when the tables finally were turned. That was only to be expected, considering all the Russians suffered under the iron heel of Hitler. But Russian reprisals were assuredly nothing in comparison to what the Nazis did to Soviet soldiers and innocent civilians. As for the purges, they were ruthless, but the Russians believe they eliminated quislings or fifth columnists during the war.

16. *Stalin is losing his grip and may be ousted.*

Such rumors and gossip have no foundation in fact. Quite the opposite is actually the case. Stalin's popularity is higher today than ever before. He is riding on the crest of the wave and there is no likelihood of anyone superseding him so long as he lives.

One final word. *Understanding is the price of friendship and friendship is the only road to enduring peace. Let us take the time and effort to understand the Soviet Union.*

SOVIET CARTOONS LAMPOON THE SOVIET



"Why doesn't he receive anyone? Today is his receiving day."

"He has this kind of receiving day: He receives no one so everyone will know how important he is."



"How did you get your ticket?"

"In the restaurant. I took the ticket seller there three successive days."



Old Man: "Citizen, give your seat to that woman."

Young Man: "Calm yourself! She's my wife."

SOVIET JIBES



"No wonder Pete's our ploughing champion. He turned up three acres with his feet during that last dance, and now he's on his fourth."



"When you see the sweetstall, Lydia, start howling. I'll back you up."



THE NEW SUIT: The advertisement

. . . and when worn

To The Reader
of
BEHIND SOVIET POWER

When Ilya Ehrenburg, brilliant Russian author and war correspondent, left for Moscow after a two months' tour of the United States, newspapers published a farewell message to America that Mr. Ehrenburg had written for The United Press. Next day *The New York Herald Tribune* devoted its leading editorial to Mr. Ehrenburg's message, which it described as "an extraordinarily moving and significant document. In fact, it may well be termed the most hopeful manifestation of a troubled time, a model of the sort of frank interchange of view that contains the only sound promise for future relations between Russia and the United States."

Although this book was already being printed, arrangements were made to include on the following pages this vital and compelling message by Mr. Ehrenburg, highest decorated civilian in Russia and correspondent for the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*.

Message To Americans

By ILYA EHRENBURG

In a few hours I shall leave the United States for Europe. I have spent here two months, and I am happy that my American colleagues had invited me. In my lifetime I had seen a great many things, but one cannot understand the world and humanity without having seen America. This is a great and complex country. I shall long linger over the empty sheet of paper before deciding to write down anything pertinent (translator's note: textually "responsible") concerning America. It is easy to sing her praise, it is not difficult to be satirical about her, but the most difficult is to understand her.

In Paris, all houses are six floors high. There are no one-floor houses, no skyscrapers. In France, there are many superb painters. You find there all the colors you want. In America, the writers and musicians are stronger than the painters; here the light swallows the color. Here everything is black or white. In New York, I saw a box of cigars that cost \$200. One can finish them within a few days. In the Mississippi Delta I saw a family of eight members who earned \$200 a year. The writers of the whole world are charmed with the books of Hemingway or Faulkner, but when you enter an ordinary movie house on "Main Street" to see an ordinary picture, your head will turn over the depths and the immensity of its platitude.

I have seen in the United States many idealists, men who dream of the happiness of the whole humanity, and I have seen in America men who are real slave drivers, but for the whip. I have seen magnificent universities, wonderful laboratories, museums, of which old Europe might be envious, and I have seen luncheons, organized by the Lions' Club, where full grown men, merchants of suspenders or of electric ranges, imitating lions, roared upon command. Complex country, great country, with a great people and a great future.

In Jackson, Miss., I once asked for a glass of wine. I was told: "It's prohibited." One advised me to drive into the neighboring state. When our car reached the border of the two states, we were summoned to pay \$1.50 for the right to cross the bridge—it was a private bridge. The explanation given to me was: "We respect private rights." On some occasions the government or the state are all-powerful, on other occasions the government or the state are powerless.

I would not have thought of mentioning it now, if the American newspapers were not always contrasting the freedom prevailing in America with the lack of freedom in Russia. I have been in the State of Tennessee. There the teaching of Darwinism is prohibited. In our country, anti-Semitic propaganda is prohibited. What is better: to prohibit the theory of evolution or the practice of the counter-revolution?

I remember how the American newspapers were roused to indignation at the fact that, in the elections in Yugoslavia, people who had compromised themselves by collaboration with the occupants were deprived of their right to vote. I have been in the State of Mississippi, where half of the population were deprived of their right to vote. What is better: to deprive of the right to vote a man who has a black conscience or one who has a black complexion?

I have seen in America many magnificent things: thousands of small things that make life agreeable, and the fairy-like sight of New York, and the factories of Detroit, and the powerful Tennessee works, and the splendid highways, and the high material standard of life. But the most beautiful thing I have seen are the spiritual possibilities of the American people. This people is young and some times it reminds one of an adolescent. It already has realized magnificent technical achievements, and I am convinced that it will create a high human culture. It possesses a real intelligence. It has many high qualities: it is straightforward and daring, industrious and energetic. It goes forward, not on a straight path, often it loses its path, it makes loops, but it always advances on its road and this is encouraging for us: the people will help humanity to force its way to happiness.

I have seen in America many things I like and many things I do not like. When I return home, I shall endeavor to speak seriously of all this. I do not take offense with those Americans who criticize us.

I do take offense with those Americans who slander us. During these two months, I have read a pack of fantastic stories about my person. Since they could make up so many stories about me, it is easy to understand all they invent about Russia. For Russia is far away.

One says, they make up stories because the Russians allegedly do not admit Americans into their country. By the way, I know a great many American journalists in Moscow. There are among them conscientious men, and others who are not. There are journalists who inform and journalists who misinform. Some of them speak of restriction of freedom and complain that, when they travelled in the country (during the war), representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied them. When I travelled through the United States, I also was accompanied by a representative of the State Department, and I not only do not complain about restriction of freedom, but am sincerely thankful for the attention shown me.

It is evidently not so much a matter of a different attitude of the authorities with regard to the journalists as a different attitude of the journalists toward the government and the people whose guests they are. I came to the United States as a friend and tried to see and understand. But among the American journalists who had come to Moscow, there were obvious enemies who knew what they would write, even before they crossed the border.

I am dwelling on the press because I am deeply saddened by its attitude. Great and serious papers are thrashing their readers with false information on Russia, they stir up every conflict, trying to convince the people that war between our two countries is possible. I want to shout: No, this war is impossible! The soldiers of the Rhine, and the soldiers of the Elbe, the heroes who fell in Stalingrad and the heroes who gave their lives in Normandy, are guarantee of it.

During the two months I have spent in this country the anti-Soviet campaign has grown in intensity, and I would have left in anger if my acquaintance with America had been limited to the press alone. But I have seen not only the newspapers. I also have seen their readers. I know that the American people do not want war, that they remember Stalingrad, that they have no bad feeling toward the Soviet people.

Why should we quarrel, two huge countries, two great and noble countries? Are there really so sharp contradictions in our interests? No. Nothing separates us but the curtain of fog drawn by the slanderers who are preparing the third world war.

The press campaign is dangerous not because the American reader is stupid. Almost in all cases he is more intelligent than the newspaper he reads. With paper articles you will not deceive him. But how should he know what is going on in Russia? He does not know that we are reconstructing the ruined cities, that we are tending the orphans and that we are cherishing the peace. He begins to ask himself: maybe the Russians have some scheme against America, against culture, against peace?

In the meantime, it is not we who deliver warlike speeches on the shores of various rivers. It is not we who ostentatiously rattle with the secret weapon. I want to tell my American friends: be more cautious—bombs, even if they are not atomic, are bad toys. You cannot play with them; they explode unexpectedly!

We are hated because we hate Fascism. We hate the war, the cult of brutal force, the haughtiness of a people or of a race that deems itself higher than another. Alas, Fascism has not been buried under the Reichstag building and Fascism is not a German monopoly. One has learned to prepare a field for it in other countries. Of course, it is a disguised, a well groomed and a good-looking Fascism, and those who dream of the "taming" of the Soviet Union should share their royalties with Hitler's successors.

In the fall of 1942, when Stalingrad was in the throes of death, before the landings in Africa, I took leave in Moscow from my friend Leland Stowe. He asked me: "When and where shall we meet again?" I answered: "I do not know when, but I know where—in Berlin."

We met again on the ruins of Nazi Germany. Now taking leave from my American friends, I want to say: I don't know when our peoples will be able to shake hands peacefully, when inept and criminal speeches about a third world war will stop, when we shall again meet, like brothers. I do not know when, but I know where—on the ruins of the Fascist ideology. I want to believe that this will be soon, that the American people will tame its rabble rousers, its Fascists, the men who dream of a crusade against Moscow, and with love I tell America: Thanks for the friendly reception, for the tenderness, for the cordial straightforwardness, thanks and goodbye!

SOVIET CARTOONISTS LOOK AT WAR AND PEACE



SECRET OF PRODUCTION

(Baby carriage is labelled atomic energy)
"How do you suppose that child is fed?"
"In a strictly secret place."




STREET ACCIDENT IN SAN FRANCISCO

Reporter writes: "The conference took place without accomplishing anything."
Caption: "Serious accident with a Hearst reporter."



LIGHT FROM THE EAST

(Authors freed include Shakespeare, Heine, Goethe, Tolstoy)
Russian Soldier: "You are free, friends!"



FINISH OFF THE BEAST IN HIS OWN LAIR!

By Kukrynikay
(Courtesy National Council of American-Soviet Friendship)